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Preface  Prologue 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) the most written about 20
th
 century philosopher has been my 
philosophical guide up the mountains of German philosophers as reflected in these writings.  I 
owe him a profound debt – absolutely.  
G.W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) was general negative about the concept of putting a “preface” in a 
book.  Hegel in his own “Preface” to Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts, 1820) made an interesting point with regard to the general idea of what 
is a ‘preface’. Hegel’s published remarks at end of his ‘preface’ are:  
 
“But it is time to close this preface. As a preface it is its place to speak only externally and 
subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces. A philosophical account of the 
essential content needs a scientific and objective treatment. So, too, criticisms, other than those 
which proceed from such a treatment, must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions. 
Such subjective criticisms must be for him a matter of indifference.” Dated: Berlin, June 25th, 
1820. 
G.W.F. Hegel wrote in his History of Philosophy (1805-1806), that “Schelling completed his 
philosophical education in public. The list of his philosophical writings is simultaneously the 
history of his philosophical education.”  Although I am surely not in F.W.J. Schelling’s (1775-
1854) league, I grant it that this group of writing is also a process of my own self-education in 
the fine art of philosophizing.  I assume there are mistakes and mis-steps. This is inherently part 
of our philosophical process.  Indeed there is some duplication as well – please disregard any of 
these unessential issues.  
There has been considerable time and effort involved in years of writing these essays. Hegel in 
the preface to the Science of Logic, makes note that. “Anyone who in our times labors at erecting 
anew an independent edifice of philosophical sciences may be reminded, thinking of how Plato 
expounded his, of the story that he reworked his Republic seven times over. The reminder of this, 
any comparison, such as may seem implied in it, should only serve to incite ever stronger the 
wish that for a work which, as belonging to the modern world, is confronted by a profounder 
principle, a more difficult subject matter and a material of greater compass, the unfettered leisure 
had been afforded of reworking it seven and seventy times over”. (Science of Logic, preface, 
21:20, p 21. Dated: Berlin, November 7, 1831).  These essays were reworked and rethought at 
the time of writing them; but have not been rewritten in toto when brought together in October, 
2011. Many of these writings have appeared on different web sites over time and have not been 
redone for the present collection.  Dated: October 14, 2011. Mount Pleasant, Michigan, U.S.A. 
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Heidegger and the Purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
 
 
'The most beautiful part of it is that I am beginning actually to love Kant. I am grateful that fate 
has kept me from spoiling Kant and Hegel with any one of those pairs of glasses available on the 
market today. I think I can sense the world spirit in the presence of both.' Heidegger's letter to 
Karl Jaspers December 1925. (Genesis of Being and Time. T. Kisiel, p. 409). 
'Kantbook, an attempt to question what had not been said, instead of writing in a fixed way about 
what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, what has not been said is filled with riches.' 
(Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, p.175). 
'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is among those philosophical works which, as long as there is 
philosophy on this earth at all, daily become inexhaustible anew. It is one of those works that 
have already pronounced judgment over every future attempt to "overcome" them by only 
passing them by.' (What is a thing, p. 61, 1935-36).  
 
Abstract  
What is Kant up to with the Critique of Pure Reason? 
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) is one of the primary works in all of 
philosophy; however, it is complex and difficult to understand. Martin Heidegger, through his 
reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason comes to an understanding of five misinterpretations 
of the purpose of the Critique: 1) Metaphysical misunderstanding (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel); 2) 
Epistemological misunderstanding, Marburg Neo-Kantianism; 3) Psychological 
misunderstanding (L. Nelson, J. Fries), Gottingen Neo-Kantianism; 4) Combination - 
metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological; and 5) Philology misunderstanding (H. 
Vaihinger). This is also part of Heidegger's general attack on the Neo-Kantians and E. Husserl's 
Phenomenology. Heidegger, through his own unique way of reading other philosophers, has a 
radical view of the Critique of Pure Reason as ontology. Kant says in a letter that the Critique is 
a "metaphysics of metaphysics." Heidegger sees this as laying the foundations of metaphysics as 
ontology. He sees Kant as a precursor to Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology of Dasein as 
was carried out in his work -- Being and Time (1927). Is the purpose of the infamous Critique 
ontology? Is Heidegger's interpretation of Kant too violent and extreme? What does Kant really 
say is the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason?  
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Introduction  
Numerous publications show Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) as the most published philosopher 
and thinker of the twentieth century. Heidegger's writing has sparked many people to write about 
him (for and against). He is the most written about twentieth-century philosopher. This has been 
called the Heidegger industry.  
Now at the end of our millennium, it is time to review what has happened in the twentieth 
century in thinking. Heidegger's first major publication was Being and Time in 1927, and it is his 
most famous work. His collected writings (Gesamtausgabe) has grown to ninety volumes and is 
still growing. Most of these are lectures he gave to specific groups or are extensive lecture notes 
that were first read to students at the Universities of Freiburg and/or Marburg.  
Clearly Heidegger is an ontologist. This is an important point to understand what Heidegger is 
doing. The question of the meaning of Being is his fundamental question in Being and Time and 
remained his primary matter for thought. In his work on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
(GA3   lecture 1930)  Heidegger says  “ . . . the inner necessities of the first and last problem of 
philosophy - the question of Being" and he continues, "I have been concerned with renewing the 
question of ontology - the most central problem of Western Philosophy - the question of Being . 
. ." (p.13) 
Additional Heidegger says, 
"We assert now that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (GA24, 1927 lecture), p11). "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual 
interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological." 
(Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, lecture 1927), p.11).  
Let us be clear; Heidegger is not going to read Kant's Critique to understand Kant's ethics or 
logic -- Heidegger is going to be looking at only ontological issues; the basic matter for thought 
is Being and ontology.  
So here I will look at Heidegger's methodology, then his attack on Neo-Kantians, and finally his 
interpretation of the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.  
After this analysis I will offer my own Kant interpretation based a friendly reading of Kant's 
works. Heidegger pushes us to do what he has done - read Kant or whoever, and then engage 
them and think with them their thoughts. So, instead of following Heidegger on all the details of 
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his works on Kant, I have given up on the details and launch into Kant's works to find Kant's 
vision and purpose of Critique of Pure Reason. I ask you as well, you can read my selections of 
Kant and try to determine what you think Kant is up to, or, you can read Kant's works your self. 
Remember what Wittgenstein said, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the 
trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own." Both 
Heidegger and I agree with Wittgenstein, perhaps after reading this article you will decide to 
engage and think with Kant yourself.  
Heidegger's encounter Methodology  
What is Heidegger's methodology? 
What is the methodology of a dialogue between thinkers?  
Heidegger has a fresh way of reading and thinking 'with' other philosophers and poets. He is not 
interested in just what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, where they got 
stuck, and how Heidegger then tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to have 
a dialogue. Heidegger is alive to the hermeneutics of the text. Part of the methodology he used in 
Being and Time was hermeneutics, and he is responsible for rekindling this methodology in the 
twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time he says, "Phenomenology of 
human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word . . ." 
Hermeneutics of Kant's texts is a part of his methodology. We will see if it is true to Kant's texts 
or Heidegger's interjections.  
Heidegger approvingly quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): "If you want to honor a 
philosopher, you must catch him where he had not yet gone forth to the consequences, in his 
fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (Of Human 
Freedom. 1809. E.T. p.9). Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid 
in what he says." In another article Heidegger says, "We show respect for a thinker only when 
we think. T his demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." (The 
Word of Nietzsche, p. 99). Heidegger wants to think everything that Kant thought, but in his own 
way and in his own time in history.  
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) says:  
‘One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. Now I bid you lose me 
and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you. Verily, my 
brothers, with a different eyes shall I then seek my lost ones; with a different love shall I then 
love you’.  (Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 1883-5). 
In reading Kant, Heidegger found himself. To be exact, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical 
interpretation. This reading has more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of 
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metaphysics than with understanding Kant's own project. Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant in 
himself' is to be left to Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics, ET p.175). 
Heidegger says in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "Kant - - 
people refuse to see the problem and speak rather of my arbitrarily reading my own views into 
Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ET p147). Has Heidegger really found Kant or only his 
own views in Kant? Did Heidegger only look into the mirror and find himself? Where do we see 
only ourselves? How can we translate between Kant  Heidegger’s dialogue, and ourselves with 
Kant? Perhaps what we can read in Kant and Heidegger is only what we already know - shades 
of Nietzsche.  
In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
says, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation 
of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx) 
And then Heidegger goes on to talk about "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers" and "In a 
dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent." 
(Kant and problem of Metaphysics, p. xx). So he sees this problem himself. But I think that is 
part of the difference between Heidegger's encounters with other thinkers in a dialogue and the 
presentation of philosophical positions, which tries to be philosophy. Heidegger is not making 
claims and counterclaims. He is not looking for proofs. Aristotle says in Book IV of the 
Metaphysics (1006a), "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for 
a proof, and when this is not necessary." 
Heidegger is reading into Kant what he wants to hear from Kant. What is the best possible 
reading of Kant that Heidegger would like to see in Kant? Kant is a great thinker and he is doing 
the same thing as Heidegger, but Heidegger's thinking is clearer than Kant. Kant had the right 
questions (about Being) and had some of the answers, but was not as clear as Heidegger. 
Therefore, for Heidegger, Kant is an important precursor to Heidegger's position. Note: this is 
said of Heidegger only in the 1920s. 
Although Heidegger learned a lot from Kant and in Being and Time he is full of praise for Kant, 
nevertheless, in the later Heidegger - Heidegger must place Kant back into traditional 
metaphysics. At a later stage in Heidegger thinking, his Metahistorical approach takes over and 
Kant rejoins history as a metaphysician. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics was for 
Heidegger the first book length analysis of a philosopher like Kant and one who was very close 
to his thinking at the time. So, he is still working out his destructuring methodology. Heidegger 
at this time is working through the destruction of metaphysics, and he has the task of reducing 
and overcoming metaphysics. Although in 1929 he was not very clear about how his destruction 
project would work out and what the entire outline would look like when it was finished, this 
became clear for Heidegger in 1930s. 
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This was an important part of Being and Time that did not get published in 1927, and in fact most 
of Heidegger later works deals with the history of ontology. But it all started in Being and Time. 
For example, Heidegger wrote in the section on the Task of a Destructuring of the History of 
Ontology. (Introduction II, E.T. p. 17). "The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially 
belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a 
formulation." (E.T. p. 20). 
One of his lectures during this time (1927) Heidegger has a concise statement about the 
importance of the destruction and has remarks about his phenomenological method as well.  
"These three basic components of phenomenological method - reduction, construction, 
destruction - belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual 
pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing 
of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this not a 
negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies 
precisely a positive appropriation of tradition." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p.23).  
This notes the methodology and intentions but not the content or the results of the process. The 
later Heidegger had the results of the appropriation of the philosophical tradition. This became 
his history of Being as metaphysics.  
We need to return back to Heidegger's method. A philosophical study of Heidegger and Kant 
makes a striking claim on Heidegger's methodology.  
Charles Sherover states: 
"It is thus irrelevant to object that Kant is being approached from a new context, subjected to 
possibly strange criteria or that novel implications are seen in what he had worked out. The task 
of a retrieve is not to chronicle the past but to wrest out of it a deeper comprehension of our 
present situation and the possibilities for development it yet offers. The real question is whether 
significant philosophic insights emerge, or new directions for philosophic development are 
brought forth, from such an encounter between two thinkers." (Heidegger, Kant and Time, pp. 
12-13.)  
In other words, who cares what Kant wrote and thought - just try everything. So, at least for 
Heidegger he will go where Kant takes the philosopher Heidegger. In other words, Heidegger is 
not considering what others think and how close or true he is to the real Kant. This is a no-holds- 
barred free-for-all in the domain of thinking, to wrest out new understandings, to push new 
possibilities.  
Finally let us look back to what Kant himself thought: 
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Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), paragraph - A314. 
"I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in 
ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even 
better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and 
hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention." Kant said this.  
Therefore, to give Kant the last word on the Heideggerian methodology of a dialogue between 
thinkers -- Heidegger can try to understand Kant better than he understood himself and still be 
Kantian. Kant has understood the problem of how to dialogue with other thinkers. For more of 
Kant, than please read Heidegger's Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. However, if you want more Heidegger read Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. 
Nevertheless, Kant is still usurped by the Heideggerian questioning; it is Heidegger's matter for 
thought first, and Kant is somewhere in the background. 
Our question remains - does this help illuminate Kant's problematic? 
The Five Misinterpretations of the Purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason 
Heidegger attacks the opposition. Although he makes critical attacks against the Neo-Kantians in 
several of his works on Kant, the clearest is in Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique 
of Pure Reason (based on his lecture course at the University of Marburg in 1927-28, E.T. P. 50-
51 (GA25).  
He outlines five misinterpretations: 
1) Metaphysical misunderstanding 
(Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) 
This is the absolutizing of reason, the absolute I. 
2) Epistemological misunderstanding 
Marburg Neo-Kantianism  
This started in the 1860s.  
The Critique is giving a theory of knowledge of mathematical nature science. 
 
3) Psychological misunderstanding  
Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) and Jakob Fries (1773-1843) 
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Gottingen Neo-Kantianism 
Since this is a theory of knowledge and knowledge is a psychic process, then 
the Critique is doing some kind of psychology.  
 
4) Combination - metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological 
In addition, we can add this number 5. 
5) Philology 
Hans Vaihinger's (1862-1933) commentary on the first 70 pages of the Critique itself is 1066 
pages. 
 
This of course looks like T. K. Oesterreich's (1880-1949) first survey of Neo-Kantianism. 
His seven positions or approaches to Neo-Kantianism are: 
1) physiological (H. Helmholtz, F. Lange)  
2) metaphysical (Otto Liebmann, J. Volkelt) 
3) realist (A. Riehl) 
4) logicalist (H. Cohen, P. Natorp, E. Cassirer - Marburg School) 
5) value-theoretical criticalism, axiological (W. Windelband, H. Rickert, H. Munsterberg, Baden 
School) Perhaps Max Scheler and B. Bauch.  
6) relativist remodeling of criticalism (G. Simmel) 
7) psychological remodeling deriving from J. Fries (neo-Friesian school, L. Nelson) 
The history of Neo-Kantianism is long and complex. Most of their works are available only in 
German. Studies have examined Neo-Kantianism in the context of historical and sociological 
events of the time. According to Thomas Willey, "The Neo-Kantian movement was the work of 
middle-class professors, a few of whom took an active interest in politics and social reform. Neo-
Kantianism emerged in the late 1850s and early 1860s, achieved academic supremacy in the 
1890s, and rapidly lost its academic preeminence (but not its entire following) after 1914."  
The philosophical context is that Neo-Kantianism is basically a rejection and an overcoming of 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and his followers. Karl Marx (1818-1883), Soren Kierkegaard (1813-
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1855), and Neo-Kantians have this point in common. The movement against Hegel shaped most 
of the philosophical thinking in 1800s. A Hegelian, Rudolf Lotze (1817-1881) and his Kantian 
critique of Hegel is sometimes credited with the being the forerunner of the Neo-Kantian 
movement.  
The following section is an overview of the Neo-Kantian movement in the context of the rise of 
epistemology at center stage of the Kantian philosophy. 
E. Zeller in 1862 accepted the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg and was the first to issue the cry 
of "Back to Kant" in his inaugural address, Uber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie 
(1887, p.433). But it was Otto Liebmann in Kant und die Epigonen (1865) who ended every 
chapter of his book with the chant "Thus Back to Kant, in German “Zurück nach Kant!”.  
The important point for the discussion here is the rise of the Neo-Kantianism of 
'Erkenntnistheorie' or theory of knowledge, or, in general, epistemology (the question of Ding-
an-sich (thing-in-itself) is a controversial area of the Neo-Kantians, but not for our focus). The 
Neo-Kantians thought in general that the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is to develop a 
theory of knowledge. Although Kant never used the expression 'Erkenntnistheorie', nevertheless, 
the import of that term has become entangled with the general movement of Neo-Kantianism. 
Friedrich Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was the main push behind the neo-Kantians' understanding 
of philosophy as epistemology and the interpretation of the Critique as a major work on the 
theory of knowledge. Friedrich Schleiermacher's (1768-1834) lectures on Dialektik (1811, 
published 1839) may have been the beginning of this new form of epistemology, but it was 
Trendelenburg and the Neo-Kantians who saw the force of this idea and made epistemology the 
central interpretation of the Critique. In recent times the neokantians.com group carried on this 
project.  
In fact, the Neo-Kantians wanted to use Kant to overcome and bring about a renunciation of 
German idealism in general by use of philosophy, that is, metaphysics as usurped by theory of 
knowledge. Therefore, they took Kant as working through the destruction of metaphysics in 
general. The return to Kant was guided by the need to find a philosophical foundation (read 
epistemology) for the positivistic concept of science. So, instead of thinking that Kant is refuting 
dogmatic metaphysics, they took it to be the case that he refuted all metaphysics. Neo-Kantians 
were against romanticism and Hegel. Metaphysics had to be tied to natural "science" in the sense 
that "science" is used today (not the German Wissenschaft). Philosophy was not to be as scientia 
scientiarum, but perhaps they could do the epistemology for this new "science," almost 
scientism. They reject any a prior metaphysics or morality. This was clearly contrary to Kant's 
own intentions.  
Heidegger wants ontology to be central, that is, not logic or epistemology, not even metaphysics 
in any form. Thus, Kant has to be doing ontology for Heidegger position.  
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Heidegger, in his essay Overcoming Metaphysics (1936-1946), says the following about theory 
of knowledge. "'Epistemology' is the title for the increasing, essential powerlessness of modern 
metaphysics to know its own essence and the ground of that essence . . . The mere reverse side of 
the empirical-positivistic misinterpretation of epistemology shows itself in the growing 
dominance of logistics." (E.T. p.89) 
Heidegger says in Kant and the problem of metaphysics, "The Critique of Pure Reason has 
nothing to do with a 'theory of knowledge' (Erkenntnistheorie)" (E.T. p 11 ). Husserl writes in 
the margin of his book at this point "nothing?" This is an astonishing thought.  
In his work on Leibniz, Heidegger says the following about Neo-Kantians and epistemology: "It 
is crucial for understanding the Kantian concept of reality. Simple uncertainty about those 
connections misled the entire neo-Kantian interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason into a 
misguided search for an epistemology in Kant." Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im 
Ausgang von Leibniz, 1928 (GA 26). (The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, E.T. p 65). 
Heidegger says else where, "The interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as 
epistemology completely misses the true meaning." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p. 
128). 
Neo-Kantians are against Hegel, irrationalism, and speculative naturalism, and they want a return 
to "SCIENCE." Somehow the Neo-Kantians had to come up with answers that were not 
relativism, subjectivism, historicism or nihilism. The Neo-Kantians still had to help us with our 
general Cartesian anxiety over our fundamental foundations or as Kant said, his "metaphysics of 
metaphysics."  
Heidegger's background comes from the Neo-Kantians. In 1913 he did his doctoral examination 
under Schneider with Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) co-examining. The Dissertation was entitled 
"The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism." Rickert was a famous Neo-Kantian, and he was a 
student of Wilhelm Windelband, (1848-1915), who was a student of Rudolf Lotze (1817-1881). 
Rickert's other important student at the time was Emil Lask, who influenced the early Heidegger. 
Heidegger's teacher E. Husserl was a student of Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who was a student 
of F. Trendelenburg (a Neo-Kantian). Heidegger gave an earlier lecture course entitled 
"Phenomenology and Transcendental Value-Philosophy" (1919) which included Windelband and 
Rickert's philosophy.  
Heidegger went on to debate E. Cassirer (1874-1945) one of the leading Neo-Kantians (Marburg 
School) at the time, during his lectures at Davos. Heidegger's Davos lecture was "Kants Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik," March 17-27, 1929. 
He gave the lecture "Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins" to the Kant 
Society of Frankfurt, January 24, 1929.  
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Some of Heidegger's conflict with his teacher E. Husserl (1874-1938) was that Heidegger 
wanted to stress more Kantian influence on Phenomenology than Husserl did with his Cartesian 
thinking. Heidegger came out of ten years (1918-1928) of working with Husserl to attack 
Husserl's Cartesianism from Heidegger's Kantian position. Heidegger indicated "Husserl himself 
fell into the clutches of Neo-Kantianism between 1900 and 1910." (Kant and problem of 
Metaphysics, E.T., p. 193). In this regard, note Husserl's work entitled, Philosophy as Exact 
Science (1910-11). In fact, it was Husserl's later Cartesianism that Heidegger sees as the 
dominant problem for Husserl's phenomenology in general. Heidegger says, "For Husserl, the 
Cartesian Meditations were not only the topic of the Parisian Lectures in February, 1920. Rather, 
since the time following the Logical Investigations, their spirit accompanied the impassioned 
course of his philosophical investigations to the end" (The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking, E.T. p. 62).  
The Neo-Kantians had the general idea that Kant was it. For example, Liebmann's aphorism: 
"You can philosophize with Kant, or you can philosophize against Kant, but you cannot 
philosophize without Kant." Windelband said, "To understand Kant means to go beyond Kant." 
And again, Windelband said, "All nineteenth-century philosophers are Kantians." 
Contemporary thinking has to work on the following questions. Can we go beyond Kant? Can 
we go beyond the Neo-Kantians? The epistemology interpretation of Kant's Critique is still the 
dominant interpretation today.  
Heidegger is working through Neo-Kantianism to come clear on his own position in philosophy 
and how it relates to the Neo-Kantianism movement from 1850-1940. Neo-Kantianism was a 
major philosophical movement during the last century and the early part of this century. How 
does Neo-Kantianism's problematic still shape the philosophical landscape now and into the next 
millennium? The ghost of Kant still lingers. Can we "overcome" the Kantian influence now? 
More precisely, can we "overcome" the Neo-Kantians' interpretation of Kant? Can we bury the 
Neo-Kantians? The answers seem to hinge on the epistemology interpretation of Kant.  
A short digression and interlude on the real question of epistemology. Nietzsche had this to say, 
"Philosophy reduced to "theory of knowledge," in fact no more than a timid epochism and 
doctrine of abstinence - a philosophy that never gets beyond the threshold and takes pains to 
deny itself the right to enter - that is philosophy in its last throes, and end, an agony, something 
inspiring pity. How could such a philosophy - dominate!" (Beyond Good and Evil; Prelude to a 
Philosophy of the Future, p. 123). You can also read this as question: how could such a 
philosophy like this concern us? Answer: it does not. Also, see Richard Rorty and the book Rorty 
and his critics for his remarks on epistemology.  
Heidegger's interpretation of the Purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
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When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were against 
the background of Husserl's Phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for a crucial 
confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search." (Phenomenological 
Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason (based on his lecture course at the University of 
Marburg in 1927-28, E.T. p. 292 (GA25). 
Heidegger wanted to use Kant against the Cartesian subjectivism of Husserl and others. He 
wanted to move against subject/object dichotomies of the Neo-Kantian logic as well. Heidegger's 
Being and Time (1927) is basically an attack on Cartesian metaphysics and thinking. With his 
work on Kant, Heidegger thinking moved into a different dimension. After Being and Time, 
Heidegger never really returned to Cartesian metaphysics or Descartes work. Heidegger's attack 
on Cartesian metaphysics is important for understanding Being and Time, but, so far, a major 
work by Heidegger on Descartes is lacking.  
In the Davos lectures (1929) and then in Kant and Problem of Metaphysics (1929), Heidegger 
showed Kant as laying the foundations of metaphysics as ontology. He saw Kant as a precursor 
to his own fundamental ontology of Dasein as carried out in his own work -- Being and Time 
(1927).  
What is Heidegger position on Kant? 
A summary outline: 
1) Against logic, epistemology, theory of experience, and metaphysics.  
2) Kant has to be an ontologist and is doing ontology in the Critique. 
3) Kant asks the question: What is man?  
4) Therefore, Heidegger's own position in Being and Time, namely, fundamental ontology of 
MAN (Dasein, being-there, Being-there) is the same thing that Kant was working toward. 
As part of this fundamental ontology of Dasein, Heidegger found areas in Kant he liked -- more 
specifically it was Kant on Time. 
Heidegger says, “. . . my attention was drawn to the chapter on Schematism, and I glimpsed 
therein a connection between the problem of categories, that is, the problem of Being in 
traditional metaphysics and the phenomenon of time." (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, 
Preface to the Fourth Edition, E.T. p. xvii). 
In Being and Time, Heidegger wrote about a projected second part to Being and Time: 
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The first division was entitled: "Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time, as preliminary 
stage of a problem of temporality." (et. p 35).  
In the second phase of Heidegger work on the Critique in the late 1920s he says,  
The whole of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a circling around the problem of transcendence - 
which in its original sense is precisely not an epistemological problem, but the problem of 
freedom - without Kant's having secured this phenomenon of transcendence radically from the 
ground up. (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, 1928 (GA26), 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, E.T. p 165). 
Heidegger's reading of "transcendence" and "freedom" as the central problem of the Critique 
leads off into a different direction. 
Heidegger's third phase (1930s -1940s) is where he says under the heading, "Reality as Will 
(Kant's Concept of Being), Everywhere the lack of questioning Being" in Sketches for a History 
of Being as Metaphysics, (p. E.T. 65). Heidegger's reading of the metahistorical history of Being 
places Kant back in the western tradition of Being as Will, which includes Schelling's Willing is 
primal Being, which leads to Schopenhauer's Will as representation, and final to Nietzsche's 
Will-to-Will as power. These are the last moments in Heidegger's reading of the history of 
metaphysics, the end of metaphysics, and the end of philosophy. Against this background of 
Heidegger's work on Kant, I will attempt our own encounter with Kant to see what Kant is doing.  
Analysis: Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
My point in reading Heidegger's work on Kant is to lose both Heidegger and Kant, and come to 
better understanding of the central issue of the Critique. What is the purpose of the Critique? 
Where do I move from philology to philosophy? Can we escape the meaning of the text?  
My methodology here is a hermeneutical approach to the text. We are attempting to get the 
meaning out of the text of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is a hermeneutical philological 
reading of Kant along philosophical grounds, which addresses the question of the purpose or the 
goal of the Critique. What did Kant say is important for us looking at his work -- not what did 
Kant want to say but did not say (Heidegger's approach). In a word, this may reduce the standing 
of Kant as a great philosopher to a mere metaphysician. Specifically what did, Kant say is the 
purpose of the critique of pure reason, what is the purpose of the work entitled, "Critique of Pure 
Reason?" How did Kant link his philosophical thinking together in his total philosophical 
system?  
What was Kant's vision?  
Let us look at the following essential areas in Kant's thinking. 
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Note: I will first gather together the essential passages from Kant and then I will response.[For 
example, A11 is a paragraph number in the Critique of Pure Reason].  
Summary outline: 
1) Critique of pure reason (as a process) 
2) Ontology  
3) Metaphysics 
4) Architectonic 
5) Propaedeutic 
6) Transcendental philosophy  
Critique of pure reason (as a process, not as a title of a book) 
What is a critique of pure reason? Why would Kant use the terms "critique" and "pure" to think 
about "reason?" This is not the title of a philosophical work, but some kind of a process, a 
"critique" that Kant is doing. Kant called his form of idealism as critical idealism. (See 
Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science, Part I).  
A11  
...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as 
the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be 
called only a critique of pure reason... 
A13 
Transcendental philosophy is here only the idea, for which the critique of pure reason is to 
outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the 
completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice.  
A14 
To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes 
transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet 
this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete 
estimation of synthetic a prior cognition.  
A751 
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One can regard the critique of pure reason as the true court of justice for all controversies of pure 
reason; for the critique is not involved in these disputes, which pertain immediately to objects, 
but is rather set the task of determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general in 
accordance with the principals of its primary institution. 
A850 
Thus the metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the preparatory (propaedeutic) 
critique of reason that dares to fly with its own wings, alone constitute that which we can call 
philosophy in a genuine sense.  
Lectures on Metaphysics 
The critique of pure reason is the propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy. (E.T. 420) 
Lectures on Metaphysics.  
That is to say, one calls a science which occupies itself with the possibility of comprehending a 
cognition a prior the critique of pure reason. (E.T. 420) 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure 
reason. (E.T. 421). 
The concept of 'critique' is caught up in Kant's concept of the 'method'. Critique means an outline 
(Vorriss) of pure reason. A critique looks at the boundaries, at the architectonic, at the sources of 
pure reason. Kant went on to publish two more important 'critiques', namely, Critique of 
Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. The critique of pure reason is the idea of 
transcendental philosophy but some how is not a 'science'. This is 'science' in the big sense, that 
is, a system of science. A goal that Kant was aiming for, but he did yet have in his grasp. The 
term Kritik was first noticed by Kant in Lord Henry Home Kames (1696-1762), who wrote the 
work, Elements of Criticism in 1762. Kant used it the term in the sense of asscessing things 
according to rules as well.  
 
Ontology 
Letter To L. H. Jakob (September 11, 1787) 
I wish you would try to compose a short system of metaphysics for the time being; I do not have 
the time to propose a plan for it just now. The ontology part of it would begin (without the 
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introduction of any critical ideas) with the concepts of space and time, only insofar as these (as 
pure intuitions) are the foundation of all experiences (E.T. p. 125).  
Letter To J. S. Beck (January 20, 1792) 
From this there emerges a whole science of ontology as immanent thinking, that is, a science of 
that thinking in which the objective reality of the concepts employed can be established with 
certainty. (E.T. 182) 
A247 
Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and proud name of 
ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a prior cognitions (Erkenntnisse) of things in 
general in a systematic doctrine (Doktrin) (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the 
modest one of mere analytic of the pure understand.  
A845 
Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of 
pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without 
assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total 
of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), 
and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis).  
A847 
Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts. 1. Ontology. 2. 
Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. Rational Theology.  
Lectures on Metaphysics 
We now begin the science of properties of all things in general, which is called ontology. 
(E.T. 140). 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
But since one used to treat ontology without a critique - what was ontology then? An ontology 
that was a not a transcendental philosophy. (E.T. 140). 
Kant used Alexander Baumgarten's (1714-1762) Metaphysica (1738) for years in his lecture 
courses on metaphysics. The outline of Baumgarten's Metaphysica is as follows: 
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Ontology  
Cosmology 
Psychology 
Theology 
Was Kant an ontologist? I think he wanted to get to a system of metaphysics that clearly put 
ontology first, but his work (Critique, Etc.) seems to be somehow "before" his notion of 
metaphysics. Kant was not an ontologist like Heidegger. Ontology is not central to Kant's 
philosophical thinking. In one place Heidegger say, "In truth, however, Kant's question is foreign 
to it . . . " (Kant and problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p. xviii, date: August 1973). He continues, "In 
later writings I attempted to retract the overinterpretation without at the same time writing a 
correspondingly new version of the Kant book itself. (Kant and problem of metaphysics, E.T. 
xvii). In a latter work Heidegger says the following of his Kantbook: "...more is thus attributed to 
Kant's thinking than he himself was able to think within the limits of his philosophy." 
(Overcoming Metaphysics, E.T. p. 92). 
Heidegger's works on Kant in general date from the 1920s. The only later work is entitled Kant's 
Thesis About Being, which dates from 1961. However, we now know that much of the material 
covered in this article dates from his 1927 seminar entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(GA24) (Chapter one, Kant's Thesis: Being is Not a Real Predicate, E.T. 27).  
Thus, back to Kant! What did Kant say about ontology, and even more precisely, what did he say 
about Being as Being in his philosophical system? Not much! Certainly, nowhere near where 
Heidegger wants to place ontology, namely, at the most fundamental and central position of 
Kant's thought.  
Although there, are some general hints of a link between ontology and Kant's transcendental 
philosophy. Kant does make a distinction between the traditional ontology (think Leibniz, Wolff 
(1679-1754), and Baumgarten) and a critical ontology, but he did not carry this project through. 
Kant shrank back from this project. 
Metaphysics  
Letter to J.H. Lamber (December 31, 1765) 
What I am working on it mainly a book on the proper method of metaphysics (and thereby also 
the proper method for the whole of philosophy). (E.T. 48) 
 
Letter To Marcus Herz (May 11, 1781)  
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This sort of investigation will always remain difficult, for includes the metaphysics of 
metaphysics. (E.T. p. 95) 
Letter To Christian Garve (August 7, 1783) 
Be so kind as to have another fleeting glance at the whole and to notice that it is not at all 
metaphysics that the Critique is doing but whole new science never before attempted, namely, 
the critique of an a priori judging reason. (E.T. 102). 
Bxxii.  
Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in that attempt to transform 
the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the 
example of the geometers and natural scientist. It is treatise on the method, not a system of the 
science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of 
its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure. 
A841 
Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the 
faculty of reason in regard to all pure a prior cognition, and is called critique, or second, the 
system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition 
from pure reason in systematic interconnection, and is called metaphysics; the name can also be 
given to all pure philosophy including the critique, in order to comprehend the investigation of 
everything that can be ever be cognized a prior as well as presentation of that which constitutes a 
system of pure philosophical cognitions of this kind, but in distinction from all empirical as well 
as mathematical use of reason.  
Metaphysics is divided into the metaphysics of the speculative and the practical use of pure 
reason, and is therefore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals.  
A845 
Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of 
pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without 
assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total 
of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), 
and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis) 
A850/1 
Just for this reason metaphysics is also the culmination of all culture of human reason... 
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A847 
Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts. 1. Ontology. 2. 
Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. Rational Theology.  
 
Lectures on Logic 
And yet metaphysics is the real, true philosophy. Our age is the age of critique, and it has to be 
seen what will come of the critical attempts of our time in respect to philosophy and in particular 
to metaphysics (E.T. p. 544).  
Lectures on Logic 
This is the age of critique for this study, and the time is near when its building will be torn down 
and a wholly new one will be built on the ruins of the old. In other respects, only metaphysics is 
true philosophy, and in it lie the real sources from which the understanding derives its use of 
reason. (E.T. 264)  
Lectures on Metaphysics 
In short, no human being can be without metaphysics. (E.T. 420) 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of wine (spiritus 
vini) is to wine. It purifies out elementary concepts and thereby makes us capable of 
comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture of the human understanding. (E.T. 
286) 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Can we not have synthetic a prior judgments? Upon the answering of this question rests the 
possibility of the whole of metaphysics. (E.T. 149) 
Summary outline: 
1) Kant was a metaphysician. 
2) Kant understood himself as a metaphysician. 
3) Kant understood himself as actually doing metaphysics in his writings. 
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According to Heidegger, Holderlin and Nietzsche have pushed metaphysics beyond itself to 
something else -- a place where Heidegger wants to get to, that is, a place after the end of 
metaphysics. But Kant is still squarely within metaphysics.  
The Critique is before metaphysics in Kant's specific philosophical system. But in a general 
sense all pure philosophy including the Critique is in the bigger sense metaphysics in general. 
Kant understands his metaphysics something like Baumgarten's Metaphysica, but Kant wants 
first to work out the method (his 'metaphysics of metaphysics') of metaphysics. Sometime Kant 
sketches out his metaphysics as: Ontology, Rational Physiology, Rational Cosmology, and 
Rational Theology. Other times metaphysics is either a metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of 
morals. This is much closer to what Kant did in his later writings. This later position seems to be 
Kant pushing a new position and overcoming the past influence of Baumgarten. But there is still 
a bit of metaphysical dogmatism in Kant's vision. Where he wants to get to eventual after the 
entire "critique" is done, there is some sense of a dogmatic position.  
Kant uses the term "metaphysics" in at least three senses: general -- all of philosophy is 
metaphysics; pre-critical metaphysics this is Baumgarten; and the third is Kant own position, 
namely, a critical metaphysics. These get all mixed up, and it is hard to understand Kant's own 
confusion on such a basic issue as metaphysics.  
Architectonic  
A13 
Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason is 
to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the 
completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice.  
A474 
Human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e., it considers all cognitions as belonging to a 
possible system, and hence it permits only such principles as at least do not render an intended 
cognition incapable of standing together with others in some system or other.  
A708 
By the transcendental doctrine of method, therefore, I understand the determination of the formal 
conditions of a complete system of pure reason. With this aim, we shall have to concern 
ourselves with a discipline, a canon, an architectonic, and finally history of pure reason... 
A832 
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By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is that which first 
makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, 
architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general, and therefore 
necessarily belongs to the doctrine of method.  
A835 
We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely outlining the 
architectonic of all cognition from pure reason, and begin only at the point where the general 
root of our cognitive power divides and branches out into two stems, one of which is reason.  
A847 
The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division; it is therefore 
architectonic, in conformity with its essential ends... 
 
Methodological questions.  
Kant says he was working out the method, that is, the proper method for metaphysics. 
"It is treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of 
the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal 
structure." Bxxii.  
Although much is made of Kant's concept of a transcendental turn, little is written about his 
methodology and thinking as architectonic. This methodological thinking (architectonic) is 
included in his attack on Aristotle. Kant says, "Aristotle's search for these fundamental concepts 
was an effort worthy of an acute man. But since he had no principle, he rounded them up as 
stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called categories 
(predicaments)." (A81) (see also his letter to M. Herz of February 21, 1772). Hegel then makes 
this same attack on Aristotle. Hegel says, " . . . his [Aristotle] philosophy does not give us the 
impression of its being in construction a self-systematized whole" (Lectures on the history of 
philosophy, II, E.T. p. 118 ). But the point is, Kant's thinking makes the concept of architectonic 
as a major part of thinking and methodology, he uses "principles" in the sense of arche or ground 
from which is derived the entire system. Kant in A13 links these all together: Transcendental 
philosophy, science, critique of pure reason, architectonic, principles, completeness and certain. 
The last four concepts fit together as his methodological ideal and show part of his purpose in 
doing the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’.  (See also his letter to Marcus Herz, November 24, 1776. In 
which Kant is already speaking of an 'architectonic of pure reason').  
The question of architectonic also plays a role in Hegel's attack on Kant. Hegel says,  
25 
 
“. . . the shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy was its unthinking inconsistency, through which 
speculative unity was lacking to the whole system." (Lectures on the history of philosophy, III, 
E.T. p. 481). How to create a metaphysical system with an architectonic that has a unity that ties 
it together is a perennial problem that Kant was aware of and was trying to answer in the 
Critique. He does not want " . . . rhapsody, but must constitute a system" (A832) and on the same 
page, "The whole is therefore articulated (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio) . . . 
" Kant sees architectonic as an integral essential part of his gift, his "treasure for posterity" 
(Bxxiv). At least for Hegel, it would be J. C. Fichte's (1762-1814) philosophy that fixed Kant's 
problems.  
For example, Hegel says, “[Fichte's] . . . philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its completion . 
. .” and Kant's “. . . shortcomings were removed by Fichte . . . “(Lectures on the history of 
philosophy, III, E.T. p. 479-481). What Kant started with philosophy as a system, an 
architectonic, Hegel takes up. Strangely enough Schelling was already taking idealism's 
metaphysics of system apart in 1809 with his work on human freedom. Beginning with Spinoza, 
the concept of the System has been an important "driving force" in Western thought, but it 
clearly reaches its climax in Hegel. Hegel is perhaps the greatest system thinker ever.  
Heidegger makes the following amazing remark about Hegel's entire system and Schelling 
destructive criticisms of systems in general: Heidegger says about Schelling's work, "The treatise 
which shatters Hegel's Logic before it was even published." (P.97). Hegel's Science of Logic is 
the fundamental foundation to his entire system. Human freedom radical conceived by Schelling, 
breaks open the metaphysical concept of system. Kant was working on freedom in the Critique, 
but from a much different point of view (see Bxxviii-Bxxx, etc). But Hegel's dialogue with Kant 
shows how Kant was initially understood. Hegel moves Kant's concept of architectonic to a 
central position in Kant philosophy. Instead of a Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, we could have 
had what Kant was saying in 1776, namely, an "architectonic of pure reason."  
 
Propaedeutic 
Letter To J.H. Lamber (September 2, 1770) 
...that such a propaedeutic discipline, which would preserve metaphysics proper from any 
admixture of the sensible, could be made usefully explicit and evident without great strain. (E.T. 
p 60).  
Letter To J.H. Lamber (September 2, 1770) 
A quite special, though purely negative science, general phenomenology (phaenomologia 
generalis), seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics. (E.T. 59) 
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A11 
...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as 
the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be 
called only a critique of pure reason... 
A841 
Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the 
faculty of reason in regard to all pure a prior cognition, and is called critique... 
A850 
Thus the metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the preparatory (propaedeutic) 
critique of reason that dares to fly with its own wings, alone constitute that which we can call 
philosophy in a genuine sense.  
Open Letter. Declaration concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (August 7, 1799).  
I must remark here that the assumption (arrogance) that I have intended to publish only a 
propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy and not the actual system of this philosophy is 
incomprehensible to me. Such an intention could never have occurred to me, since I took the 
completeness of pure philosophy within the Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of 
the truth of my work. (In Kant's letters, Correspondence, E.T. p 559, AK 12:370-371).  
Kant in his words  “Hierbey muß ich noch bemerken, daß die Anmaßung, mir die Absicht 
unterzuschieben: ich habe bloß eine Proprädevtik zur Transscendental=Philosophie, nicht das 
System dieser Philosophie selbst, liefern wollen, mir unbegreiflich ist. Es hat mir eine solche 
Absicht nie in Gedanken kommen können, da ich selbst das vollendete Ganze der reinen 
Philosophie in der Crit. der r. V. für das beste Merkmal der Wahrheit derselben gepriesen habe.” 
 
Kant put the concepts of propaedeutic and critique together. This project is called a propaedeutic 
and preparatory is before doing metaphysics. This concept is before some kind of actual content, 
before a doctrine. Kant had this idea of a prior foundation, laying a foundation, a presupposed, 
and a "before," a "beforehand," doing his general metaphysics. Again, this concept of doing a 
"metaphysics of metaphysics" before doing the general metaphysics itself. If metaphysics is 
somehow "after," "behind," or "beyond" physics (physika), then Kant saw his project as after 
physics but before general metaphysics. Think about the position and location of different parts 
of a philosophical system. Hegel's system is richer and the parts fit together better than Kants.  
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Note also that Kant bolds the words propaedeutic and critique. Thus, from a contextual point of 
view he is trying to emphasis this connectedness. T here is still the strong sense in Kant of the a 
prior philosophical foundations for his method.  
Transcendental philosophy 
To Marcus Herz (February 21, 1772) 
...and I sought to reduce the transcendental philosophy (that is to say, all concepts belonging to 
completely pure reason)to a certain number of categories, but not like Aristotle...(E.T. 73). 
To Marcus Herz (end of 1773) 
I shall be glad when I have finished my transcendental philosophy, which is actually a critique of 
pure reason, as then I can turn to metaphysics, which has only two parts, the metaphysics of 
nature and the metaphysics of morals, of which I shall present the latter first. I therefore look 
forward to the future. (E.T. 78). 
A12 
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our 
mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a prior. A system of such concepts 
would be called transcendental philosophy. But this is again too much for the beginning.  
A13 
Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason is 
to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the 
completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice.  
A14 
To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes 
transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet 
this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete 
estimation of synthetic a prior cognition.  
A15 
Hence transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure, merely speculative reason. 
A845 
28 
 
Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of 
pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without 
assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total 
of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), 
and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis) 
 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure 
reason. (E.T. 421). 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Indeed, one can say that the entire transcendental philosophy is an investigation into the 
possibility of synthetic a prior judgments. (E.T. 143).  
Transcendental philosophy is a system of concepts that is based on pure reason. Transcendental 
philosophy as a critique of pure reason, as pure speculative reason, is only the idea of system, but 
is not the full "science." Transcendental philosophy is somehow before doing metaphysics and is 
linked with the critique of pure reason as a project that is done before metaphysics. Metaphysics 
will be done after this project. Kant then goes and calls both of these concepts the "product" of 
the critique of pure reason.  
Heidegger finds a different passage in an essay that Kant did not publish in his lifetime. The 
essay is entitled: "What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Times of 
Leibniz and Wolff" (written 1791). Heidegger quotes Kant: "Ontology is called transcendental 
philosophy because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a prior." 
(Basic Problems in Phenomenology. E.T. p. 128).  
This clearly ties Kant's main thought with ontology and perhaps strengthens Heidegger's 
interpretation that Kant is somehow an ontologist.  
Conclusion 
Thales was looking upward when he fell into the well. Kant, in a famous passage writes: 
"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and 
more enduringly reflection is occupied with them: the starry heavens above me and the moral 
law within me." (Critique of Practical Reason, conclusion). Hopefully in this investigation I 
have not been looking up but have been trying to follow exactly what Kant thought and then 
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wrote in his works. Although Heidegger has remarked, "What has been said is insufficient," 
perhaps for us what Kant did say was enough for us to illuminate Kant's quest.  
What is the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason?  
The purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is to find proper method (a critique) and procedure 
for metaphysics and the whole of philosophy. The critique of pure reason is derived 
architectonically from principles and is complete and certain. It is not the 'system of science' 
(Wissenschaft) itself and it is not a doctrine, but it catalogs the sources, the boundaries, and the 
entire outline of the science. The Critique of Pure Reason is a propaedeutic (preparation), it is 
after physics, and yet before metaphysics; it is a prior, namely, which is a”metaphysics of 
metaphysics." This is before ontology, where ontology belongs solely to metaphysics. This is an 
architectonic of all cognition or knowledge (Erkenntnis) from pure reason (rational not 
practical). The Critique of Pure Reason is to provide the foundation before metaphysics. The 
critical method has to be clarified first before moving onto any metaphysics, to any ontology.  
The importance of method brings us to Descartes' work Rules for the Direction of the Mind 
(Regulae ad directionem ingenii), which was published fifty years after his death in 1701. 
Descartes said, Regula IV, "Method is necessary for discovering the truth of nature." This brings 
the concept of "method" to the forefront. Although it is unlikely that Kant knew of Descartes 
work, this way of thinking has become part of the dominated thinking of the modern age. Kant 
breathes and works within this realm.  
Kant was still in the investigative mode. Kant was looking at the possibility of metaphysics. Can 
there be a critical metaphysics? Can there be a method to metaphysics? Kant says, "Can we not 
have synthetic a prior judgments? Upon the answering of this question rests the possibility of 
the whole of metaphysics." Kant was not sure if he had an answer, if he had the answer in his 
philosophical system, in his vision.  
From this investigation we have come to a point of view of what Kant thought he was doing in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, what he thought he was going to do in the Critique, not what he did 
or how he did it. Authors may have one thing in mind and actually do something else as they 
work on their projects. Kant had a lot on his mind about his philosophical system, his vision. 
This made this project very complex. Kant cannot jump over his own shadow; he is still partial 
entrapped in his own time. Parts of his vision move forward beyond his own historical period 
and his contemporaries. The Critique was obviously way beyond most of Kant's contemporaries 
who stood "helpless" before this work. In Kant's lifetime, more than 2,000 works were written 
about him. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all tried to go around Kant -- none were successful! 
Heidegger has attempted to go through Kant.  
Kant's tremendous insights and works still hold us in awe today.  
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Martin Heidegger’s Encounter Methodology: Kant 
 
“Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology”.  Martin Heidegger  
Abstract  
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) has written a signification amount about other philosophers. 
There are over 100 volumes in a collection of his writings. His reading of other philosophers 
does not follow the traditional lines of presenting philosophical arguments. But rather, he uses 
the phenomenological and hermeneutical methodology, which is tied to his de-constructing and 
critique of metaphysics. Heidegger has a fresh and often times unusual reading of philosophers 
and poets. Heidegger reading of I. Kant is the paradigm of his kind of interpretation, where 
Heidegger admits to his “allegation of violence” to the text of his Kant interpretation. What is the 
methodology of a dialogue between thinkers? What is the meta-dialogue? Heidegger points us 
toward the path of thinking.  
Introduction  
There are no innocence readings of philosophers (Alfred Denker). Getting a philosopher “right” 
is to be left to philology – not philosophers (Heidegger). If we are to call ourselves philosophers 
then we have to engage in a critical debate with other philosophers. Philosophers who think they 
can do an ahistorical reading of philosophers are wrong with their basic assumption. Nietzsche 
taught us this and the time for metaphysical “eternal” readings of so called philosophical 
“problems” or “truths” is over. Historical relativism is our basic position after the end of 
metaphysics. We are finite humans in a finite world, and in a given historical epoch. There are no 
objective readings of philosophers that are worthy of being called philosophy. Thinking has its 
own task with us and we must listen and hear this call to philosophizing.  
Metahistories of Philosophers  
If we are to read philosophers then we need to develop a metahistory of philosophy. Our 
presuppositions and assumptions on the course of history of philosophy are part of our historical 
context. Heidegger wrote  “…all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds its presupposition.” 
(HHPS, et. 36). We construct an understanding based on our presuppositions and derive via 
rhetoric an essay that tells a story about the direction of the history of philosophy. What is a 
metahistory?  
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Metahistories of philosophy follow the course and direction of the history of philosophy. If there 
is a dynamic principle at work in the development of the history of philosophy, then a 
Metahistory of philosophy seeks to understand these major trends and inner determinations 
(necessities) at work. Is there a purpose and reasons for way the history of philosophy has 
developed? If there is no purpose and inner necessity, then where do we stand in history?  
We need a philosophical context of a metahistory of philosophy in order to read philosophers. 
Hegel saw the history of philosophy starting with the most abstract and then final coming to the 
end point with Hegel as the most real and actualization of the absolute Spirit knowing itself.  
On the other hand, Nietzsche reading sees the history philosophy as an error. Nietzsche poses the 
question if “perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of philosophy?” (The Gay 
Science: la gaya scienza  1886  Preface  section    et. p. 34).  ietzsche’s remarks are often 
tormented and murky and they make it difficult to understand, so straight foreword explanations 
are not easy. His virulence and caustic quality makes his thinking and philosophy complicated to 
elucidate.  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy was ripened and put into a single page by 
Nietzsche in September 1888. HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. 
The History of an Error. (Section 4 from  ietzsche’s Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize 
with a Hammer. Just like Hegel, Nietzsche metahistory ends with Nietzsche own position 
(INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA).  
Martin Heidegger sees the history of philosophy as the history of forgetting, the "oblivion of 
Being" (Seinsvergessenheit). This hiddenness is the "self" concealment of Being itself. In other 
words, Heidegger reads the metahistory of philosophy in a complete reversal from Hegel. The 
early Greek philosophers had it right and were open to Being – Hegel and finally Nietzsche were 
caught up in the abstraction of Being. They see Being as empty and abstract. Hegel in the 
Science of Logic and for Nietzsche it is Twilight of Idols.  
As an example  I will use Kant’s metahistory of philosophy as an example  since I expect there 
are more Kantian among us than Hegelians, Nietzschians, or Heideggerians. Of course who can 
resist an exanimation of Kant?  
Kant's Metahistory of philosophy  
Heidegger said:  
“Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is among those philosophical works which  as long as there is 
philosophy on this earth at all, daily become inexhaustible anew. It is one of those works that 
have already pronounced judgment over every future attempt to "overcome" them by only 
passing them by.” (What is a thing, p. 61, 1935-36).  
SECTION: Critique of Pure Reason  
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Let us begin by looking at the final section of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) (Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft). The section is called  “The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Fourth 
Chapter. The History of pure reason.” (CPR  A85 /B800 to A855/B883). Kant starts of by 
talking about “place that is left open in his system and must be filled in the future.” It is 
interesting to note the same kind of issue Kant talked about in his last unpublished work, the 
Opus postumum (written 1796-1804). This was collection of writings that Kant was working on 
very late life and did not finalized or published. Sometime Kant talks about a ‘transition’  then a 
‘gap’  a ‘pain like that of Tantalus’  and then the “unpaid bill of my uncompleted system’ (Letter 
Christian Garve  September  1  1798). This is in regard to the “Transition from metaphysical 
foundations of natural science to physics.” This heading appears early in the Opus postumum (et. 
p. 10, AK 21:373).  
So  where is the other part of which Kant had promised  “must be filled in the future” (CPR  
A852/B880) in the Critique of Pure Reason? Namely, the complete history of pure reason or a 
comprehensive history of philosophy. Kant never did work out a detailed history of philosophy 
or a history of pure reason. In fact, where Kant left holes or gaps in his philosophical system, 
then philosophers have rushed in to complete the Kantian project. The neo-Kantians, Friedrich 
Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) are some examples of 
philosophers who have developed a history of philosophy along neo-Kantians lines.  
 ow back to Kant’s outline of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
Kant starts by giving a ‘cursory outline’ of the ‘chief revolutions’ in metaphysics (CPR  
A855/B881). There are three issues in this small section.  
1) “With regard to the ob ect of all of our rational cognitions”.  
Kant said we have the sensual philosophers (Epicurus, 342-270 BC) and the intellectual 
philosophers (Plato, 427-348 BC).  
 ) “With regard to the origin of pure cognitions of reason” (Vernunfterkenntnisse). Kant said we 
have the empiricist (Aristotle 384-322 BC, John Locke 1632-1704) and noologists (Plato, 
Leibniz 1646-1716).  
3) “With regard to method”. (In Ansehung der Methode).  
Kant said we have the naturalistic (Democritus 460-370 BC) and the scientific methodology. The 
scientific leads to either the dogmatism (Christian Wolff (1679-1754) or skepticism (David 
Hume (1711-1776). In this same section  Kant concludes that the “critical path alone is still 
open” (CPR  A855/B883). This is very last page of the Critique of Pure Reason. Note: Kant in 
this  
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3 section does not say “Wissenschaft ” but rather  “szientifische” methodology (szientifischen 
Methode). Why does he use this word?  
This refers back to the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason  where Kant says  “It is treatise on 
the method” (CPR  Bxxii). Kant sees himself within the history of metaphysics working on a 
subsection under ‘method’ and then ‘scientific’. The location within metaphysics for the Kantian 
‘critical path’ is under the direction of method  and then scientific headings.  
Kant begins the Critique of Pure Reason with the image of the “battlefield of these endless 
controversies is called metaphysics” (CPR  Avii). He then tells us a little story of about how in 
the beginning metaphysics started with “administration of the dogmatists  her rule was despotic” 
(CPR, Aix). These battles continue and almost come to end with the famous John Locke (1632-
1704)  but “fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism” (CPR  Ax). Thus  the text of the 
Critique of Pure Reason begins with the history of philosophy and then the final section is called 
the history of pure reason (Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). Within this beginning and 
ending is this treatise on the method of the “metaphysics of metaphysics”  namely  the Critique 
of Pure Reason (Letter To Marcus Herz, May 11, 1781, Correspondence, et. p. 181). So, Kant is 
situating himself within his own history of pure reason, that is, within his own Metahistory of 
philosophy.  
Kant says at the beginning of the chapter on the history of pure reason:  
I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely transcendental point of view, 
namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, which presents to my 
view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins. (CPR, A852/B880). (Beginning of chapter, Die 
Geschichte der reinen Vernunft).  
There are two important matters here.  
1) Kant is going to look at the history of pure reason, that is, the history of philosophy from a 
special point of view  namely  the “transcendental point of view”. Or  in other words  from 
Kant’s own point of view. This is a Metahistory of Philosophy from the transcendental point of 
view (transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte). The uniquely Kantian position.  
 ) The past is in “ruins” (Ruinen).  ote this point very well. This is crucial point and consistent 
conclusion for Kant.  
Kant often uses these analogies and images of building a house. The second division of the 
Critique of Pure Reason is called “Transcendental doctrine of method”. He talks of the building 
edifices, building materials, height, strength, erection of a sturdy dwelling, etc (CPR, 
A707/B735). Thus, when we come to the last chapter of the section and Kant said that there are 
‘only ruins ’ then keeping with this analogy from Kant’s view there is nothing to really ‘build-
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on’ from history of philosophy. Therefore  I understand Kant’s own position (from the 
‘transcendental point of view’) that the history of philosophy is not helpful or important  it is in 
‘ruins’. I understand Kant is saying that Kant’s own transcendental or critical idealism is not 
based on the history of philosophy and it totally unique to Kant. In other words, Kant has to 
begin his building from the ground-up or from the essential foundations. There is nothing to 
build-on, only a little dirt to begin the building. Therefore, sticking with this image, for Kant, the 
ground is reason.  
Kant wanted to develop is his own metaphysical system, but somewhere he got trapped writing 
the Critique of Pure Reason. He said in a letter that it would take him three months (1772) to 
finish his work. In reality, it took him another nine years before the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781) was published. Here we start to see why. All Kant sees is ‘ruins’ everywhere. He does not 
have any building materials to even begin to build a sturdy dwelling (namely, a metaphysical 
system, a system of science).  
Kant is doing a propaedeutic. Kant is just getting the ground ready for the building process or 
Kant in another publication he calls it a prolegomena. Now, this is not the science or a doctrine 
or in terms of the image – this is not the sturdy dwelling, but rather, a propaedeutic, that is, 
laying out the foundational pro ect (think of Heidegger’s Kant and Problem of Metaphysics). 
Kant said in an early part of the Critique of Pure Reason  “...we can regard a science of the mere 
estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of 
pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure 
reason...” (CPR  A11).  
From the ruins there are no blocks to build a metaphysical system (synistemi, systema). In other 
words, this is neither a Wissenschaft nor szientifische system. This points to why Kant had to a 
do a “critique” before getting to the real knowledge of metaphysics. From this point of view the 
critique of pure reason pro ect is not metaphysics  but rather a “critique” of reason  which needs 
to be done before the science of a metaphysical system. That is why Kant called the Critique a 
“metaphysics of metaphysics” in a letter. The fundamental foundation  the background  the 
primary ground, before doing the project of metaphysical systems. But for Kant this is not some 
kind of special physics in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the critique of pure reason  
A Hegelian aside. Hegel completed the metaphysical system in the Science of Logic. Hegel used 
the Phenomenology of Spirit  where Hegel said  ‘…the detailed history of the education of 
consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science.” So the history of the education of 
consciousness is for Hegel the starting point, but the goal is to get to the standpoint of Science of 
the Logic (substantia infinita) – which is then has the philosophy of nature (res extensa) and 
the philosophy of spirit (res cogitans) to complete the Hegelian System of Science (System der 
Wissenschaft).  
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SECTION: What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz 
and Wolff?  
Kant wrote this work in 1793. The German title is: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die 
Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? This was about the 
same time he was working on Religion within the Bounds of Unaided (blossen) Reason. This 
work (Progress) by Kant was edited by Friedrich Rink (the manuscripts have subsequently been 
lost) and published shortly after Kant’s death in April 1804. Kant’s work was in a response to 
prize question announced by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Berlin, January 24, 1788). Kant in 
the end did not submit his manuscript. Nevertheless, we have with this work another attempt by 
Kant to look at the past in philosophy and we then might see if another facet of Kant’s 
Metahistory of philosophy comes forward into the light.  
Kant at the beginning of the Introduction gives us a picture of his view of metaphysics. Kant 
said,  
“But this science is metaphysics, and that completely changes matters. This is a boundless sea in 
which progress leaves no trace and on whose horizon there is no visible destination that allows 
one to perceive how near one has come to it.” (et. p. 51).  
There is no trace of anything good left, namely, no progress. The boundless sea is without a 
history and without even a horizon to navigate the ship. Kant is lost at sea. The sea is the history 
of metaphysics or at the very least, just the lost sea of metaphysics in general. Kant abruptly, 
then drops an interesting remark; “Ontology has made little progress since Aristotle’s time” (et. 
p. 53). (Perhaps Martin Heidegger would agree with him. He told a group of students to read 
Aristotle first for 15 years, before reading Nietzsche).  
Kant then goes on to talk about the three steps taken by metaphysics.  
Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics. The first was the stage 
of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason. (et p. 61).  
This sounds again like Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (Wolff’s 
follower, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant used his Metaphysics (1757) in his 
lectures), Hume, and then Kant. When Kant thinks of skepticism, I think in this context it must 
be Hume. Although already in December of 1792, in a letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, Kant 
mentions the assumed name of Aenesidemus (real name is: Gottlob Ernst Schulze, 1761-1833) 
where “an even wider skepticism has been advanced” (Correspondence, et. p. 445). The 
complete title of the book was Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von Herrn Professor 
Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie  179 . In Germany  Schulze’s name during 
this time became synonymous with skepticism (was Fichte’s teacher for awhile). Kant might also 
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be thinking of the early Greek skeptics. For example, Kant mentions in a different context, 
“Pyrrho among others was a great Skeptic” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 305). Plus, on the 
same page he says  “Sextus Empiricus  who brought all doubts together” (Lectures on 
Metaphysics, et. p. 305). Thus, Kant was well acquainted with skepticism from a variety of 
sources in the complete history of philosophy.  
How did Kant see these three stages in metaphysics?  
Kant said,  
This temporal order is based on the nature of the human capacity for knowledge. When the first 
two had been gone through, metaphysics was in such a state that for many generations it swung 
from unbounded trust in reason in itself to boundless mistrust and then back again. (Progress, et 
p. 61).  
So  Kant is saying in this remark that Metahistory is based on “human capacity 
(Erkenntnisvermogens). Then Kant describes a process of trust (Vertrauen) or not trusts in 
reason. But clearly the movement and motion within history is a ‘swinging’ (schwankend  
vacillation  wavering) back and forth between the two opposites of ‘unbounded’ and ‘boundless’ 
trust in reason. Thus, at this point Metahistory of philosophy is the swinging between trust and 
not trust in reason. Kant can see himself in this process as being for the trust in reason. In other 
words, Kant is on the side of rationalism. The Kantian Metahistory of philosophy is a process 
between reason (ratio) and reasonlessness (note: this is not irrationalism, we must wait 100 years 
before this becomes an issue).  
Perhaps Kant saw Schulze’s contemporary skepticism as  ust part of the process. However  at the 
time, Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s (1758-18 3) widespread popularization of Kant’s philosophy 
was underway and then Schulze devastating critique of Reinhold’s Kantianism as an infinite 
regress obviously upset Kant’s agenda. Even Hegel had to come to terms with contemporary 
skepticism in his essay “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy  Exposition of its 
Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One ” (180 ) 
(Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) which is a critical discuss and review of Schulze's work. In 
this way Kant’s Metahistory of philosophy could take into account the contemporary 
philosophical schools of his time.  
Section: Lectures on Logic  
The Blomberg Logic  
Kant learned a great deal about the history of philosophy from the work of Johann Formey 
(1711-1797), Kurzgesfassete Historie der Philosophie von Hernn Formey, Berlin, 1763, 
(Abridged History of Philosophy). Kant wrote Formey a letter in June 28, 1763 
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(Correspondence, et. p. 69-70) and often had people send Formey copies of Kant’s works 
(Correspondence, et. p. 88). Formey was the permanent secretary of the Berlin Royal Academy 
of Sciences, he was a Wolffian, and wrote over 600 books and 20,000 letters. In fact, it is not 
clear where Kant came up with the critical remarks about Greek philosophers, since he read Plato 
and Aristotle in Greek. Perhaps it was Formey’s views  for example  Kant remarked  “Plato was 
very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such way that he often did not understand himself. (Lectures 
on Logic, et. p. 23). About Aristotle  Kant said  “Aristotle developed a blind trust in himself  and 
he harmed philosophia more than he helped it.” (Lecture on Logic, et. p. 23). Is this Kant or 
could this be Formey view of the history of philosophy?  
Kant is of course talking through the lecture notes of his students. In this case, the Blomberg 
Logic was based on Kant’s lectures of the early 1770s. Kant in one part of his lectures talks 
about the ancient philosophers as being either skeptical or dogmatists. This is a familiar refrain 
from Kant. However, he does go on to says,  
Carteius, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Wolffus, the last whom, through his industry, produced a 
systema of philosophy, were in recent times the ones who improved philosophy, and were its 
true fathers. All of the efforts of our philosophy are 1) dogmatic, 2) critical. Among critical 
philosophers Locke deserves priority. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 24).  
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was reviewed 1782 by J.G.H. Feder (1740-1820). In this review 
Kant was portrayed as  ust restating Bishop George Berkeley’s (1685-1753) Idealism and Kant 
responded is the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (2
nd 
edition, 1787). However, in 
this passage we note two things of interest: a) Kant refers to more recent philosophers as the 
‘true fathers’ of philosophy  b) again Locke seems to be praised for his importance. Kant often 
has critical remarks about Berkeley  for example  calling him a “dogmatic idealism” (CRP  
B274). Kant discusses this whole issue with Berkeley in his “Refutation of Idealism” (CRP  
B274-287).  
In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (179 )  Kant said  “Dogmatism and skepticism are opposed to 
one another” (Lectures on Logic  et. p. 745). He then goes and states his position  “Criticism is 
the middle way between dogmatism and skepticism  the principle of a rightful trust in one’s use 
of reason” (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 480).  
This shows Kant working and thinking through his relation to earlier philosophers and the 
history of philosophy. Although it does not give us anymore direct insight into Kant’s 
Metahistory of philosophy, it does show his thoughtful dialogue with past philosophers.  
Section: Lectures on Metaphysics  
39 
 
Kant’s point of view on the history of metaphysics can be summarized by one of his remarks  
“The whole of metaphysics is nothing other than a chain of built-up and overthrown systems.” 
(Lectures on Metaphysics  et. p. 134). This passage points again to Kant’s remarks about the 
history of philosophy being in ruins. Another passage says  “Up to now in metaphysics we still 
have not had anything satisfactory  for all systems can be shaken.’ (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. 
p. 127).  
Kant said that Hume “aroused me from a dogmatic slumber” (Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, 1783). However, in the lectures notes called Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783) 
we have an interesting and perhaps a more candid remark about Hume from almost the same 
year. Kant said,  
Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the 
wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not 
study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept. An investigation of practices (facti), 
how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason. Locke accomplished 
much here…” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 137).  
An interesting point, again we have the praise of the empiricist Locke and rather critical and 
almost cynical remarks about Hume. Kant is saying rather decisively that Hume’s philosophy 
looked at “only this or that concept”. This is Kant’s position on the overall consequence of 
Hume’s philosophical skepticism to Kant’s pro ect of transcendental and critical idealism (“my 
transcendental  or  better  critical idealism” (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). 
Kant’s critical idealism leads away from Humean skepticism. Kant does have unbounded trust in 
reason and the pervasiveness of these criticism of Hume suggest strongly that Kant’s rationalism 
was the essential foundation of his project.  
Kant’s transcendental philosophy (idealism) can be seen as providing the ontology of rationalism 
(Lectures on Metaphysics  et. p. 307). Kant said that “Transcendental philosophy is also called 
ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure reason.” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 
4 1). The concept of “critique” means an outline (Vorriss) of pure reason. A critique looks at the 
sources and boundaries (Quellen und Grenzen) (CPR, A11), at the architectonic, at the sources of 
pure reason and hence  a “critique” is the method but reason is the content. Reason and 
rationalism is the touchstone of the Kantian project.  
Conclusion on Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy  
A final note on one of Kant’s genuine and interesting position.  
How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds is 
own work  so to be speak  on someone’s else’s ruins  but no work has ever come to be that was 
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to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet 
given. But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be 
able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only 
historical. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538).  
Again we have the metaphor of philosophers among the ‘ruins’. The  unky remains of systems. 
The metaphysical systems are broken down blocks and ruins, which give us nothing to built on. 
But then Kant sinks in his final conclusion. Every system is only ‘historical’  even Kant’s system 
only gives us another part of the boundless sea. A philosopher must build his own system even 
though it is some how on parts of ‘ruins’. We can learn Kant’s system  but that does not mean we 
are philosophers. In the middle of this remark by Kant  we see the function of the “But even 
granted”  so he might granted you can have a philosophical system  but in fact  this does you no 
good  since you have this system only ‘sub ectively’ and ‘historically’. Crucial philosophical 
point for Kant.  
Kant does see a course and development to the history of philosophy. Kant has a Metahistory of 
philosophy that can be seen through an analysis of his works. However, Kant did not develop his 
thinking in any systematically or comprehensive way. This topic is still left open in the Kantian 
system  however  we can try to fill the gap by an assessment of Kant’s writings  but the purists 
may insist on a more philological reading. Back to Kant’s pro ect.  
To summarize Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy:  
1) From the transcendental point of view, there many edifices, but only ruins remain. Hence the 
need for Kant’s critical idealism.  
2) Metaphysics as philosophy is a boundless sea and progress has left no trace.  
3) Metaphysics as philosophy has been a swinging back forth between trust in reason and 
mistrust in reason.  
4) This history of philosophy or Metahistory of philosophy is made of overthrown system and all 
philosophical systems are shaken and broken.  
5) Philosophical systems can only be known ‘sub ectively’ and ‘historically’ unless you create 
your own system.  
Kant says in a Letter To L. H. Jakob  
I wish you would try to compose a short system of metaphysics for the time being; I do not have 
the time to propose a plan for it just now. The ontology part of it would begin (without the 
introduction of any critical ideas) with the concepts of space and time, only insofar as these (as 
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pure intuitions) are the foundation of all experiences”. (September 11  1787  Correspondence 
E.T. p. 125).  
Philosophers should follow Kant’s suggestion – compose a system.  
Heidegger’s Encounter Methodology: Kant  
Heidegger has a fresh way of reading and thinking 'with' other philosophers and poets. He is not 
interested in just what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, where they got 
stuck, and how Heidegger then tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to have 
a dialogue. Heidegger is alive to the hermeneutics of the text. Part of the methodology he used in 
Being and Time (1927) was hermeneutics, and he is responsible for rekindling this methodology 
in the twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time he says, 
"Phenomenology of human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of 
that word." Hermeneutics of philosopher’s texts is a part of his methodology.  
For example, Heidegger approvingly quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): "If you want to 
honor a philosopher, you must catch him where he had not yet gone forth to the consequences, in 
his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (Of Human 
Freedom. 1809. E.T. p.9). Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid 
in what he says." In another article Heidegger says, "We show respect for a thinker only when 
we think. This demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." (“The 
Word of  ietzsche ” p. 99). Heidegger wants to think everything that a philosopher thought  but 
in his own way and in his own time in history.  
To be exact, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical interpretation. This reading has more to do 
with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics than with understanding 
Kant's own project. Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant 
philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics, ET p.175). Heidegger says in his work on 
Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "Kant - - people refuse to see the problem 
and speak rather of my arbitrarily reading my own views into Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, ET p147). Perhaps what we can read in Kant and Heidegger is only what we already know 
- shades of Nietzsche.  
In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
says, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation 
of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx)  
And then Heidegger goes on to talk about "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers" and "In a 
dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent." 
(Kant and problem of Metaphysics, E.T. xx). So he sees this problem himself. But I think that is 
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part of the difference between Heidegger's encounters with other thinkers in a dialogue and the 
presentation of philosophical positions, which tries to be philosophy. Heidegger is not making 
claims and counterclaims. He is not looking for proofs. Aristotle says in Book IV of the 
Metaphysics (1006a), "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for 
a proof, and when this is not necessary."  
Although Heidegger learned a lot from Kant and in Being and Time he is full of praise for Kant, 
nevertheless, in the later Heidegger - Heidegger must place Kant back into traditional 
metaphysics. At a later stage in Heidegger thinking, his Metahistorical approach takes over and 
Kant rejoins history as a metaphysician. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics was for 
Heidegger the first book length analysis of a philosopher like Kant and one who was very close 
to his thinking at the time. So, he is still working out his destructuring methodology. Heidegger 
at this time is working through the destruction of metaphysics, and he has the task of reducing 
and overcoming metaphysics. Although in 1929 he was not very clear about how his destruction 
project would work out and what the entire outline would look like when it was finished, this 
became clear for Heidegger in 1930s.  
This was an important part of Being and Time that did not get published in 1927, and in fact most 
of Heidegger later works deals with the history of ontology. But it all started in Being and Time. 
For example, Heidegger wrote in the section on the Task of a Destructuring of the History of 
Ontology. (Being and Time, Introduction II, E.T. p. 17). "The destructuring of the history of 
ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely 
within such a formulation." (E.T. p. 20).  
One of his lectures during this time (1927) Heidegger has a concise statement about the 
importance of the destruction and has remarks about his phenomenological method as well.  
These three basic components of phenomenological method - reduction, construction, destruction 
- belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. 
Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of 
traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this not a negation 
of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a 
positive appropriation of tradition." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p.23).  
This notes the methodology and intentions but not the content or the results of the process. The 
later Heidegger had the results of the appropriation of the philosophical tradition. This became 
his history of Being as metaphysics.  
Charles Sherover states:  
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"It is thus irrelevant to object that Kant is being approached from a new context, subjected to 
possibly strange criteria or that novel implications are seen in what he had worked out. The task 
of a retrieve is not to chronicle the past but to wrest out of it a deeper comprehension of our 
present situation and the possibilities for development it yet offers. The real question is whether 
significant philosophic insights emerge, or new directions for philosophic development are 
brought forth, from such an encounter between two thinkers." (Heidegger, Kant and Time, pp. 
12-13.)  
So, at least for Heidegger he will go where Kant takes the philosopher Heidegger. In other 
words, Heidegger is not considering what others think and how close or true he is to the real 
Kant. This is a no-holds- barred free-for-all in the domain of thinking, to wrest out new 
understandings, to push new possibilities.  
Finally let us look back to what Kant himself thought:  
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), paragraph - A314.  
"I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in 
ordinary speech as well as in writings, it  
is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since 
he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even 
thought, contrary to his own intention."  
“Ich merke nur an  daß es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei  sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche  als in 
Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand 
äußert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht 
genugsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht ntgegen redete, oder auch 
dachte.”  
Therefore, to give Kant the last word on the Heideggerian methodology of a dialogue between 
thinkers -- Heidegger can try to understand Kant better than he understood himself and still be 
Kantian. Kant has understood the problem of how to dialogue with other thinkers. Nevertheless, 
Kant is still usurped by the Heideggerian questioning; it is Heidegger's matter for thought first, 
and Kant is somewhere in the background.  
Conclusion  
Heidegger said:  
44 
 
“Kantbook  an attempt to question what had not been said  instead of writing in a fixed way 
about what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, what has not been said is filled with 
riches.” (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p.175).  
Kant opens up philosophical questions. Heidegger wants to follow in similar way. Not by 
following Hegel’s lead by doing a metaphysical system (telling a story of the world), but rather, 
by a critical debate about the foundations. Kant and Heidegger must question even this. 
Heidegger wants us to follow Kant as a kindred spirit and be engaged with Kant about the matter 
for thinking. We are not getting Kant “right”  but rather  we are getting the task for thinking 
“right”.  
Heidegger encounter methodology is to “the things themselves” (Hegel  1807) or “to the thing 
itself” (Husserl  1911). On one hand  Heidegger is doing the “reduction  construction  
destruction” pro ect with the history of philosophy (ontology  metaphysics); but then on the other 
hand, Heidegger wants to go directly to the primary matters/issues themselves. Here you can 
think of the analytic of humans (Da-sein), his analysis of moods, etc. This all follows out of his 
main project outlined in Being and Time (1927).  
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Metahistories of philosophy: Kant and Nietzsche 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to use Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche as springboard to a 
general investigation of the nature of Metahistories of philosophy.   Kant and Nietzsche are two 
very dissimilar philosophers and they have approached the history of philosophy in radically 
different ways.    By comparing and contrasting their approaches, then a sharp and clear idea of a 
Metahistory of philosophy should appear.   Metahistories of philosophy follow the course and 
direction of the history of philosophy.   If there is a dynamic principle at work in the 
development of the history of philosophy, then a Metahistory of philosophy seeks to understand 
these major trends and inner determinations (necessities) at work.  Is there a purpose and reasons 
for way the history of philosophy has developed?  Do we need the phenomenological or 
hermeneutical destruction of history of philosophy?  Has philosophy reached its completion or 
goal? Is there a continuing history to philosophy?   
Introduction 
Both Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) had a relationship to past 
philosophers and this reverberates throughout their writings.  The purpose of this paper is the 
assessment of Kant’s and  ietzsche’s relationship to early philosophies and to investigation their 
overall Metahistories of philosophy. In general, Kant had less interest in the early philosophers, 
whereas  ietzsche’s work is covered with name-dropping of philosophers, writers, politician, 
and artists of every kind.  Nietzsche has a myriad of remarks about various philosophical and 
religious positions or –isms.   Nietzsche’s critique and dialogue with whole history of philosophy 
comes partial from his background in philology and his study of the Greeks, but a major part of 
his philosophy is directed at the value structure of philosophies and religion (Christian in 
particular).  Nietzsche situated himself within history and has a highly developed Metahistory of 
philosophy. Although extreme opposites in their general approach to philosophy, both G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831) and Nietzsche are in fact completely historical thinkers and know their own 
historical context.  Part of  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy comes from a meaningful and 
penetrating dialogue with G.W.F. Hegel.  
This can be seen by the view of Hegel that Nietzsche had in his early essay "On the Use and 
Abuse of History for Life " 1874.  This is the second of  ietzsche’s Untimely Meditations (1873-
1876).  Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen.  Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie 
für das Leben.  
  ietzsche said this about Hegel’s influence: 
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“I believe that there has been no dangerous variation or change in German culture in this century, 
which has not become more dangerous through the monstrous influence of the philosophy of 
Hegel, an influence which continues to flow right up to the present.” 
Nietzsche then goes on to say  “Thus  for Hegel the summit and end point of the world process 
coincided with his own individual existence in Berlin.”   ietzsche view of Hegel was undoubted 
influence negatively by Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), but the Hegelian view of the world 
spirit progressing in history up to the point of the 1820s in Berlin is a view that Nietzsche surely 
wants to reject. To justify the present with the past (if Hegel did indeed do this, certainly many 
people have interpreted Hegel this way), yes, Nietzsche would not stand for this kind of thinking.   
( ietzsche had more says about Hegel’s philosophy of history  see his notes of 1873  for 
example  VI  336).  Hegel did say  “The owl of Minerva  takes its flight only when the shades of 
night are gathering.” (Philosophy of Right, Preface dated, Berlin, June 25th, 1820).  This means 
philosophers do not appear until after the historical moment or epoch.   Philosophers for Hegel 
only look and deduce history after it has happen.  For Hegel world history had an aim, a plan, 
and there was reason in history.  Nietzsche rejected this view of history.  
Following his critique of Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872), Karl Marx (1818-1883) said, 
“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”  
Theses On Feuerbach, written spring of 1845. One of Feuerbach main works was entitled: 
Principles of Philosophy of the Future (1843), Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft.   
Nietzsche was reading this book in 1882 (Thomas H. Brob er  “ ietzsche’s Reading and Private 
Library, 1885-1889”).   I think  ietzsche got some of his inspiration from Feuerbach’s pointing 
toward the future.   One of  ietzsche’s important works is entitled  “Beyond Good and Evil: 
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886).  So, in a sense there is more than just the question 
of changing the world with philosophy, but the direction of philosophical thinking as pointing 
toward the future.  
 ietzsche’s dialogue with Hegel is over the direction of philosophy and how one reads this 
history of philosophy and of course how one understands history as such.   For Hegel history 
always is a progression.  
The issues with any Metahistories of philosophy most always include a dialogue with Hegel.   
Although not explicitly part of this paper nevertheless, Hegel is still part of this investigation.  
No philosopher before him had such a metaphysical sweep of the history of philosophy and with 
it philosophy of history as Hegel had.  In addition  Hegel’s equates his own philosophy with the 
progress of the history of philosophy.  Hegel was the first great philosopher to undoubtedly 
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develop a systematic and comprehensive Metahistory of philosophy.  Hegel understood and 
implicitly knew the course of the history of philosophy as a philosophical problem.  
 
However, in this paper I will assess and investigate the Metahistories of philosophy that were 
developed by Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche.   Hopefully by comparing and contrasting 
we will gain a deeper understanding of doing a Metahistory of philosophy.     As a contemporary 
and insightful philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) said  “The greater a revolution is to 
be  the more profoundly must it plunge into its history.” (“Nietzsche’s Overturning of 
Platonism ” 1936).  A paradigm shift or a revolution within philosophy can only come about by a 
plunge into the history of philosophy and for that we need a well-developed idea and concept of 
a Metahistory of philosophy.   
The counterexample seems to be Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who had no understanding 
of the history of philosophy.  Scholars are finding more and more of Schopenhauer’s influence in 
Wittgenstein writings. Wittgenstein did not read widely in the history of philosophy.  
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to work out the concept of a Metahistory of philosophy 
through an investigation of two dissimilar philosophers, namely, Kant and Nietzsche.   
Kant's Metahistory of philosophy 
SECTION:   Critique of Pure Reason 
Let us begin by looking at the final section of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) (Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft).  The section is called  “The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Fourth 
Chapter. The History of pure reason.” (CPR  A85 /B800 to A855/B883).   Kant starts of by 
talking about “place that is left open in his system and must be filled in the future.”  It is 
interesting to note the same kind of issue Kant talked about in his last unpublished work, the 
Opus postumum (written 1796-1804).  This was collection of writings that Kant was working on 
very late life and did not finalized or published.   Sometime Kant talks about a ‘transition’  then a 
‘gap’  a ‘pain like that of Tantalus’  and then the “unpaid bill of my uncompleted system’ (Letter 
Christian Garve, September 21, 1798).  This is in regard yo the “Transition from metaphysical 
foundations of natural science to physics.”  This heading appears early in the Opus postumum 
(et. p. 10, AK 21:373).   
So  where is the other part of which Kant had promised  “must be filled in the future” (CPR, 
A852/B880) in the Critique of Pure Reason?   Namely, the complete history of pure reason or a 
comprehensive history of philosophy.  Kant never did work out a detailed history of philosophy 
or a history of pure reason.  In fact, where Kant left holes or gaps in his philosophical system, 
then philosophers have rushed in to complete the Kantian project.  The neo-Kantians, Friedrich 
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Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) are some examples of 
philosophers who have developed in the history of philosophy.  
 ow back to Kant’s outline of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Kant starts by giving a ‘cursory outline’ of the ‘chief revolutions’ in metaphysics (CPR  
A855/B881).  There are three points in this small section. 
1) “With regard to the ob ect of all of our rational cognitions”. 
Kant said we have the sensual philosophers (Epicurus, 342-270 BC) and the intellectual 
philosophers (Plato, 427-348 BC). 
 ) “With regard to the origin of pure cognitions of reason” (Vernunfterkenntnisse). Kant said we 
have the empiricist (Aristotle 384-322 BC, John Locke 1632-1704) and noologists (Plato, 
Leibniz 1646-1716). 
3).  “With regard to method”.  (In Ansehung der Methode). 
Kant said we have the naturalistic (Democritus 460-370 BC) and the scientific methodology.  
The scientific leads to either the dogmatism (Christian Wolff (1679-1754) or skepticism (David 
Hume (1711-1776).   In this same section  Kant concludes that the “critical path alone is still 
open” (CPR  A855/B883).   This is very last page of the Critique of Pure Reason.   Note: Kant in 
this section does not say “Wissenschaft ” but rather  “szientifische” methodology (szientifischen 
Methode).   Why does he use this word? 
This points back to the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says  “It is treatise on 
the method” (CPR  Bxxii).  Kant sees himself within the history of metaphysics working on a 
subsection under ‘method’ and then ‘scientific’.  The location within metaphysics for the Kantian 
‘critical path’ is under the direction of method, and then scientific headings.     
Kant begins the Critique of Pure Reason with the image of the “battlefield of these endless 
controversies is called metaphysics” (CPR  Avii).  He then tells us a little story of about how in 
the beginning metaphysics started with “administration of the dogmatists  her rule was despotic” 
(CPR, Aix).  These battles continue and almost come to end with the famous John Locke (1632-
1704)  but “fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism” (CPR  Ax).  Thus  the text of the 
Critique of Pure Reason begins with the history of philosophy and then the final section is called 
the history of pure reason (Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft).  Within this beginning and 
ending is this treatise on the method of the “metaphysics of metaphysics”  namely  the Critique 
of Pure Reason (Letter To Marcus Herz, May 11, 1781, Correspondence, et. p. 181).   So, Kant 
is situating himself within his own history of pure reason, that is, within his own Metahistory of 
philosophy.  
49 
 
Kant says at the beginning of the chapter on the history of pure reason:  
I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely transcendental point of view, 
namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, which presents to my 
view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins. (CPR, A852/B880). (Beginning of chapter, Die 
Geschichte der reinen Vernunft).  
There are two important points here. 
1) Kant is going to look at the history of pure reason, that is, the history of philosophy from 
a special point of view  namely  the “transcendental point of view”.  Or  in other words  
from Kant’s own point of view.  This is a Metahistory of Philosophy from the 
transcendental point of view (transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte).  The uniquely Kantian 
position.  
2) The past is in “ruins” (Ruinen).    ote this point very well. This is crucial point and 
conclusion for Kant.  
Kant often uses these analogies and images of building a house.  The second division of the 
Critique of Pure Reason is called “Transcendental doctrine of method”.  On the incredibly first 
page we hear Kant’s images.  He talks of the building edifices  building materials  height  
strength, erection of a sturdy dwelling, etc (CPR, A707/B735).   Thus, when we come to the last 
chapter of the section and we hear from Kant that there are ‘only ruins ’ then keeping with this 
analogy from Kant’s view there is nothing to really ‘build-on’ from history of philosophy.  
Therefore  I understand Kant’s own position (from the ‘transcendental point of view’) that the 
history of philosophy is not helpful or important  it is in ‘ruins’.  I understand Kant is saying that 
Kant’s own transcendental or critical idealism is not based on the history of philosophy and it 
totally unique to Kant.   In other words, Kant has to begin his building from the ground-up or 
from the essential foundations.  There is nothing to build-on, only a little dirt to begin the 
building.  Therefore, sticking with this image, for Kant, the ground is reason.  
Kant wanted to develop is his own metaphysical system, but somewhere he got trapped writing 
the Critique of Pure Reason.  He said in a letter that it would take him three months (1772) to 
finish his work. In reality, it took him another nine years before the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781) was published.  Here we start to see why.   All Kant sees is ‘ruins’ everywhere.  He does 
not have any building materials to even begin to build a sturdy dwelling (namely, a metaphysical 
system, a system of science).  
Kant is doing a propaedeutic. That is just getting the ground ready for the building process or 
Kant in another publication he calls it a prolegomena.  Now, this is not the science or a doctrine 
or in terms of the image – this is not the sturdy dwelling, but rather, a propaedeutic, that is, 
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laying out the foundational pro ect (think of Heidegger’s Kant and Problem of Metaphysics). 
Kant said in an early part of the Critique of Pure Reason  “...we can regard a science of the mere 
estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of 
pure reason.   Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure 
reason...” (CPR  A11).  From the ruins there are no blocks to build a metaphysical system or a 
system built on science.  In other words, this is neither a Wissenschaft nor szientifische system.  
This points to why Kant had to a do a “critique” before getting to the real knowledge of 
metaphysics.  From this point of view the critique of pure reason project is not metaphysics, but 
rather a “critique” of reason  which needs to be done before the science of a metaphysical 
system.  That is why Kant called the Critique a “metaphysics of metaphysics”.  The fundamental 
foundation, the ground, before doing the project of metaphysics.  But for Kant this is not some 
kind of special physics in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the critique of pure reason.  Aristotle 
would not understand the project, which is why Kant is so unique.   
SECTION:   What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz 
and Wolff? 
Kant wrote this work in 1793.  The German title is: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die 
Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?  This was about the 
same time he was working on Religion within the Bounds of Unaided (blossen) Reason.   This 
work (Progress) by Kant was edited by Friedrich Rink (the manuscripts have subsequently been 
lost) and published shortly after Kant’s death in April 1804.  Kant’s work was in a response to 
prize question announced by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Berlin, January 24, 1788).   Kant 
in the end did not submit his manuscript.  Nevertheless, we have with this work another attempt 
by Kant to look at the past in philosophy and we might see if another facet of Kant’s Metahistory 
of philosophy comes forward into the light.   
Kant right in the beginning of the Introduction gives us a picture of his view of metaphysics. 
Kant said, 
“But this science is metaphysics, and that completely changes matters. This is a boundless sea in 
which progress leaves no trace and on whose horizon there is no visible destination that allows 
one to perceive how near one has come to it.” (et. p. 51).  
There is no trace of anything good left, namely, no progress.  The boundless sea is without a 
history and without even a horizon to navigate the ship.  Kant is lost at sea. The sea is the history 
of metaphysics or at the very least, just the lost sea of metaphysics in general.   Kant abruptly, 
then drops an interesting remark; “Ontology has made little progress since Aristotle’s time” (et. 
p. 53).  (Perhaps Martin Heidegger would agree with him.  He told a group of students to read 
Aristotle first for 15 years, before reading Nietzsche).  
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Kant then goes on to talk about the three steps taken by metaphysics.   
Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics.  The first was the stage 
of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason. (et p. 61).   
 This sounds again like Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (Wolff’s 
follower, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant used his Metaphysics (1757) in his 
lectures), Hume, and then Kant.  When Kant thinks of skepticism, I think in this context it must 
be Hume. Although already in December of 1792, in a letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, Kant 
mentions the assumed name of Aenesidemus (real name is: Gottlob Ernst Schulze, 1761-1833) 
where “an even wider skepticism has been advanced” (Correspondence, et. p. 445). The 
complete title of the book was Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von Herrn Professor 
Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie  179 .   In Germany  Schulze’s name during 
this time became synonymous with skepticism.  Kant might also be thinking of the early Greek 
skeptics.  For example  Kant mentions in a different context  “Pyrrho among others was a great 
Skeptic” (Lectures on Metaphysics  et. p. 305).  Plus  on the same page he says  “Sextus 
Empiricus  who brought all doubts together” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 305).  Thus, Kant 
was well acquainted with skepticism from a variety of sources in the complete history of 
philosophy.    
How did Kant see these three stages in metaphysics? 
Kant said, 
This temporal order is based on the nature of the human capacity for knowledge.  When the first 
two had been gone through, metaphysics was in such a state that for many generations it swung 
from unbounded trust in reason in itself to boundless mistrust and then back again.  (Progress,  et 
p. 61).  
So, Kant is saying in this remark that Metahistory is based on “human capacity 
(Erkenntnisvermogens).  Then Kant describes a process of trust (Vertrauen) or not trusts in 
reason.  But clearly the movement and motion within history is a ‘swinging’ (schwankend, 
vacillation  wavering) back and forth between the two opposites of ‘unbounded’ and ‘boundless’ 
trust in reason.   Thus, at this point Metahistory of philosophy is the swinging between trust and 
not trust in reason.   Kant can see himself in this process as being for the trust in reason.  In other 
words, Kant is on the side of rationalism.  The Kantian Metahistory of philosophy is a process 
between reason (ratio) and reasonlessness (note: this is not irrationalism, we must wait 100 years 
before this becomes an issue).  
Perhaps Kant saw Schulze’s contemporary skepticism as  ust part of the process.   However  at 
the time  Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s (1758-18 3) widespread popularization of Kant’s 
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philosophy was underway and then Schulze devastating critique of Reinhold’s Kantianism as an 
infinite regress obviously upset Kant’s agenda.  Even Hegel had to come to terms with 
contemporary skepticism in his essay  “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy  
Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient 
One ” (180 ) (Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) which is a critical discuss and review of 
Schulze's work.   In this way Kant’s Metahistory of philosophy could take into account the 
contemporary philosophical schools of his time.  
Section : Lectures on Logic 
The Blomberg Logic 
Kant learned a great deal about the history of philosophy from the work of Johann Formey 
(1711-1797), Kurzgesfassete Historie der Philosophie von Hernn Formey, Berlin 1763 
(Abridged History of Philosophy).   Kant wrote Formey a letter in June 28, 1763 
(Correspondence, et. p. 69-70) and often had people send Formey copies of Kant’s works 
(Correspondence, et. p. 88).  Formey was the permanent secretary of the Berlin Royal Academy 
of Sciences, he was a Wolffian, and wrote over 600 books and 20,000 letters.   It is not clear 
where Kant came up with the critical remarks about Greek philosophers, since he read Plato and 
Aristotle in Greek.  Perhaps it was Formey’s views  for example  Kant remarked  “Plato was 
very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such way that he often did not understand himself. (Lectures 
on Logic, et. p. 23).   About Aristotle  Kant said  “Aristotle developed a blind trust in himself  
and he harmed philosophia more than he helped it.” (Lecture on Logic, et. p. 23).  Is this Kant or 
could this be Formey view of the history of philosophy? 
Kant is of course talking through the lecture notes of his students. In this case, the Blomberg 
Logic was based on Kant’s lectures of the early 1770s.   Kant in one part of his lectures talks 
about the ancient philosophers as being either skeptical or dogmatists.  This is a familiar refrain 
from Kant.  However, he does go on to says,  
Carteius, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Wolffus, the last whom, through his industry, produced a 
systema of philosophy, were in recent times the ones who improved philosophy, and were its true 
fathers.  All of the efforts of our philosophy are 1) dogmatic, 2) critical.  Among critical 
philosophers Locke deserves priority. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 24).  
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was reviewed 1782 by J.G.H. Feder (1740-1820).  In this review 
Kant was portrayed as  ust restating Bishop George Berkeley’s (1685-1753) Idealism and Kant 
responded is the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (2
nd
 edition, 1787).  However, in 
this passage we note two things of interest:  a) Kant points to more recent philosophers as the 
‘true fathers’ of philosophy  b) again Locke seems to be praised for his importance.   Kant often 
has critical remarks about Berkeley  for example  calling him a “dogmatic idealism” (CRP  
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B 74).  Kant discusses this whole issue with Berkeley in his “Refutation of Idealism” (CRP  
B274-287).  
In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (179 )  Kant said  “Dogmatism and skepticism are opposed to 
one another” (Lectures on Logic  et. p. 745).  He then goes and states his position  “Criticism is 
the middle way between dogmatism and skepticism  the principle of a rightful trust in one’s use 
of reason” (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 480). 
This shows Kant working and thinking through his relation to earlier philosophers and the 
history of philosophy.  Although it does not give us anymore-direct insight into Kant’s 
Metahistory of philosophy, it does show his thoughtful dialogue with past philosophers.   
Section: Lectures on Metaphysics 
Kant’s point of view on the history of metaphysics can be summarized by one of his remarks  
“The whole of metaphysics is nothing other than a chain of built-up and overthrown systems.” 
(Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 134).   This passage points again to Kant’s remarks about the 
history of philosophy being in ruins.   Another passage says  “Up to now in metaphysics we still 
have not had anything satisfactory  for all systems can be shaken.’ (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. 
p. 127).  
Kant said that Hume “aroused me from a dogmatic slumber” (Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, 1783).  However, in the lectures notes called Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783) 
we have an interesting and perhaps a more candid remark about Hume from almost the same 
year.  Kant said,  
Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the 
wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not 
study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept.  An investigation of practices 
(facti), how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason.  Locke 
accomplished much here…” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 137).  
An interesting point, again we have the praise of the empiricist Locke and rather critical and 
almost sarcastic remarks about Hume.  Kant is saying rather decisively that Hume’s philosophy 
looked at “only this or that concept”.    This is Kant’s position on the overall consequence of 
Hume’s philosophical skepticism to Kant’s pro ect of transcendental and critical idealism (“my 
transcendental  or  better  critical idealism”  (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783).  
Kant’s critical idealism points away from Humean skepticism.  Kant does have unbounded trust 
in reason and the pervasiveness of these criticism of Hume suggest strongly that Kant’s 
rationalism was the foundation of his project.   
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Kant’s transcendental philosophy (idealism) can be seen as providing the ontology of rationalism 
(Lectures on Metaphysics  et. p. 307).  Kant said that “Transcendental philosophy is also called 
ontology  and it is the product of the critique of pure reason.” (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p.  
421). The concept of “critique” means an outline (Vorriss) of pure reason.   A critique looks at 
the sources and boundaries (Quellen und Grenzen) (CPR,A11), at the architectonic, at the 
sources of pure reason and hence  a “critique” is the method but reason is the content.   Reason 
and rationalism is the touchstone of the Kantian project.  
Conclusion on Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy 
A final note on one of Kant’s genuine and interesting position.   
How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway?   Every philosophical thinker builds is 
own work, so to be speak  on someone’s else’s ruins  but no work has ever come to be that was 
to be lasting in all its parts.  Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet 
given.   But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would 
be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only 
historical.   (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538).  
Again we have the metaphor of being among the ‘ruins’.  The metaphysical systems are broken 
down blocks and ruins, which give us nothing to built on.  But then Kant sinks in his final 
conclusion.  Every system is only ‘historical’  even Kant’s system only gives us another part of 
the boundless sea.  A philosopher must build his own system even though it is some how on 
parts of ‘ruins’.  We can learn Kant’s system  but that does not mean we are philosophers.  In the 
middle of this remark by Kant  we see the function of the “But even granted”  so he might 
granted you can have a philosophical system, but in fact, this does you no good, since you have 
this system only ‘sub ectively’ and ‘historically’.   Crucial philosophical point for Kant.  
Kant does see a course and development to the history of philosophy.  Kant has a Metahistory of 
philosophy that can be seen through an analysis of his works.  However, Kant did not develop 
his thinking in any systematically or comprehensive way.  This topic is still left open in the 
Kantian system, however, we can try to fill the gap by an assessment of Kant’s writings  but the 
purists may insist on a more philological reading.  Back to Kant’s pro ect.  
To summarize Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy: 
1) From the transcendental point of view, there many edifices, but only ruins remain. 
2) Metaphysics as philosophy is a boundless sea and progress has left no trace.  
3) Metaphysics as philosophy has been a swinging back forth between trust in reason and 
mistrust in reason.   
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4) This history of philosophy or Metahistory of philosophy is made of overthrown system and all 
philosophical systems are shaken and broken.  
5) Philosophical systems can only be known ‘sub ectively’ and ‘historically’.  Does Kant really 
mean this?  What are the implications?  
Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy 
Nietzsche has a very rich and complex relationship with the history of philosophy and history in 
general.   One of his good friends was the famous Swiss philosopher of history, Jacob 
Burckhardt (1818-1897) who developed a whole new theory of cultural history. Nietzsche not 
only attend his lectures, but in addition he had student lecture notes of different lectures that 
Burckhardt did over a period of many years.  Burckhardt influenced Nietzsche relationship to 
history and his profound effect can be seen in many of  ietzsche’s writings.  
Nietzsche says in his autobiographical work Ecce Homo (written 1888)  “I am a disciple of the 
philosopher Dionysus” (Preface  Section    et. P.  17).   The Greek philosophers are important 
for Nietzsche as a source and origin of his thinking.  For example, in the Will To Power (#419, 
1885) notes, he says,   
A few centuries hence, perhaps, one will judge that all German philosophy derives its real 
dignity from being a gradual reclamation of the soil of antiquity, and that all claims to 
“originality” must sound petty and ludicrous in relation to that higher claim of the Germans to 
have  oined anew the bond that seemed to be broken  the bond with the Greeks…  
Nietzsche sense of the Greek world and the modern world does not allow him to think of 
historical progress or development like Hegel or Kant.   He said   “But the nineteenth century 
does not represent progress over the sixteenth; and the German spirit of 1888 represents a regress 
from the German spirit of 1788.  “Mankind” does not advance  it does not even exist.” (Will to 
Power, #90, Jan-Feb 1888).  There are of course many other places where Nietzsche says the 
same thing.   He does not seem to quite get to the point of Heidegger of saying that the ancient 
Greeks were more original thinkers than the rest of the philosophers.  Nietzsche has a high 
regard for many things from ancient Greek.    
But he does pose the question if “perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of 
philosophy?” (The Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886, Preface, section 2, et. p. 34).   
 ietzsche’s remarks are often tormented and murky and they make for difficult understanding 
and straight foreword explanations are not easy.  His virulence and caustic quality makes his 
thinking and philosophy complicated to elucidated.  
Nietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy was ripened and put into a single page by  ietzsche in 
September 1888.   The year 1888 saw Nietzsche write his last four books.  Although Twilight of 
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the Idols (Die Götzen-Dämmerung) was written in 1888 it was not published until January 24, 
1889.  This page is its own section (the fourth) and it contains a complete vision of the course of 
the history of philosophy  namely   ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy.   Heidegger’s remarks 
captures the importance of this section  “in a magnificent moment of vision, the entire realm of 
 ietzsche’s thought is permeated by a new and singular brilliance” (Nietzsche Vo1, et. p. 202).  
A Kantian note on the word, Übersinnlichen (the supersensuous). Translation note: 
Übersinnlichen could be translated as oversensuous or oversense or oversensorial.   Kant in the 
unpublished essay, What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of 
Leibniz and Wolff? of 1793 defines metaphysics as “the science of advancing by reason from 
knowledge of the sensible (Sinnliche) to the knowledge of the supersensuous. (Progress, et. p. 
53).  The object of the Kantian problem is the transition from the sensible (sensory) to 
supersensuous.    There are three objects or components to the supersensuous, namely, God, 
freedom, and immortality (Progress, et. p. 294-295).  But what can we know of these objects?  In 
the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason  Kant said  “ ow after speculative reason has 
been denied all advance in this field of the supersensuous…” (CPR, Bxxi).  Kant was not happy 
about this and went on to say in the same paragraph that “cognitions a prior that are possible, but 
only from a practical intention.” (praktischer Absicht)  (CPR  Bxxi).  
This is the background on  ietzsche’s thought of the “true world”.  Translation note: the German 
is “wahre Welt” this can also be translated as the “real world”  but I think it makes more sense to 
translated as the “true world”.  This is the realm of Plato’s idea (eidos, ideos).  The world of the 
forms.  Or, to cross the line and have only knowledge at level of opinion (doxa).   Nietzsche 
wrote in the Will to Power, #568 (March-June 1888)  “Critique of the concept “true and apparent 
world”.  Of these  the first is mere fiction  constructed of fictitious entities.”  Thus  there is 
nothing to the true world (Will to Power, #567).  These are concept-mummies (Begriffs-
Mumien).  So, from this analysis Nietzsche has a decisive and lucid vision of the central and 
inner logic of metaphysics.  For Nietzsche, this is the fundamental constitution of metaphysics 
and hence he uses this distinction to lay out his Metahistory of philosophy.  Does Nietzsche 
himself get caught within metaphysics?  Short answer: yes, but he pushes the limits of 
metaphysics.  His finger is pointing onward.    ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy is partially 
 ietzsche looking back into history  but  ietzsche’s vision for philosophy points toward the 
future.  At this point, let us read Nietzsche words and then grapple and grasp his 
historical/philosophical vision.  
This next page (following 6 points) is the complete text of Section 4 from  ietzsche’s Twilight of 
Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer (written August and September, 1888).  
HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. 
The History of an Error 
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1. The true world--attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. 
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the 
sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.") 
2. The true world--unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man 
("for the sinner who repents"). 
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible--it becomes female, it 
becomes Christian. ) 
3. The true world--unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it--a 
consolation, an obligation, an imperative. 
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, 
pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.) 
4. The true world--unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. 
Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate 
us? 
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.) 
5. The "true" world--an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating--an idea 
which has become useless and superfluous—consequently (therefore), a refuted idea: let us 
abolish it! 
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens (good sense) and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed 
blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.) 
6. The true world--we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But 
no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. 
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of (pinnacle) 
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.).  [end of section].  
Remarks on  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy as fable and an error (Irrthums). 
For Nietzsche the course of the history of philosophy has just been a fable (Fabel), that is, a 
fictitious story of the “true world” and man’s relationship to the “true world”.   The history of 
philosophy has been a fabrication, not even a legend or a parable, but rather, just a myth.  
Philosophers have been confused about the supersensuous world. This is just a simple error in 
thinking.  But of course, at what cost?  How has this lead the Western World into a dangerous 
straight?  The essence of Nihilism is heard here.  This fable obviously leads to Nietzsche’s 
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critique of the religious realm, which is full of the supersensuous world (the eternal God).  
 ietzsche’s Ockham razor cuts off the world of the supersensuous.  
Nietzsche uses a the image of the different parts of the day.  In point 4, we start with the 
“morning”  in point 5  it is the “bright day or broad daylight”  and then in point 6  we have 
“noon” (in German: Morgen  Heller Tag  Mittag).   We now have the “shortest shadow” at noon.  
This is the high point, the summit, the peak, the tip, the top of the rock, the apex, the top of the 
wave, the very pinnacle of mankind (humanity, Menschheit).   Afterwards humanity can perished 
or incipit tragoedia (The Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886 #342).  
What are the periods of Metahistory does Nietzsche show us?  
The six periods are:  
1) Plato. 
2) Platonism and Christian. 
3) Kantian. 
4) Auguste Comte (1788 – 1857) (positivism). 
5) Early Nietzsche (but still caught between the two worlds). 
6) Midday sun –  ietzsche’s own final philosophy in the name of Zarathustra.    
In The Gay Science: la gaya scienza  1886   ietzsche says  “incipit tragoedia” (#342, the 
tragedy begins) and in this points to Zarathustra, whereas in the this section of the Twilight of the 
Idols   ietzsche says “I CIPIT ZARATHUSTRA” in capital letters in both the English version 
and the German edition.   Nietzsche asks the question in Ecce Homo in the section about the Gay 
Science  where he asks the question  “What is here called “highest hope” – who could have any 
doubt about that when he sees the diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra flashing at 
the end of the fourth book?”   ietzsche’s endings are often the beginnings.  The going under 
(untergehen), the setting of the sun, the twilight of the setting sun.  The twilight of the old idols, 
the old truths (Ecce Homo  “the old truth is approaching its end”).   But out of the process of 
going under   ietzsche says “I am he that brings these glad tidings. – Thus I am also a destiny.”  
(Ecce Homo).  So from this fable and history of error, Nietzsche does brings us something, - a 
gift. What is that gift?  The beginning of Zarathustra  “I CIPIT ZARATHUSTRA” means the 
starting of the time of Zarathustra here on earth.  
Who is Zarathustra? 
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Zarathustra the teacher of the overman/superman (Übermensch, frenzy and lightening) and of the 
eternal return of the same (ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen).   Nietzsche says in Ecce Homo at 
the beginning of the section on Thus Spoke Zarathustra  “ ow I shall relate the history of 
Zarathustra.  The fundamental conception of this work, the idea of eternal recurrence, this 
highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable…”.  What does this mean for  ietzsche 
Metahistory of Philosophy?  
For Nietzsche, the supreme point (point 6, midday) comes to be Nietzsche’s final philosophy.  
Do you hear shades of Hegel and some of Kant?     ietzsche’s last philosophy is at the final 
ultimate end point of his Metahistory of philosophy, namely, Nietzsche, the thinker as he was 
during September 1888 in Sils-Maria (Upper Engadine, Switzerland).   
What is the end point or goal for  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy?  Answer:  ietzsche 
and his Zarathustra.  For Nietzsche, Zarathustra is a code name for: (negative) end of the ideals 
and idols, the old truths, the end of the eternal supersensuous world, death of God, (positive) free 
spirits, immoralist, Dionysus, overman, innocent of becoming, will-to-power, and the highest 
affirmation – the eternal return of the same.  
To summarize  ietzsche’s Metahistory of Philosophy: 
 
1) Nietzsche Metahistory of philosophy is a fable and the history of an error, which is the 
fundamental logic of metaphysics, namely, the two worlds, the eternal supersensuous 
world and the apparent world.  
2)  ear the end of  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy we have the two worlds 
abolished  but still the distinction is there.   ietzsche’s early thought moves with this 
distinction.  
3) The end and goal of  ietzsche’s Metahistory of philosophy is  ietzsche’s own final and 
ultimate philosophy, code name: Zarathustra.  Nietzsche is caught within his own 
shadow.  Else where Nietzsche has pointed toward the future.  
Conclusion 
By comparing and contrasting the philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche, we wanted to get a sense 
if there is a dynamic principle at work in the development of the history of philosophy.  One 
thing has become clear in Hegel, some parts of Kant, and Nietzsche they all see themselves as 
the end point in their Metahistories of philosophy.  Hegel’s position is well known.  But from 
this analysis we can see some of Kant and Nietzsche coming to this point.  In contrast to 
Heidegger, who sees himself building a bridge forward, ambit of a narrow path.   
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But on the other hand, it looks like Kant has the most interesting and far-reaching position.   
How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway?   Every philosophical thinker builds is 
own work  so to be speak  on someone’s else’s ruins  but no work has ever come to be that was 
to be lasting in all its parts.  Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet 
given.   But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would 
be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only 
historical.   (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538).  
What is Kant’s position? 
Kant’s position here is similar to Heidegger when he wants people to think about the matters for 
thinking and not to worry about becoming Heideggerians or getting Heidegger right; but rather, 
thinking through the matters or issues themselves. Remember the principle, following both Hegel 
and Edmund Husserl  the remarkable phenomenological methodology motto  that is  “to the 
things themselves” (die Sachen selbst).  Heidegger pushed his student away from him and tried 
to point them to on their own paths.  Although they (and us) traveled along with Heidegger, we 
still need our own expereicnes (Erfahrung).  Heidegger at one point said there is no Heideggerian 
philosophy.  
Nietzsche uses the expression Versuch, an experiment, and an attempt.  In the Gay Science: la 
gaya scienza  1886  he says  “We ourselves wish to be our experiments…” (#319).  Individuals 
must develop and attempt their own singular unique historical thinking.  Fly and be your own 
eagle, do not be sheep.  Nietzsche stated clearly with the expression  “I want no “believers” 
(Ecce Homo, Why I am a Destiny, section #1).  How many philosophers in the history of 
philosophy would have said they want no “believers” in their metaphysical systems?    
Nietzsche said in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:  
One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. 
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all 
denied me will I return to you. 
Verily, my brothers, with a different eyes shall I then seek my lost ones; 
with a different love shall I then love you. 
 ietzsche does not want “pupils” or “believers”.  This is not a question of faith or the use of 
reason to find foundations of metaphysics or some new values in philosophy.  But rather, an 
admonishment to the eagles to fly on your own.   He said in the Wanderer and His Shadow 
(# 67)   “There are no educators.  As thinker  one should speak only of self-education”.  
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Final remarks 
Kant is saying that even if we pick up his philosophy, still we are not philosophers.  We can 
show respect by following a philosophers thoughts, but in the end, we must find our own path 
otherwise we are following philosophers only in a subjective and historical way. 
No one can climb the mountain for you.  A guide like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger for 
example, may help you by pointing out the way they have gone.  The mountain in its stillness – 
awaits the climber, awaits the thinker.  
 
Appendix: 
Hegel's Metahistory of philosophy 
 
For Hegel philosophy itself is identical with the history of philosophy as spirit and reason come 
to know pure absolute Spirit.  Hegel said  “History we have before us here is the history of 
thought finding itself (p. 67-68).  Starting with the Greeks as the most abstract and come to the 
final conclusion in Hegel’s own absolute idealism system.  The big Hegel system comes in three 
parts: logic, nature, and spirit or to use Descartes, substantia infinita, res extensa, and res 
cogitans (Logic, Nature, spirit).  Hegel divides the history of philosophy in three periods, the 
Greek  Middle Ages  and the modern (starting with ‘ego cogito sum')  namely  Descartes starting 
point of ‘self-reflecting thought’. Hegel says: "In philosophy as such  most currently and 
recently, is contained what the work from a thousand years has produced; it is the result of all 
that has preceded it."  The modern period is the where the subjective and objective is united in 
the absolute. That means: Hegel.   History did not stop with Hegel according to Hegel. It was 
Alexandre Kojève that put that in Hegel.  Hegel was constantly updating his lectures etc.  Hegel 
work a great deal on the history of philosophy; starting on the history of philosophy in Jena 
(1805) and lectured up until at least winter of 1829-1830. In 1833-36 in volumes 13-15 in the 
first edition of Hegel's Werke were collected and edited by Karl Ludwig Michelet.  
Hegel wrote “ o philosophy  therefore  can make its appearance sooner than it does. It is true  of 
course, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ancient philosophies were resurrected – this 
was necessary to the progress of Christian culture. Nevertheless, when past philosophies return 
again they are like mummies of earlier thoughts. The World-Spirit has progressed, and a past 
philosophy is not its proper garment  the form in which it finds expressed what it in fact is.” 
(1825-1826, in Introduction).  
Martin Heidegger Metahistory of philosophy. 
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For Heidegger history of philosophy is the history of metaphysics, which begins with Platonism, 
hits its high point with Hegel, and then reaches its completion with Nietzsche and the reversal of 
Platonism.  Heidegger sees himself as starting a new beginning.  
Heidegger wrote  “The history of Being begins  with the forgetting of Being”. Metahistory of 
philosophy as the Metahistory of metaphysics as the History of Being.  
From one of his writing is Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics (1941, et. p. 65-66).  
   Being 
Aletheia (apeiron, logos, hen-arche) 
Revealing as the order as the start 
Hen 
One 
Logos 
Idea 
Physis 
Ousia 
Energeia 
Hypokeimenon 
Hyparchein 
Substance, substantia 
Actuality, actualitas 
Perception, perception 
Subiectum 
Monad 
Position 
Objectivity 
Will of reason (Kant) 
Will of love (Schelling)  
Will as absolute knowledge (Hegel)  
Absolute concept (Hegel)  
Spirit 
Will Power 
Will to Power in the eternal recurrence of the same 
Will to will (Spengler)  
Production 
Transcendental Ego 
Machination (Enframing (Gestell)  
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Heidegger in a short essay on the Recollection in Metaphysics  says  “The history of Being is 
neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to 
Being.  The history of Being is Being itself  and only this.” (Recollection in Metaphysics, et. p. 
8 ). (“Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums 
noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte 
ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses.” (‘Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik’ Nietzsche II, p. 
489).   Martin Heidegger in section 85 of his second magnum opus  says  “the thrust into the 
crossing and thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to 
an end  if philosophy is to attain its other beginning (Anfang).” (GA 65  Beiträge zur Philosophie 
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) p.171-173, et. p 121).   
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Martin Heidegger and Hegel’s Science of Logic 
 
Je großer eine Umwälzung sein muß, um so tiefer wird sie in ihrer Geschichte ansetzen.
1
 
 
Abstract 
Martin Heidegger has a unique and never an innocent reading of philosophers (A. Denker).  My 
paper will be examining Heidegger’s reading of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831).  Hegel was the 
leading philosopher of German Idealism. In Hegel’s mature metaphysical system the 
Wissenschaft der Logik
2
 is the central cornerstone of the system. Heidegger is interested in 
raising the question of meaning of Being (ontology) in the context of the destruction of 
metaphysics. Heidegger plunges deep into the history of German Idealism to create a revolution 
within ontology, metaphysics, philosophy, and the history of Being.  In order to do a 
deconstruction of metaphysics  Heidegger has to go through Hegel.  Heidegger’s reading of 
Hegel has progressed through an early critical stage to a more open appraisal of Hegel’s position 
in western philosophy. Finally  I will take a detailed look at Heidegger’s reading of Hegel’s 
Wissenschaft der Logik.    
Introduction 
In the winter 1910-1911 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, at age of 21 Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) took a course from the Reverend Carl Braig (1853-19 3) entitled: ‘Einleitung in die 
katholische Dogmatik; Gotteslehre’.  Some fifty years later in 1963  Heidegger remembers it was 
during the few walks with Braig that he heard about the Hegel’s significance for speculative 
theology.  During years 1914/15 Heidegger is taking courses that include Hegel from Heinrich 
Rickert (1863-1936) ‘Philosophisches Seminar  Übungen zur philosophischen Systematik im 
Anschluß an Hegel’ and in 1915/16 a course on ‘Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis 
 ietzsche’, which mostly likely covered Hegel. At end of his Habilitationsschrift on Die 
Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus
3
 (1915) surprisingly Heidegger ends this work 
with a reference for the need of philosophy to aufgehoben Hegel. This is part of the beginning 
context of Heidegger’s struggle with Hegel. Heidegger then begins a dialogue with Hegel that 
will last until at least 1968 with a seminar on Hegel: Differenzschrift (Le Thor). At that time 
Heidegger said  “In unserem Fall handelt es sich um Hegel: wir müssen also Auseinandersetzung 
mit Hegel beginnen  damit Hegel zu uns spricht.”4  
 
65 
 
How are we to characterize Heidegger’s dialogue with Hegel? Certainly the influence of 
Aristotle, I. Kant, F. Nietzsche, and E. Husserl on Heidegger is greater.  Early his dialogue, 
Heidegger often gives sharp critical remarks about Hegel.  During Heidegger’s life time there 
was not a large work published about Hegel. For example, Heidegger did publish his famous 
interpretations of Kant and Nietzsche during his lifetime. But Hegel was left in the background.  
Even in the current plans of the Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe shows the absent of any lengthy 
interpretation of Hegel.  Part of the purpose of this paper is to see how Heidegger’s confrontion  
critical debate and struggle with Hegel defined his understand of the Hegel’s Wissenschaft der 
Logik.   
Back to the story, ten years later, by December 10th, 1925 Heidegger writies to Karl Jaspers 
(1883-1969) that “Mir machen die Hegel und Kant Übungen ungewöhnlich viel Freude, und ich 
bin froh, daß ich jetzt erst an diese Sachen komme, wo relativ mindestens die Möglichkeit da ist, 
etwas zu verstehen.“5  In another letter to Jaspers  Heidegger says  „Ich bin dankbar dafür, daß 
mich das Schicksal davor bewahrte, mir Kant und Hegel durch irgend eine der jetzt käuflichen 
Brillen zu verderben. Ich glaube, den Weltgeist in der Näge dieser beiden zu spüren.”6 (Marburg 
16. Dez. 1925).     
The Hegel course at Marburg that Heidegger is talkings about is “Phänomenologische Übungen 
für Fortgeschrittene (Hegel, Logik I. Buch)”.  We have the lecture notes from one Heidegger’s 
students, Helene Weiss, who keep detailed notes on this seminar but there is no known 
manuscript of Heidegger’s.  There is a manuscript for the next course Heidegger taught on 
Hegel  the course was entitled “Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik” (19 7).  Heidegger 
taught seventeen courses and seminars on Hegel between 1925 and 1968.  Did the students ask 
for courses on Hegel or was there something more to it than just an acdemic interested.  Hegel 
stands at the center and he is intricately rich in complexity.    
Hegel begins the Vollendung of metaphysics, but it is with Nietzsche that philosophy as 
metaphysics reaches its final culmination and is the consummation of Platonism.  Heidegger 
wants to escape being merely part of the countermovement to Hegel.  In order to do that, 
Heidegger needed to enter into confrontation and a critical debate with Hegel.   What is 
Heidegger methodology in his dialogue with Hegel?  
Heidegger's encounter Methodology 
What is the methodology of a dialogue between thinkers? There are no objective readings of 
philosophers that are worthy of being called philosophy.  Thinking has its task with us.  
Heidegger said  “Philosophie ist Philosophieren.”7   We need to engage in philosophizing with 
Heidegger.  What is Heidegger’s encounter methodology? 
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For instance, Heidegger sympathetically quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): “Will man einen 
Philosophen ehren, so muss man ihn da auffassen, wo er noch nicht zu den Folgen fortgegangen 
ist  in seinem Grundgedanken; [in dem Gedanken]  von dem er ausgeht.”8  
Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says."
9
  In 
another place Heidegger says  “Einen Denker achten wir nur, indem wir denken. Dies verlangt, 
alles Wesentliche zu denken  was in seinem Gedanken gedacht ist.”10   Heidegger said  “Damit 
wir selbst durch die Auseinandersetzung für die höchste Anstrengung des Denkens frei 
werden.”11 The task of the Auseinandersetzung is so that we become thinkers – not that we 
become scholars or experts on Hegel or  ietzsche  this is not Heidegger’s pro ect and vision.  
Scholarship provides some of the timber, but not the bricks for the bridge.  
Heidegger wants to think everything that a philosopher thought, but in his own way and in his 
own time in history.  There are no ahistorical interpretations or reading of philosophers.  No 
eternal texts outside of history.   
Heidegger’s dialogue with Kant shows us Heidegger’s encounter methodology in its fullest form.  
Heidegger says  „Den “Kant an sich” zu entdecken bleibe der Kantphiologie überlassen.“12  
Heidegger says in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "bei Kant 
nämlich, daß man heir nicht sehn will, sondern umgekehrt von einem willkürlichen 
Hineininterpretieren meinerseits spricht.”13  
Can we see the problem? Can we find “Heidegger in himself”? Among the Heideggerians of the 
center-right or the orthodox position are they trying to get Heidegger right? When Heidegger is 
reading Hegel  does he want to find “Hegel in himself”?  Is Heidegger trying to get Hegel right?  
No.  Heidegger dialogue with Hegel is a Kampf over the issues themselves.  
In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
says  “Unablässig stößt man sich an der Gewaltsamkeit meiner Auslegungen. Der Vorwurf des 
Gewaltsamen kann an dieser Schrift gut belegt werden.”14 And then Heidegger goes on to talk 
about "ein denkendes Gespräch zwischen Denken-den" and "Das Verfehlende ist in der 
Zwiesprache drohender, das Fehlende häufiger."
15
   This is a dialogue – not a re-presenting of 
Kant’s or Hegel’s philosophical position. Heidegger is not making claims and counterclaims. He 
is not looking for logical proofs. Heidegger approvingly quotes Aristotle from Book IV of the 
Metaphysics (1006a sqq.), "Es ist nämlich Unerzogenheit, keinen Blick zu haben dafür, mit 
Bezug worauf es nötig ist  einen Beweis zu suchen  in bezug worauf dies nicht nötig ist.”16   
Heidegger is engaged in a dialogue, a decisive and thoughtful debate with Hegel.  But that means 
more than  ust an analysis of Hegel. Heidegger said  “Das Gespräch mit einem Denker kann nur 
von der Sache des Denkens handeln.”17   This is more than just getting the words right.  
Kant said in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781 (KrV), paragraph - A314. 
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“Ich merke nur an  daß es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei  sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche  als in 
Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand 
äußert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht 
genügsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete, oder auch 
dachte.” 
There is in Kant a lot more than the Neo-Kantians would have us believe.  Heidegger said  “Wir 
sind für Kant gegen den Kantianismus und sind für Kant nur, um ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, 
erneut in lebendiger Auseinandersetzung mit uns zu leben.”18   One of Heidegger’s early 
formulations of his methodology with his dialogue with the history of philosophy is from a 
lecture course of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.  During this time he must have 
been thinking a lot about the uncompleted second part of Being and Time which was to be about 
Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. Heidegger has given us a concise statement about his 
phenomenological method from this period. 
“Diese drei Grundstücke der phänomenologischen Methode: Reduktion  Konstruktion  
Destruktion, gehören inhaltlich zusammen und müssen in ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit begründet 
werden. Konstruktion der Philosophie ist notwendig Destruktion, d.h. ein im historischen 
Rückgang auf die Tradition vollzogener Abbau des Überlieferten, was keine Negation und 
Verurteilung der Tradition zur Nichtigkeit, sondern umgekehrt gerade positive Aneignung ihrer 
bedutet.”19  
In a missing third part of this lecture dealing with the method of ontology, there is a third 
chapter, which is outlined as being on the phenomenological method: reduction, construction, 
and destruction.  Did Heidegger run out of time in this lecture series or were the issues 
unresolved?  
For Hegelians  Heidegger’s approach is starting to sound a little like aufgehoben the tradition. 
Heidegger uses the terms “positive Aneignung”. The Hegelian image of the bud becoming the 
blossom and then the fruit in the Preface to the Phänomenologie des Geistes.  Or, in the 
Wissenschaft der Logik where Hegel is explaining how the system of B. Spinoza (1632-1677) is 
contained within the higher true system. There is no higher standpoint for Heidegger; rather 
Heidegger characterized his conversation with the history of thinking as a Schritt zurück.
20
  
Both Heidegger and Hegel want to come to terms with history of philosophy.  But their 
metahistories of philosophy go in opposite directions.  Although it is apparent that Hegel sees 
himself squarely within his own metahistory of philosophy, I think it is less obvious where 
Heidegger see his own awakening and questioning in the Geschichte des Seyns, or for that matter 
in the Seinsvergessenheit.  
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Martin Heidegger’s Kindred Reading of Hegel 
Heidegger and Hegel have a highly developed and structured metahistories of philosophy.  Both 
of them have written extensively on the history of philosophy and on individual philosophers.  
Undoubtedly, a historical encounter is important for both of these philosophers.  This is the crux 
of their radical transformation of philosophy historical thinking.  Hegel has thought through the 
entire course of the history of philosophy up to his time.  Heidegger has written more about the 
history of philosophy than any other philosopher.   Plus, he has reflected on the methodology of 
a dialogue between philosophers.   
In Heidegger’s encounter with Hegel he says  “Wenn wir zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel 
kommen vollen  dann geht an uns die Forderung  mit ihm “verwandt” zu sein.”21 Heidegger 
meant that his reading of Hegel was among the family.  There are only philosophers here.  
Heidegger following Hegel said  “…Denn in der Philosophie “gibt es weder Vorgänger noch 
 achgänger”  das heißt nicht  daß  edem Philosophen  eder andere gleichgültig sei  sondern es 
besagt umgekehrt….”22 Heidegger is not the successor to Hegel, nor is Hegel the predecessor to 
Heidegger.  Each thinker is unique, exclusively, and his thought is radically his own.   
Heidegger approvingly quoted Hegel on his “verwandt” methodology. In The Difference between 
Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy  Hegel wrote  “Der lebendige Geist  der in einer 
Philosophie wohnt, verlangt, um sich zu enthüllen, durch einen verwandten Geist geborn zu 
werden.”23  
Through out most of the Heidegger’s works on Hegel he used one word to designate his 
encounter and dialogue with Hegel. That word is Auseinandersetzung, a critcial debate.  
Heidegger says  “Aus-einander-setzung – Scheidung“ 24  He says that this is a not a controverse 
nor a polemic, but rather a Kampf.  This is not just a minor debate over some philosophical 
problem, but rather, this is a struggle over  the ground question of philosophy.  
This is the place for the encounter and dialogue with the primary matters for thought.  Indeed, 
this is the clearing that is open for genuine, authentic philosophical thinking.   
Background on Martin Heidegger’s Hegel project 
Why did Heidegger not publish more of his works on Hegel?  Why did he not fully develop his 
Hegel lectures? Heidegger mentioned in a Letter to Elisabeth Blochmann.  “In die Vorlesung 
habe ich nur eine kleine Zahl aufgenommen, aber auch für diese was das meist zu schwer.“25 
These were difficult lectures for Heidegger students and perhaps for Heidegger as well.  
Heidegger’s book length work on Hegel is entitled: Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes comes 
from an earlier course in 1930/1931.
26
 This was left by Heidegger to be published posthumous.  
Why was Hegel left in the background?  David Krell reports in a conversation with Heidegger, 
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that Heidegger thought it was important no to let Hegel stand in isolation (May 16, 1975).
27
   
This was specifically in regards to the lecture Hegel und die Griechen (1958), but I think we 
generalize this remark – Heidegger has myriad of tribulations with Hegel and his general 
tendency would be to leave him isolated  but Heidegger worked and struggled on Hegel’s 
thinking – he may not have been happy with the process and some of the results.  Although it is 
apparent that he learn more from other philosophers.  
From 1925 to at least 1968 (43 years) Heidegger was working and writing on Hegel, yet, he did 
not publish a large number of his writing on Hegel.  For example, in the Martin 
Heidegger/Eugen Fink: Heraklit seminar of 1966/67, Hegel is the modern philosopher who is 
mentioned most frequently. So even in an unrelated work, it still seems like Heidegger is in some 
kind of dialogue with Hegel.  
Dr. Alfred Guzzoni’s Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag “Zeit und Sein” written in 
1962 has long passages discussing the Heidegger/Hegel relationship. From the seminar notes: 
“Obgleich Hegel der Sache nach dem Anliegen Heideggers in gewisser Weise entfernter ist als 
 ede andere metaphysische Position.”28   Heidegger reviewed this Protokoll and had it published 
in his works to help us understand his essay.  
There are three important quotes from Heidegger, which give some indication of how he 
approached Hegel’s philosophy: 
Heidegger said in 1915, 
“Die Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes  der tatvollen Liebe  der verehrenden Gottinnigkeit  
deren allgemeinste Richtpunkte nur angedeutet werden konnten, insonderheit eine von ihren 
Grundtendenzen geleitete Kategorienlehre steht vor der grossen Aufgabe einer prinzipiellen 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem an Fulle wie Tiefe, Erlebnisreichtum und Begriffsbildung 
gewaltigsten System einer historischen Weltanschauung, als welches es alle vorausgegangenen 
fundamentalen philosophischen Problemmotive in sich aufgehoben hat  mit Hegel.”29  
Heidegger said in 1919,  
“Dann stehn wir mit der Front gegen Hegel  d.h. vor einer der schwierigsten 
Auseinandersetzungen.”30  
Heidegger said in 1946,  
“Trotz des flachen Geredes vom Zusammenbruch der Hegelschen Philosophie bleibt dies Eine 
bestehen, dass im 19. Jahrhundert nur diese Philosophie die Wirklichkeit bestimmte, ob-zwar 
nicht der äußerlichen Form einer befolgten Lehre, sondern als Metaphysik, als Herrschaft der 
Seiendheit im Sinne der Gewißheit. Die Gegenbewegungen gegen diese Metaphysik gehören zu 
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ihr. Seit Hegels Tod (1831) ist alles nur Gegenbewegung, nicht nur in Deutschland sondern in 
Europa.”31 
 
One may add nich nur in Europa sondern die Welt. Heidegger saw Hegel’s philosophy as a huge 
system and as a task to overcome as part of metaphysics  but Heidegger’s own philosophical 
thinking was not close to Hegel.  Question: how close is Heidegger to Hegel? – The simple 
answer is that they are not especially close at all.    
In some ways Hegel’s philosophical system is a closed system within itself  so it did not give 
much room for Heidegger to try to find the unthought or the unresolved or an opening for a 
reinterpretation.  Some of Heidegger’s task of the destruction of the history of Ontology is at 
work with Hegel in the section on “Hegel's Concept of Time” in Sein und Zeit (Section 82), but 
there is less evidence of this in Heidegger’s other works on Hegel.  Heidegger did included 
Hegel in his general remarks on German Idealism, but most of these remarks are not insightful 
their relationship and serve only to distance Heidegger from idealism and metaphysics as such.  
Heidegger seems to be closer to F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) than to Hegel, when he remarks, 
“denn Schelling ist der eigentlich schöpferische und am weitesten ausgreifende Denker diese 
Ganzen Zeitalters der deutsche Philosophie.”32   Heidegger made the following interesting 
statement about Schelling’s Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) when he remarks that 
it is  “Die Abhandlung  die Hegels “Logik” schon vor ihrem Erscheinen erschüttert!”33   
Thus, it was Schelling that Heidegger saw as the boldest thinker of this epoch, not Hegel.   For us 
this means Hegel still needs to be encountered, and thus his metaphysical systems need to be 
confronted.  Hegel at this point is more villain than hero. Following what Alfred Denker said 
about Heidegger’s Hegel interpretation “for Heidegger – Hegel is both villain and hero”.34    
Martin Heidegger’s Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel  
“…geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel.“35  
Heidegger’s approach to Hegel is shown by this remark  „Hegels Systematik in den 
beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken.“36  This may sound like 
that Heidegger’s project is to develop a contra position to Hegel. Yes and no.  Heidegger is not 
part of the Gegenbewegung to Hegel like L. Feurbach, K. Marx, S. Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche 
(yes, Nietzsche has plenty to say contra Hegel and Hegelianism).  Heidegger is developing a 
bridge and a transition after metaphysics and Hegel is epitome of metaphysics.  So, it is not a 
contra position per se. Nietzsche and Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) are part of the transition.  
Heidegger is pointing the way for us toward this transition and new Anfang.  
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What are the main philosophical Sachen between Heidegger and Hegel?  In fact, following both 
Hegel and Husserl  we are subscribing to the grand methodology motto  that is  “die Sachen 
selbst”.  
I want to stress Heidegger’s contra thinking to Hegel: 
1) Heidegger is contra systems in general.  See Schelling Book. (GA 42). Also, in the Beiträge 
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)  he said  “Die Zeit der “Systeme” ist vorbei.”37  
2) Heidegger notes Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik as sub ectivity  “rein im Elemente des 
Denkens.”38   Heidegger contra subjectivity.  The absolute idea.  
3) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s Unendlichkeit and Ewigkeit.  (GA 80).   
4) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik . (GA 11). 
Ontology, theology, and logic.  
5) Heidegger is contra Hegelian dialectics. (GA 1, GA 56/57, GA 63).  
6) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s concept of time from the philosophy of nature (See Sein und 
Zeit, section 82) (GA 2).  
7) Heidegger contra Hegel’s idea of time in the Phänomenologie des Geistes als der reine 
Begriff tilgt die Zeit. 
8) Heidegger sees the Phänomenologie des Geistes as the major work as contra the 
Wissenschaft der Logik.  There is some connection between Being and Time (the existenziale 
Analytik des Da-sein) and the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Whereas there appears to be no 
connection between Analytik of Da-sein and the Wissenschaft der Logik. (GA 32).  
9) Heidegger’s Being and Time the main thesis is the essence of Being is time, this the exact 
opposite of Hegel’s philosophy (GA 32).  
10) Heidegger is contra the way Hegel thinks the history of philosophy (abstract developing to 
the highest standpoint – Hegel). Metahistory.  
11) Heidegger is contra Hegel on speculative philosophy. Hegel’s Letter “Philosophical content 
has in its method and soul three forms: it is  1  abstract     dialectical  and 3  speculative.” 
Hegel to Niethammer Nuremberg, October 23, 1812.  [Werke III, 301-16].  
12) Heidegger is contra Hegel correspondence theory of truth. 
13) Heidegger is contra Hegel on Philosophie as Wissenschaft.  
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14) Heidegger is contra Hegel on Wissenschaft as a circle.39.  
15) Heidegger is contra Hegel on the absolute.  
16) Heidegger is contra Hegel dissolving ontology into logic.40  
17) Heidegger’s anfänglich denken contra Hegel on begreifende Denken. Hegel said, 
“immanente Entwicklung des Begriffes ist die absolute Methode”41 Or  Heidegger’s remark 
on besinnliches Denken (letter to M. Boss, Sept 12, 1965).  
18) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s absolute metaphysics.42  
19) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s Logik im Sinne der Theo-Logik.43. 
20) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s Gott als absoluter Geist.44 
 1) Heidegger is contra Hegel’s Sein als “Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare.“45  
  ) Open Issue: Heidegger’s Die  egativität (1938-1939).46  
 3) Open Issue: Hegel’s Aesthetics.  See Staiger-Heidegger Briefwechsel.  
24) Open Issue: Heidegger places Hegel in history of Being as will to absolute knowledge 
(Wissen).   
25) Open Issue: According to O. Pöggeler, Heidegger borrowed for many years the original 
edition of the Hegel’s Die Lehre vom Wesen from the Hegel-Archiv.  Heidegger gave a seminar 
on this topic in the Wintersemester 1955/56.  There is a known Heidegger manuscript from this 
seminar.  This work may turn out to be the most detailed interpretation of Hegel’s Wissenschaft 
der Logik by Heidegger.  There are manuscripts from Heidegger’s seminars on other topics than 
either the Phänomenologie des Geistes or the Wissenschaft der Logik. For example: 1) Hegels 
Jenenser Realphilosophie, 2) Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte, 3) Hegel Über den Staat, and 4) 
Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik. We await these publications in perhaps GA 86.  
26) Open Issue: Heidegger is against Weltanschauung – Hegel wants to create some kind of a 
Weltanschauung.  
 7) Open Issue: “Hegel  umped over his Schatten…and into Sonne.”47 The elimination of 
Endlichkeit des menschen.  
28) Open Issue: Heidegger says for Hegel freedom is will and will is freedom. What is 
Heidegger’s position on freedom and will?  
Martin Heidegger on Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik 
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Heidegger said in 1923, « Alle Dialektik lebt immer eigentlich in dem, was sie bringt, vom Tish 
der anderen. Das leuchtende Beispiel: Hegels Logik. Nicht nur, daß es bei flüchtiger Betrachtun 
schon in die Augen springt, daß die eine traditionelle Logik lediglich verarbeitet ist.”48 This 
comes from the period at the end of Heidegger’s work with E. Husserl  so from a 
phenomenologist point of view Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik is just the re-working of the 
tradition.  This is before Heidegger real starts to reflecton Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. 
Heidegger first course on the Wissenschaft der Logik is a few years later in 1925.  Evidently, 
Heidegger does not see the importance of Hegel’s Logik at this time.  Through many of 
Heidegger’s early writing we see the sharp and critical remarks about Hegel.  At this point, 
Hegel is  ust simply the vilain for Heidegger.  Heidegger’s remarks show Hegel at his lowest 
point for Heidegger.  Heidegger’s natural tendency as a phenomenologist is to perhaps see 
something substantial in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, but the whole project of the Logik 
is suspect from the beginning.  In a sense this is a dividing line for Heidegger, by this early 
rejection of the Wissenschaft der Logik this puts Heidegger on a different path and a different 
direction in his dialogue with Hegel.  
Heidegger said  “Der letzte und zugleich gewaltigsten Versuch dieses Durchdenkens der 
Kategorien, d.h. der Hinsichten, nach denn die Vernunft das Seiende als solches denkt, ist die 
Dialektik Hegels, die er in einem Werk gestaltet hat, das den echten und gemäßen Namen 
“Wissenschaft der Logik” trägt. Dies besagt: das Sichwissen des Wesens der Vernunft als das 
Denken des “Seins”  in wilchem Denken sich die Einheit und die Zusammengehörigkeit der 
Bestimmungen des Seins zum “absoluten Begriff” entfalten und sich darin begründen.”49  
By this time (1939) Heidegger is starting to see Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik in a larger 
context.  He calls this an “gewaltigsten Versuch”  so now Hegel’s pro ect is understood through 
a philosophers eyes, not just a phenomenologist.  This shows how far Heidegger as come, not 
that he has discarded his earlier thinking, but he is putting philosophical issues in a much more 
grounded historical totality.  
Heidegger makes the convincing connections between der Kategorien, die Dialektik, und 
absoluten Begriff.  This summary statement assumes a great amount of work by Heidegger and 
gives us further evidence of Heidegger’s continuing and detailed analysis of Hegel’s 
Wissenschaft der Logik.  
By 1946, Heidegger has now further developed his thinking and the place of Hegel in the history 
of philosophy.  ow he says  “Die Gegenbewegungen gegen diese Metaphysik gehören zu ihr. 
Seit Hegels Tod (1831) ist alles nur Gegenbewegung, nicht nur in Deutschland sondern in 
Europa.”50 So  now it is not  ust the importance of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, but rather, 
the whole of Hegel’s metaphysics is central to western philosophy. However  not as a system 
followed, rather, as the counterpunch or the Gegenbewegungen to Hegel thinking.  The broad 
74 
 
and historical context is emphasized so Hegel is the key modern philosopher.  Every since 
Hegel’s death  philosophy is only a series of footnotes that are contra to the Hegelian influence.  
Heidegger gives Hegel the honor of being the central opponent.  
Heidegger said in 196   “Diese Vorstellung vom Sein als des schlechthin Abstrakten wird im 
Prinzip auch noch nicht aufegeben, sondern nur bestätigt, wenn das Sein als das schelechthin 
Abstrakte in das schlechthin Konkrete der Wirklichkeit des absoluten Geistes aufgehoben wird, 
was im gewaltigsten Denken der neueren Zeit, in Hegels spekulativer Dialektik sich vollzogen 
hat und in seiner “Wissenschaft der Logik” dargestellt wird.”51   
This is now (1962) the highest point in Heidegger’s reconsideration of Hegel’s metaphysics. 
Hegel is now the “gewaltigsten Denken der neueren Zeit”.  Hegel is Heidegger’s Gegenspieler. 
Heidegger’s geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel is because Hegel is the Gegenspieler.  
Hegel is a good Bösewicht for Heidegger.  
Being is abstract. This is how Hegel starts the beginning of the Wissenschaft der Logik. Hegel 
said  “Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare.“52 Being gets transformed into the absoluten 
Geistes (Gott), but also as the absoluten Begriff and als die absolute Methode.  Heidegger puts 
his finger on the whole project of the Wissenschaft der Logik, and of course rejects the 
fundamental position, but he shows the Hegel central place in Geschichte des Seyns, and in the 
Seinsvergessenheit.  Hegel’s grand and imposing metaphysical system is the most important key 
Gegenspieler for Heidegger, which is why he must Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel.  
Conclusion 
Heidegger said in 1927, „Das Problem kommt solange nicht von der Stelle  als die Logik selbst 
nicht wieder in die Ontologie zurückgenommen wird, d.h. solange nicht Hegel, der umgekehrt 
die Ontologie in Logik aufloste, begriffen ist, und das besagt immer, durch die Radikalisierung 
der Fragestellung überwunden und zugleich angeeignet wird.  Diese Überwindung Hegels ist der 
innerlich notwendige Schritt in der Entwicklung der abendländischen Philosophie, der gemacht 
werden muss  wenn sie überhaupt noch am Leben bleiben soll.“53   
If we can not get through Hegel and reverse his influence, then western philosophy no longer 
lives, it dies. Thus, we must take the necessary step of Überwindung Hegel.  Heidegger points us 
in two directions here: 1) Logic needs to be taken back into ontology. 2) The Radikalisierung of 
the question and positive Aneignung of Hegel.  
Heidegger plunges deep into Logik and Ontologie to create eine Umwälzung.  Heidegger’s 
reading of Hegel has progressed through a critical stage to a more open assessment of Hegel’s 
position in western philosophy.  Hegel’s position is the central opponent for Heidegger.  Hegel is 
the most powerful thinking in modern times and the later Heidegger seems to place more 
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emphasis on the Wissenschaft der Logik than the Phänomenologie des Geistes.  Evidently, 
Heidegger’s position on Hegel  philosophy and Hegel’s position in the history of philosophy has 
changed.  Heidegger has positively Aneignung Hegel and has not left him out.   This positive 
Aneignung has overwhelmingly been by developing by Heidegger as a Gegendurchschlag to 
Hegel.  Heidegger does this not by a critical refutation of Hegel’s arguments or a re ection of 
Hegel’s philosophical problems  but by developing a transition and a new Anfang out of 
metaphysics.  The transition is to das anfängliche Denken.   
 
In the years 1936/38 Heidegger worked on a second major work after Sein und Zeit, entitled 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). This is not a lecture series or a work about other 
philosophers, but rather, Heidegger attempts to recast in his own philosophy. In the Beiträge, 
Heidegger  tells us about his general approach to Hegel  „Hegels Systematik in den 
beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken.“54 
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A conference was held in Prague  Czech Republic  in  ovember  00  that was entitled “Issues 
Confronting the Post-European World” and that was dedicated to Jan Patočka (1907-1977). The 
Organization of Phenomenological Organizations was founded on that occasion. The 
following essay is published in celebration of that event.   Essay 39:  
 
Heidegger and the Purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
Abstract  
What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel’s seminal work the Phenomenology of Spirit? It has 
spawned two great traditions, namely Marxism and Existentialism. Hegel wrote the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in 1806, in a rush during the battle of Jena. It went out of print, and 
Hegel did not use it in his lectures. How did Hegel see the purpose of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit? Martin Heidegger gave a lecture in the 1930s on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in 
which he identified and discussed four misinterpretations of the intention or purpose of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Those four are (1) it is not Husserlian phenomenology, (2) it is not a 
typology of philosophical standpoints (K. Jaspers, W. Dilthey), (3) it is not some kind of 
introduction to philosophy, and (4) it is not some form of rationalism. After an analysis and 
critique of Heidegger’s hermeneutical interpretation  I offer my own analysis and insight into the 
purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation follows Hegel more closely and 
shows connections to Hegel’s Science of Logic and his metaphysical system.  
 “Ever since Hegel’s Death  everything is merely a countermovement …” (Martin Heidegger  
Overcoming Metaphysics)  
Introduction  
What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel’s (1770-1831) celebrated work the Phenomenology of 
Spirit? It has contributed two great traditions, namely, Marxism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905-
1980) Existentialism. Both of these schools would have been offensive to Hegel and surely is not 
what Hegel intending to do in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Marxism is simply a counterpunch to 
Hegel. The Existentialism tradition has the same common interest of facticity and human 
existence. A third important philosopher and theologian is Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) 
whose anti-Hegelianism is still deeply rooted in Hegelianism.  
Another influence of Hegel during the mid to late 1800s, was the straight Hegelianism of the 
British James Stirling (1820-1909) and the American St. Louis Hegelians, namely, William 
Harris (1835-1909) and Henry Brokmeyer (1828-1906).  
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In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) saw his own work as closer to Immanuel 
Kant’s (17 4-1804) than to Hegel’s  and yet he has offered many still unpublished seminars on 
Hegel. Heidegger said that to link the Phenomenology of Spirit with his own work Being and 
Time (1927) was nonsense, but he still wanted to engage and encounter Hegel. Heidegger was 
famous for his interpretation of Kant and his confrontation with Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) at 
Davos was an important event in his attack on the Neo-Kantians. Heidegger’s Hegel 
interpretation is not as well known as his attack and radical interpretation of Kant and the Neo-
Kantians.  
Part I: Heidegger’s Kindred Reading of Hegel  
Heidegger and Hegel both had a highly developed and structured metahistories of philosophy. 
Both of them have written extensively on the history of philosophy and on individual 
philosophers. Clearly, a historical encounter is important for both of these philosophers. This is 
the crux of their radical transformation of philosophy. Hegel has thought through the entire 
course of the history of philosophy up to his time. Heidegger has written more about the history 
of philosophy than any other philosopher. Plus, he reflected on the methodology of a dialogue 
between philosophers. This is true in particular in his interpretation of Kant. Heidegger made 
scattered remarks over thirty years about his detractors concerning his radical Kant 
interpretation. One of his remarks was very refreshing. In the Preface to the Second Edition 
(June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger said, "Readers have taken constant 
offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be 
supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx). However  Heidegger’s Kant 
interpretation seems to be much more radical than his engagement with Hegel. There is a lot 
more at issue with Kant and the Neo-Kantians (which includes Heidegger’s teacher  Edmund 
Husserl, as well) than with Hegel and the Hegelians.  
In Heidegger’s encounter with Hegel he says  “If we wish to confront Hegel  then we are 
required to be ‘kindred’ with him.” (E.T.  p 31). Heidegger meant that his reading of Hegel was 
among the family. There were only philosophers here. Hegel made the following remark in one 
of his earliest publications  “…with respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither 
predecessors nor successors.” (The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of 
Philosophy, e.t. p.87). This means that the inner essence of philosophy is the same matter for all 
of us. Heidegger is not the successor to Hegel, or Hegel the predecessor to Heidegger. Each 
thinker is unique and his thought is radically his own. Again we are all kindred. We are all 
philosophers here following the “inner essence of philosophy.”  
In other places  Heidegger spoke of getting at the unthought in a philosopher’s thinking. 
Heidegger stood firmly within the hermeneutical tradition and was keenly aware of the nature of 
textual interpretation.  
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Kant said something insightful about the nature of the interpretation of other philosophers, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason:  
I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in 
ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even 
better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and 
hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention. (Critique of Pure 
Reason, A314.).  
Perhaps following Kant we can say that we know Hegel better than he understood himself. This 
is a large and difficult undertaking, what Hegel did with his writing; we can try to see the single 
driving force. It is important to see how the underlying assumptions and presuppositions of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the whole ontotheological/metaphysical system come together. The 
best interpretation needs to include both a general understanding of his entire system and an 
understanding of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Heidegger only hinted at this combination. For 
this interpretation, however, this important point will be the guiding method.  
Heidegger approvingly quoted Hegel on his “kindred” methodology. In The Difference between 
Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, Hegel wrote  “If the living Spirit which dwells in 
a philosophy is to be revealed  it needs to born through a kindred spirit.” (HHPS, p.31). This is 
the place for the encounter and dialogue with the primary matters for thought. Indeed, this is the 
clearing that is open for us for genuine, authentic philosophical thinking. The task for our 
thinking is open.  
Part II: Background on Heidegger’s Hegel project  
Many of Heidegger’s writings and works on Hegel are not currently planned as part of the 
collected writings  Gesamtausgabe (GA). Why is the Hegel material left out of Heidegger’s 
works? Why did Heidegger not publish more of his works on Hegel?  
In 1929 Heidegger taught a course on Idealism and Realism in the Preface to the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. The materials for this course have not been published, and currently plans omit them 
from the collected works (Gesamtausgabe). He also taught several other unpublished courses on 
Hegel: Science of Logic (book one) 1925/1926; ontology of Aristotle and Hegel 1927; Jenenser 
Realphilosophies 1934; Phenomenology of Spirit 1934  1935  1936; Hegel’s Metaphysics of 
History 1939/1940; Phenomenology of Spirit 1943; Logic: Logic of Essence 1955/1956; Logic: 
About the beginning of Science 1956/1957. None of these materials from these courses has been 
published  and none is slated for inclusion in the collected works. Heidegger’s book length 
published work called Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (HHPS) comes from an earlier course in 
1930/1931 (GA 32).  
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From 1925 to at least 1968 (43 years) Heidegger was working and writing on Hegel, yet he did 
not want to publish a large number of his writing on Hegel. For example  in Heidegger’s 
Heraclitus Seminar (of 1966/67) with Eugen Fink (1905-1975), Hegel is the modern philosopher 
who is mentioned most frequently. So even in an unrelated work, it still seems like Heidegger is 
in some kind of dialogue with Hegel.  
There are three important quotes from Heidegger, which give some indication of how he 
approached Hegel’s philosophy.  
1) Heidegger said in 1915. “Philosophy…now faces the huge task of fundamentally confronting 
the system of a historical worldview which is the most powerful with regard to its fullness, its 
depth, its conceptually, and the richness of its experiences, and which as such has resumed and 
surpassed all proceeding fundamental philosophical problems; that is  it has to confront Hegel” 
(translation by Karin de Boer, GA 1:410-411).  
 ) Heidegger said in 1946  “In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian 
philosophy, one thing remains true: only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth 
century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed, but rather as metaphysics, as 
the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty. The counter movements to this metaphysics 
belong to it. Ever since Hegel’s death (1831)  everything is merely a countermovement  not only 
in Germany  but also in Europe. (GA 3 :57  “Overcoming Metaphysics ” E.T.  p. 89).  
3) Heidegger said in 1958  “Accordingly  philosophy as the self-development of spirit into 
absolute knowledge and the history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to Hegel's 
had acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling and requiring 
philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be in this movement 
philosophy itself. (“Hegel and the Greeks ” Conference of the Academy of Sciences at 
Heidelberg. 1958).  
Heidegger saw Hegel’s philosophy as a huge system and as a task to overcome as part of 
metaphysics, but Heidegger’s philosophical thinking was not close to Hegel. Question: how 
close is Heidegger to Hegel? – The simple answer is that they are not very close at all. Perhaps 
the great anti-system thinker Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is the farthest from Hegel. But this 
is a digression.  
In some ways Hegel’s philosophical system is a closed system within itself  so it did not leave 
much room for Heidegger to try to find the unthought or the unresolved or an opening for a 
reinterpretation. Some of Heidegger’s task of the destructuring of the history of ontology is at 
work with Hegel in the on “Hegel's Concept of Time” in Being and Time. (E.T., p. 428), but 
there is less evidence of this in Heidegger’s other works on Hegel. Heidegger did included Hegel 
84 
 
in his general remarks on German Idealism, but most of these remarks are not insightful about 
Hegel and serve only to distance Heidegger from metaphysics as such.  
Heidegger seems to be closer to F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) than to Hegel, when he remarks, 
“…for Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German 
philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German Idealism from within right past its 
own fundamental position.” (Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, E.T., p. 4). 
Heidegger made the following interesting statement about Schelling’s Treatise on Human 
Freedom when he remarks that it is  “The treatise which shatters Hegel’s Logic before it was 
even published.” (Schelling’s treatise on the essence of human freedom Treatise, E.T., p. 97). 
Thus, it was Schelling that Heidegger saw as the boldest thinker of this epoch, not Hegel. For us 
this means Hegel still needs to be encountered, and thus his metaphysical systems need to be 
confronted. Heidegger is still part of that countermovement to movement to Hegel, and if he 
needs Schelling’s help to push the foundations  well so be it.  
Part III: Heidegger Points To Four Misinterpretations of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(HHPS)  
1) Phenomenology of Spirit is not Husserlian phenomenology.  
2) Phenomenology of Spirit is not a typology of philosophical standpoints.  
3) Phenomenology of Spirit is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that 
this is not a “…transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine 
speculative philosophical knowledge.” (HHPS  p.  9).  
4) Phenomenology of Spirit is not some form of rationalism or, for that matter irrationalism.  
A. Remarks on Heidegger’s First Misinterpretation  
Heidegger’s First Thesis:  
Phenomenology of Spirit is not Husserlian phenomenology.  
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) did not do Hegelian phenomenology. This is obvious to everyone 
with any training or background in philosophy. Certainly Hegel is not some kind of forerunner of 
Husserl, either. It is doubtful that Heidegger could find anyone holding this position, other than 
perhaps some misdirected popular magazine; of course he could not link this misinterpretation to 
any philosopher. But he wanted to be sure to link the then current usage of phenomenology only 
to Husserl – no one else including Heidegger was doing “phenomenology.” This is  ust another 
way that Heidegger used to distance himself from Husserl and all the present-day schools or “-
ism.” Heidegger has always wanted to stand by himself as unique philosopher. Heidegger did not 
want to be known simply as a student of Husserl’s or as only an assistant to Husserl.  
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B. Remarks on Heidegger’s Second Misinterpretation  
Heidegger’s Second Thesis:  
Phenomenology of Spirit is not a typology of philosophical standpoints.  
Heidegger argued against the position that the Phenomenology of Spirit was a typology of 
philosophical standpoints. Hegel’s shapes of consciousness could be misconstrued by Hegelians 
as worldviews and types of philosophical standpoint. Is the Phenomenology only a question of 
the typologies of philosophical standpoints? On the hand, Hegel discussed skepticism and 
stoicism in the earlier part of the Phenomenology of Spirit; however, these are not philosophical 
types, but rather various shapes of self-consciousness. At the end of the Introduction, Hegel says 
that these are “patterns of consciousness” (Gestalten des Bewußtseins).  
Kant first used this term in term “Weltanschauungen” in the Critique of Judgment (1790). 
Heidegger used this term in the title of his first lecture in 1919. The title of the lecture is “Die 
Idee der Philosophies und Weltanschauungsproblem.” Heidegger’s own position was more 
complex on the use of term. In general, following Husserl, Heidegger is against and opposed the 
position of worldviews as some kind of philosophical standpoint.  
Perhaps one philosopher who can be mentioned in this context (who was for philosophy as 
worldviews) is Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). Karl Jaspers’ work on the Psychology of WorldView 
(Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 1919) is perhaps what Heidegger was thinking of when he 
wrote these remarks.   
Heidegger did a review of Jaspers’ work in 19 1  but he does not discuss Jasper’s remarks on 
Hegel.  
Another possible candidate for the position as one who saw philosophy and Hegel as doing 
philosophy as worldviews, would be Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), whose work entitled The 
Essence of Philosophy discusses some of the same points on concept of worldviews 
(Weltanschauungen). In this work, Dilthey made a passing comment on Hegel and worldviews 
(E.T., p. 60-61). In addition  Dilthey published an article entitled “Weltanschaguung  
Philosophies und Religion” in 1910.  
Heidegger was right in calling this position of the Phenomenology as stages of worldviews a 
misinterpretation and misdirection in thinking about Hegel. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is 
not worldviews just put together in an arbitrary arrangement. Again, Hegel showed that there is a 
necessity at work in this process of patterns of consciousness, of the history of the education of 
consciousness  and of the absolute Spirit unfolding. The “We” of self-consciousness is on the 
way toward the great ending – absolute Knowing. There is a progression upward to higher stages 
on the path. The philosophical point here is not some collection of worldviews as a topology of 
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philosophical standpoints. The Phenomenology is the progress of consciousness moving and 
striving to the absolute Spirit.  
C. Remarks on Heidegger’s Third Misinterpretation  
Heidegger’s Third Thesis:  
Phenomenology of Spirit is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that it 
is not a “…transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine speculative 
philosophical knowledge.” (p. 29).  
Heidegger did not elaborate on this misinterpretation. This interpretation (“transition…”) is 
straightforward, and there are lots of reasons to actually support this so-called misinterpretation. 
This interpretation (“transition…”) of Hegel is one of the many intentions that Hegel was 
thinking of when he wrote the Phenomenology of Spirit. So, why did Heidegger not see this at 
least as part of the purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit? Let us attempt to look at the 
other side (from Heidegger) and see if we can clarify the purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit.  
There are a number of places where Hegel looked at this issue. If Heidegger’s remark of 
“genuine speculative philosophical knowledge” is taken to mean what it was for Hegel  namely  
Science  then the “We” are on the way to standpoint of Science. For example  in the 
Introduction  Hegel says  “The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along 
this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the 
standpoint of Science” (Wissenschaft). (Phenomenology of Spirit, E.T., p. 50). (Bewußtseins 
selbst zur Wissenschaft. Jener Vorsatz stellt die Bildung in der einfachen Weise des Vorsatzes 
als unmittelbar abgetan und geschehen vor; dieser Weg aber ist gegen diese Unwahrheit die 
wirkliche Ausführung.)  
Hegel in the Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, E.T., p. 48) wrote the following about the 
Phenomenology of Spirit  “The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of 
consciousness to the object and had the Notion (Begriff) of Science (Wissenschaft) for its 
result.”  
This single interpretation may not be the one all-encompassing interpretation of the purpose of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: it is evident that Notion or the standpoint of Science is at least 
one of the results, or goals, or the final purpose and intention of the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
The second part of Heidegger’s remark was that the Phenomenology of Spirit does not start with 
“natural consciousness of sensibility.” This may in fact be true  but only in a very limited sense. 
Hegel started with consciousness. Perhaps the first ob ect is not “sensibility.” The first ob ect 
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according to Hegel is called “sense certainty”; there is a case that the first ob ect is also 
“knowing.” The idea of “sensibility” is a general supposition as to where Hegel starts.  
In his work entitled “Hegel’s Concept of Experience ” Heidegger makes this general point about 
how the Phenomenology of Spirit is not a description of a journey. He said  “…this error [in 
interpretation] is not accidental. It follows in the train of the book’s essence  overtakes and thus 
conceals it.” (‘Hegel’s Concept of Experience’, 1942, E.T., p. 51).  
In addition, Hegel started with the absolute Spirit as well – hidden in the background or 
underneath the beginning. All beginnings and presuppositions are arduous in philosophy and 
metaphysics. For Hegel, this whole issue took on a much more decisive role as First Philosophy 
or First Science. Hegel may have been thinking of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the idea of First 
Philosophy. Aristotle is a very important thinker for Hegel.  
So  part of the purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is the “detailed history of the 
education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” or in other words it is the 
movement to something like “genuine speculative philosophical knowledge ” namely  to the 
Hegelian philosophical Science (Wissenschaft).  
D. Remarks on Heidegger’s Fourth Misinterpretation  
Heidegger’s Fourth Thesis:  
Phenomenology of Spirit is not some form of rationalism, or for that matter, irrationalism.  
Heidegger  echoing Schelling said  “Both rationalism and irrationalism represent an external 
labeling of the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy, which does not succeed in unfolding this 
philosophy in terms of the fundamental issue in question.” (E.T.  p.30). Calling Hegel’s system 
some kind of -ism does not really help engage and encounter Hegel’s thought.  
The thinking related to Ismology may be interesting as the history of ideas, but it is definitely not 
true philosophical thinking. Many philosophers agree with this, but it is difficult to ascertain the 
nature of true philosophical thinking. Real philosophy is more than a little proof for some idea. 
Philosophy moves in a realm that is not provable by single statements. To try to refute Hegel 
because of his arguments does not engage his thinking or his metaphysical system. For Hegel, 
the whole system is the truth. Truth is not in parts of Hegel’s system. The system is the inner 
self-unfolding of Spirit or the absolute Spirit or just the absolute unfolding itself in time. This is 
not just an analysis or the text of a book. In a fundamental way, this is reality that is in this 
process.  
Back to Heidegger and Hegel. What does Hegel mean by rationalism? Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right shows that  for Hegelianism  rationalism is important. Hegel in 18 0 wrote  “What is 
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rational is actual and what is actual is rational.” (et p. 10). This is the famous passage. But in 
another few later paragraphies  Hegel stated his position even stronger  where he says  “To 
comprehend what is  this is the task of philosophy  because what is  is reason.” (E.T.  p. 11).  
Hegel’s thinking is in the camp of reason. There are of course the typically rationalist’s 
positions, such as Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), and even Spinoza (1632-1677). 
Spinoza’s system was in the air of the times and was talked about in intellectual circles  and 
Hegel’s friend Schelling is often linked to Spinoza. Schelling often mimicked Spinoza’s method 
of geometry, for example, laying down axioms and trying to prove those propositions.  
Spinoza’s rationalism led to pantheism. This raises the specter of the pantheism controversy 
(“All-is-one-ists”) debated by F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786); 
started by a report about G.E. Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing said he was a Spinozist shortly 
before his death, according to a report from Jacobi. The pantheism controversy drew Kant (1724-
1804) into the dialogue as well. Hegel certainly would have understood his own theological 
position vis-a-via this debate. Hegel made a number of remarks about the shortcomings of 
Spinoza in the Science of Logic (E.T., p. 536). In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel said  “Spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated into thought.” 
Hegel sees himself within rationalism. But Hegel’s is a different kind of rationalism than 
Spinoza, for example.  
Although Hegel may have thought about matters outside of reason, these were not matters that 
were philosophical or in Hegelian terms – not contained within Science. These were outside of 
the scope of philosophy. The philosophical world is for Hegel rational. For Hegel, only the 
rational fell within the philosophical world.  
Hegel wrote in the remarks to paragraph 16 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 
Outline  “The philosophical encyclopaedia excludes  first of all  mere aggregates of information  
such as philology at first appears to be. Secondly, it also (just as decisively) excludes learning 
that is based on mere arbitrariness  such as heraldry  for instance.” (E.T.  p. 40). So  according to 
Hegel there are areas of knowledge and even some kinds of sciences that are outside of his 
philosophical system.  
Thus, Heidegger maybe wrong that this is not some form of rationalism. Heidegger points to 
“reason and ratio” in his own interpretation of Hegel. But Heidegger was correct in that calling 
Hegel’s system “rationalism” (or  any other -ism) does not deepen our understanding of Hegel’s 
thinking. For example  calling Heidegger’s book Being and Time a finite Critique of Pure 
Reason may be helpful for understanding some of the issues in Being and Time, but it does not 
really enjoin us to Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time. Hegel had a place for Reason in his 
system, but simply calling him a rationalist does not engage his thinking. There might be a place 
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for the irrational in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but this is off the main point of Hegel’s 
thinking.  
 
E. What is Heidegger’s Own Interpretation?  
Heidegger’s own specific philosophical position vis-a-via Hegel was  “If reading the problematic 
of Being and Time into some other text is ever nonsensical, then this is the case with Hegel. For 
the thesis that the essence of Being is time is the exact opposite of what Hegel tried to 
demonstrate in his entire philosophy.” (HHPS  p. 145). Therefore  Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit is not some kind of early Being and Time. Only Kant has a glimmer of the problematic of 
Being and Time, according to Heidegger in his 1930 lecture. That glimmer was that the meaning 
of Being (Sinn von Sein) is temporality.  
What does Heidegger think is the main purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit?  
Heidegger summarized by writing that the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit was “…the 
absolute self-presentation of reason (ratio-logos), whose essence and actuality Hegel finds in 
absolute Spirit.” (HHPS p. 30). Where did Heidegger find a special place for reason (Vernunft) 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit? Indeed, according to Hegel, reason is just one of the main stages 
or shapes of consciousness that Spirit passes through on the way to absolute Knowing. This is 
not the same idea of reason that Kant was thinking of in the Critique of Pure Reason. Although 
Heidegger was trying to read Kant into Hegel, he was unsuccessful in attempting to do so. Hegel 
owes a lot to Kant for clearing the way of dogmatic metaphysics and for simulating his thinking, 
but Hegel’s own system is not at all Kantian.  
Part IV: Ferrer’s Reading of the Purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit  
A. How should we Interpret Hegel’s Thinking?  
We will start with a few exordiums.  
Ferrer’s interpretation of Heidegger’s reading of Hegel does not stand in the earlier classical 
period of Heiedggerian scholarship. Nor does it fall in any way in the formulaic schools of 
Heiedggerian interpretations: ultra-orthodox, rejectionist wing, orthodox wing, or liberal-
assimilationists. The interpretation does not follow in the new Beiträge paradigm shift, either 
(see Thomas Sheehan’s article on “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Studies”).  
Rather, I use Heidegger in much the same way that Heidegger used Kant or Hegel, namely, to 
clarify my own thinking. I am, in fact, using Heidegger to open a door -- to have my own 
dialogue with thinkers  and  in this case  it is with Hegel’s work on the pro ect of the Science of 
Experience of Consciousness, which is later known as the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
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In fact, following both Hegel and Husserl, I am subscribing to the grand methodology motto, that 
is  “to the things themselves” (die Sachen selbst). This means for me to view Hegel’s pro ect as 
the Science of Experience of Consciousness, which has become transformed into the infamous 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Although Hegel’s work is a “text ” it is beyond a “book” and a “text” 
on some philosophical positions. Can this new interpretation be just one more interpretation 
among many, standing side-by-side, or am I saying that this interpretation is the only one that is 
consist with Hegel’s intentions? Is there only one correct meta-interpretation of Hegel’s purpose 
for the Phenomenology of Spirit?  
We will start with a series of questions before getting to the central purpose of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
How did the word “Phenomenology” develop in Hegel’s works?  
To begin with  Hegel’s earlier title for the Phenomenology of Spirit was: System of 
Wissenschaft: Part One, Wissenschaft of the Experience of Consciousness. When the work was 
final published in 1807 the title was System of Science Part One, The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Some of the books we have today have two title pages with a different title on each page. This 
published work of Hegel’s  then in a few years went out of print and Hegel never did use it for 
his lectures for students. Hegel was working on a new edition when he died in 1831. However, in 
1832 a new edition of his Collected Works (Werke, Berlin, 1832-1845) came out. The second 
volume simply had the title of “Phenomenology of Spirit.” This is the title  as we know it today.  
The German title is Phanomenologie des Geistes. This is called the Jena Phenomenology of 
Spirit  for the city of Jena  where Hegel wrote this work. Hegel’s story is that he finished this 
work on the eve of Napoleon's October 12, 1806 victory at Jena. As a historical note, Hegel was 
reading the proofs (January 16, 1807) when he wrote:  
Soon, but not quite yet, I will be able to say bon voyage to the child. But while reading through 
the manuscript for printing errors this one last time I truly often wished I could clear the ship 
here and there of ballast and make it swifter. With a second edition to follow soon—if it pleases 
the gods! (si diis placet?!) —everything shall come out better. (Hegel: The Letters, p. 119).  
The second part of the Hegelian system came to be the Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-1816) that 
is the Science of Logic, also called the greater logic as compared to the lesser or smaller logic, 
which is the logic as it appears in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline or 
the Encyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817).  
Back to the use of the term “Phenomenology ” it was used by J.H. Lambert (17 8-1777) in 1764 
the Neues Organon and was used by Kant in a number of places. The expression 
“Phenomenology” was also used by J.G. Fichte (176 -1814) in his Berlin lectures of 1804.  
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According to Heidgger  Husserl heard or read it about the word “phenomenology” in lecture 
about metaphysics by Franz Brentano (1836-1917).  
In a letter to J.H. Lambert  Kant stated  “A quite special  though purely negative Science  general 
phenomenology (phaenomologia generalis) seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics.” 
(1770). Kant discusses the position of phenomenology in his system in a 1772 letter to Marcus 
Herz: “The first part would have two sections  (1) general phenomenology and ( ) metaphysics  
but this only with regard to its nature and method.” Kant actually published the Critique of Pure 
Reason eleven years later in 1781. Kant’s work could have been called the Phenomenology of 
Pure Reason.  
Both Hegel and Kant viewed their works as something that precedes metaphysics. These are 
philosophical issues that need to be worked out before actually engaging in creating the 
metaphysical system. This is not “physics” in the sense of Aristotle. Rather  these works are the 
presuppositions to metaphysics. Heidegger wrote  “…all philosophy from first to last merely 
unfolds its presupposition.” (HHPS  E.T.  p. 36). The Critique of Pure Reason is after physics, 
and yet before metaphysics; it is a prior  namely Kant’s expression of the "metaphysics of 
metaphysics." Hegel at one point wrote in a similar vein of  “thinking of thinking.”  
Kant spoke of phenomenology in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). The 
Fourth Chapter is entitled: “Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology ” but his use of the 
term is different from Hegel’s. At that point  for Kant  phenomenology meant something like 
doctrine of appearance or Erscheinugslehre.  
Walter Kaufmann reported that Novalis (1772-1801) used the term “phenomenology” at this 
point in time as well. So, the term, phenomenology was being used in the philosophical 
discourses at the time Hegel used.  
How did Hegel come to the change the name of the Phenomenology of Spirit?  
There was shift from the original design of the book  when “Wissenschaft” was in the title. Hegel 
uses the term “phenomenology” later in Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. Perhaps Hegel thought a book with title of the Science of Experience of Consciousness 
would not sell very well. Heidegger thought this title put too much emphasis on “experience.” 
Another title could have been: The Science of the Phenomenology of Experience or, 
Phenomenology of the Experience of Consciousness? or, the Experience of Spirit? For Hegel, it 
is clear that Spirit was central in his thinking.  
The Preface was written several months after the book was essentially finished. The Preface 
mainly related to Hegel’s entire philosophical system. It was not  ust a Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction functioned more as a Preface than did the real 
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Preface. The Introduction spoke only of the “Science of the Experience of Consciousness” Hegel 
did not use the term “phenomenology” in the Introduction. Many scholars think that the 
Introduction was one of the first parts of the book that was written.  
Hegel first used the term “phenomenology” in the last section in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
that is  in the section on “Absolute Knowing ” and then later he started using the expression in 
Preface, since it was written later. The term is used only once in the later part of the book. For a 
book on the process called the phenomenology of Spirit, it is surprising how little the term is 
actually used in the book. As far as I can determine, Hegel did not use the term in his much 
earlier expressions of his system that are extant today. So the first use of term “phenomenology” 
was in the last chapter  where Hegel wrote  “Whereas the phenomenology of Spirit each moment 
is the difference of knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is 
cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and the canceling of it.” 
(Phenomenology of Spirit  Paragraph  805). (“Wenn in der Phänomenologie des Geistes  edes 
Moment der Unterschied des Wissens und der Wahrheit und die Bewegung ist, in welcher er sich 
aufhebt, so enthält dagegen die Wissenschaft diesen Unterschied und dessen Aufheben 
nicht…”). It is important to note that Hegel did not italicize the phrase “phenomenology of 
Spirit.” This means that Hegel in the first use of the term  did not think of it as the title of the 
book; it was rather a process. The phenomenology of Spirit can be considered as the appearance 
of Spirit self-unfolding and coming to itself.  
B. The Central Issues of the Purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Ferrer’s 
Fundamental Interpretation  
1. The Phenomenology of Spirit and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave  
Plato’s allegory of the cave starts at the beginning of the seventh book of the dialogue within 
Plato’s Republic (514 a2 to 517 a7). The people are chained in the cave and see only the 
shadows. They do not know that they are seeing only shadows of real things. Plato tells the story 
of their escape from the cave and how they go outside into the sunlight. The allegory is similar to 
Hegel’s “story” of the Science of the experience of consciousness  namely that  the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is the journey from inside the cave outside into the sunlight. Heidegger 
used this allegory for his analysis of “Plato’s doctrine of Truth” (1931/3   pub 1940). Although 
Heidegger did not make the connection, it is obvious by analogy that this is what Hegel was 
doing in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Science of Logic is then the true form, namely, the 
ideal form (ideos/edios) outside of the cave in the sunlight.  
Hegel gave us a very important clue for the analogy and for the book in general, in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit  where Hegel said  ‘…the detailed history of the 
education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science (Wissenschaft) (Phenomenology of 
Spirit  paragraph  78). (…ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur 
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Wissenschaft). The German word “Bildung” is used by German translators to translate the Greek 
word “paideia” into German. The term is used at the beginning of the allegory of the cave. In the 
cave the people remove the chains and leave the cave; this is their education in the same way that 
Hegel thinks of the “education of consciousness.” The people head toward the sunlight; the 
image of the sun is the idea (idea) of the good (agathon). In one of the last sections of the Science 
of Logic, there is the section entitled “The Idea of the Good” (et P. 818-823). This shows a 
connection between Plato and Hegel and gives a deeper look at Hegel’s work. There are linkages 
between the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic.  
Hegel went on to include history or historical consciousness in a way that no other philosopher 
had included in his thinking. For Hegel, this was not pure consciousness stripped of its 
historicalness. Self-consciousness and “We” were and are all included in the stuff of history. 
Therefore, Hegel led self-consciousness to the last chapter, on the Absolute Knowing. The idea 
of the good is the absolute Spirit and truth that Hegel has thought of right at the end of the book. 
Self-consciousness and “We” are on the way to absolute Knowing (Das absolute Wissen). The 
Phenomenology of Spirit is the path through the stages, the moments, the shapes of 
consciousness and their relation to the objects (including history, education of consciousness) on 
the way to Science.  
There is a religious dimension to the system. Hegel included a section in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion entitled  “The metaphysical  otion or Conception of the Idea of God.” 
Hegel declared  “The metaphysical  otion of God here means that we have to speak only of the 
pure Notion which is real through its own self. Spirit or the Absolute Idea is what appears simply 
as the unity of the  otion and reality in such a way that the  otion in itself represents totality…” 
(E.T., p. 348). Hegel thought something similar in the Science of Logic  “God as absolute Spirit  
which alone is the true nature of God.” (E.T.  p. 5 7). The absolute Idea is more connected with 
the Science of Logic, but we still have absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
This is tied to Hegel’s ontotheological metaphysics  so this means that the absolute Spirit is the 
true nature of God. Thus  this is the path to Hegel’s metaphysical God.  
Philosophically speaking we are on shake grounds, when we base an analogy on top of an 
allegory, but I think he gives us a clear understanding of the purpose of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit and Science of Logic within the Hegelian metaphysical/theological system.  
2. Where to Begin a Metaphysical System?  
Hegel in the early unpublished text “Logic and Metaphysics” of 1801-180   wrote  “I believe 
that only Logic can serve as an introduction to philosophy…” (Translation in Forster  p. 589). 
This important and central issue is how to start philosophy or, more specifically, how to start a 
metaphysical system. This is one of the main issues about which Hegel seemed to change his 
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philosophical viewpoint overtime. After Hegel wrote the Preface and Introduction to the Science 
of Logic, the next section in the Science of Logic is not the infamous Being, Nothing, Becoming 
– nor is it the “General Division of Being”; the very first part of the main text starts with a deep 
metaphysical and speculative question  namely “With What Must the Science Begin?” After 
Hegel wrote this section in Science of Logic, his system of first philosophy changed. His entire 
philosophical system changed.  
Hegel started this famous section with the words; “It is only in recent times that thinkers have 
become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy…” (Science of Logic, et p. 
67). With this Hegel set the stage for his beginning with Logic and the real results of the task, 
which he called the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel hits the nail on the head with this point. Not 
only the beginning, but also the whole thought of creating a “system ” then come to fore front 
and become a burning issue for Hegel.  
Hegel wrote  “…the phenomenology of Spirit is the Science of consciousness  the exposition of 
it, and that consciousness has for result the Notion of Science, i.e., pure Knowing.” (Science of 
Logic, E.T., p. 68). At this point, it should be noted this is the last chapter of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit called “Absolute Knowing” (Das absolute Wissen). This point for Hegel is now  pure 
Knowing. As Hegel noted  “…pure Knowing is the ultimate  absolute truth of consciousness.” 
(Science of Logic, E.T., p. 68).  
At this point for Hegel  Logic is called pure Science. Instead of using the term “absolute” Hegel 
used the expression “pure.” The Phenomenology of Spirit starts with “empirical and sensuous 
consciousness ” with immediate knowledge not with mediated and pure Knowing. Hegel notes in 
this section  “Logic presupposes the Science of manifested Spirit.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 
68). The Science of manifested Spirit means the description and process of the phenomenology 
of Spirit as it unfolds.  
In other words using  Plato’s allegory  should philosophical systems start with shadows in the 
cave or with world in the sunlight? The Phenomenology of Spirit starts with the shadows and 
shows “us” the direction up to the sunlight. We can then consider the Logic in this allegory as 
our world in the sunlight. Where do philosophical or metaphysical system (systema) start?  
Hegel wrote at the end of this section  in a parenthetical remark  “(and God has the absolutely 
undisputed right that the beginning be made with him).” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 78). In 
addition, Hegel in speaking of the Logic as the system of reason, in the realm of pure thought; he 
noted  “…this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation 
of nature and a finite Spirit. (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 50). This is a very powerful image of the 
place of God within the context of Hegel’s theological metaphysics. God’s true nature is as the 
absolute Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit leads to the absolute Spirit, but the Science of Logic 
is exposition of God before creation.  
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These parts in the Logic are the categories in mind of God before creation. In another part of the 
Logic, namely, the Introduction  Hegel indicated that the chapters and explanations are “…to 
facilitate a preliminary survey and strictly are only of historical value.” (Science of Logic, E.T., 
p. 54). So, the Phenomenology of Spirit is dealing with history, plus, the Science of Logic content 
is of “only historical value.” Hegel is making the point at some level that this is not “absolute” 
and “pure” anything. Hegel’s philosophical system is in history in some fundamental way. The 
“We” (from Hegel’s point of view or standpoint) are in history. Even the “reader” or the “writer” 
of the Science of Logic is engaged in a process that is “in” history.  
The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit was to lead to the absolute Spirit, to the absolute 
pure Knowing, which is Science or the actual standpoint of Science. The Science of Logic is pure 
Science and presupposes the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel noted  “The  otion of pure Science 
its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the Phenomenology of 
Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 49).  
Hegel is leading us up the ladder to the Science of Logic to the absolute beginning. At this point, 
the Phenomenology of Spirit is driving us to the beginning of Science of Logic, that is, in a 
general sense to Science and Philosophy. But, this is not Philosophy in the normal sense, but 
rather, Philosophy as Hegel thought of his speculative metaphysical system. Science of Logic is 
the pure Science. Philosophy does not start as the Phenomenology of Spirit does with Sense 
Certainty (Die sinnliche Gewißheit). Philosophy for Hegel started with logic thought of as a 
metaphysical system. The Phenomenology of Spirit takes us (the “We” of historical 
consciousness) up to the door, or, in our other analogy, it takes us out of the cave into the light.  
Philosophy has an absolute beginning, and that beginning is God or the absolute Spirit for Hegel. 
The absolute metaphysical system must have a beginning, and that beginning is not the 
Phenomenology of Spirit; rather it is the Science of Logic, or the beginning just simply starts with 
the Hegelian logic as such. The Phenomenology of Spirit is only the ladder to the absolute 
beginning.  
3. The Final Goal for Hegel’s is the Absolute Notion – Methodology and Movement of the 
System  
Part of our general misunderstanding of Hegel’s system is that we some how think of it as a 
static system. Hegel’s system actually is essential in motion.  
Hegel wrote in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy  “Here we see land; there is no 
proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic” (E.T.  Vol 1  p.  79). Heraclitus 
was the first philosopher who started his system with change; ‘all-is-flux’ is his motto. Hegel’s 
system is always a “process” system. There is nothing static about Hegel’s system  so the key is 
to bring that “processing” (‘all-is-in-motion) into our interpretation of Hegel. Hegel is not 
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defending the status quo as a static end. The dialectic is the engine of motion and movement 
within his system. Hegel’s system is describing the world (not a static world) as in motion.  
Hegel pointed out in the Science of Logic, that his method alone is true. The rest the material 
within his book is of ‘‘only historical value.” Hegel wrote in the last chapter on the “Absolute 
Idea ” that the “method is only the movement of the  otion itself.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 
8 6). This method is the motor that keeps the system in motion. But the method is “in” the world 
as well  so it is not  ust a “sub ective” aspect added on to the world; rather it is in the world itself. 
Hegel wrote:  
By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the Science (Wissenschaft) exhibits itself as 
a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground by 
mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by 
the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the 
beginning of the new member. (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 842).  
At this point  we begin to see Hegel’s true philosophy  his fundamental thinking about how his 
system is put together. The Phenomenology of Spirit in general does not consider methodology 
issues, whereas, the Science of Logic has a number of detailed sections which discuss 
methodology. The most important is the last section on the “Absolute Idea.” This is part of the 
infamous dialectical method that Hegel put forth as his methodology (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 
831).  
The circle of circles has an interesting connection to Kant, when he said in the later part of the 
Critique of Pure Reason  “Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in 
experience…and to find peace only in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic 
whole.” (CPR  A798/B8 6). (In German  Die Vernunft wird durch einen Hang ihrer  atur 
getrieben, über den Erfahrungsgebrauch hinauszugehen, und nur allererst in der Vollendung 
ihres Kreises  in einem für sich …. bestehenden systematischen Ganzen, Ruhe zu finden).  
Reason finds its peace in the circle, which is in the systematic whole of a complete and absolute 
metaphysical system. Kant wanted and knew that reason would lead to the science of a 
metaphysical system, but he did not make it up the mountain. Hegel said in the Preface, 
“Through this movement the pure thoughts become  otions (Begriffe) and come to be what they 
are in truth: self-movements  circles  that which is their substance  spiritual entities.” 
(Kaufmann’s translation  E.T., p. 52). ( In German, Durch diese Bewegung werden die reinen 
Gedanken Begriffe, und sind erst, was sie in Wahrheit sind, Selbstbewegungen, Kreise, das, was 
ihre Substanz ist, geistige Wesenheiten).  
Hegel did not speak of dialectic in the Preface, but Nietzsche had some interesting things to say 
about the general nature of dialectics.  
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Nietzsche wrote:  
One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust 
with it, that it is not very persuasive. Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the 
experience of every meeting at which there are speeches proves this. It can only be self-defense 
for those who no longer have other weapons. (Twilight of the Idols, 1888).  
Heidegger does not have much sympathy for dialectics either.  ietzsche concluded  “The most 
valuable insights are arrived at last; but the most valuable insights are methods.” (Will to Power, 
469  1888  E.T.  p.  61). Hegel’s method was unmistakably one of the most important parts of 
his philosophical thinking. For Hegel, philosophy required a very specific methodology to 
become Science (Philosophy). Hegel indicated in the Preface, where in a more personal way he 
used the word “I:”  
The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring 
philosophy closer to the form of Science  to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of 
knowing’ and be actual knowing – that is what I have set myself to do. (Phenomenology of Spirt, 
E.T., p. 3)  
As to the main purpose of Phenomenology of Spirit  here he said  “…goal is the revelation of the 
depth of Spirit  and this is the absolute  otion.” (Phenomenology of Spirit  paragraph 808). (… 
Ziel ist die Offenbarung der Tiefe, und diese ist der absolute Begriff). In the Phenomenology of 
the Spirit, the goal is first the absolute Notion and then, secondarily, the goal is absolute 
Knowing. The absolute Notion and absolute Knowing are both the goals at the end of the journey 
(remember the cave).  
The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit, is to raise consciousness to self-consciousness and 
onward to the path where (“We”) consciousness in general finds the absolute  otion. Hegel said 
this about his method and that means the  otion as well. He notes  “The method itself by means 
of this moment expands itself into a system.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 838). Hegel rarely wrote 
about his system, so this important idea is a distinctive link among the Notion, the method, and 
the system. Hegel clearly said that the “…the absolute method, which has the Notion for its soul 
and content… (Science of Logic  E.T.  p. 839). Think about the nature of “the absolute method.” 
Who today would claim to have “the absolute method”? To continue  he also used the expression 
the “ otion as  otion” (p. 817).  
Therefore, philosophers can see (pure, absolute, eternal) Notions as the ideas in the sunlight of 
Plato’s cave  and yet  the  otion is methodology and the process of the dialectics. Spirit finds its 
pure element of existence in the Notion. The Notion is the entelecheia that is the internal 
movement of spiritual reality unfolding itself. Hegel late in the Science of Logic said  “In point of 
fact, as the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Notion, and all of its content rests on that 
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alone.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 817). In another important passage, he tied the Notion with 
Philosophy  saying  “Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it 
is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the 
 otion.” (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 824). Thus, the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to 
get us to the standpoint of the circle of circles, namely, the pure, absolute, eternal, spiritual, 
ensouled reflected into itself – Notion.  
Hegel used the expression in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit  “the seriousness of the 
 otion” (der Ernst des Begriffs). (A. Miller’s translation of this as “serious speculative effort” 
seems off the point). Right at the end of the Preface  Hegel commented in a personal way  “I find 
the distinctive mark of Science in the self-movement of the  otion…” (Indem ich das  wodurch 
die Wissenschaft existiert, in die Selbstbewegung des Begriffes setze). This plainly points to the 
importance that the  otion has for Hegel’s system. The final goal for Hegel’s is the absolute 
Notion; this is his methodology, movement, and the content of his metaphysical system.  
Conclusion  
To summarize to this point, the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is by analogy like 
Plato’s allegory of the cave in the Republic. It is the movement from the shadows out of the cave 
into the sunlight. The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to bring us to an absolute 
beginning. The Phenomenology of Spirit is the ladder to the absolute beginning as the Science of 
Logic. The third point is the Phenomenology brings the system to the point of the absolute 
 otion  which are both the methodology and the movement of Hegel’s metaphysical system.  
Hegel, in the public announcement about the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) said the following: 
“It considers the preparation for Science from a standpoint which makes it a new  interesting 
Science and the first Science in philosophy.” (Forster  p. 61 ).  
This is the exactly the point about which Hegel changed his mind as he worked on his system 
after publishing the Phenomenology of Spirit, namely, where his First Science is philosophy. 
Clearly, Hegel stepped back from the Phenomenology of Spirit after he wrote it. This is evident 
from what he wrote in his letters and the fact that he never used the Phenomenology of Spirit in 
his lectures.  
Hegel changed his mind. The Jena (1807) Phenomenology of Spirit was too subjective. The 
Phenomenology of Spirit’s starting point was not philosophy or Science. Hegel concluded that 
Philosophy is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea through the Notion. Why 
would Hegel have started with sense certainty as he did in the Phenomenology of Spirit? How are 
the patterns of consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, Spirit, in their self-unfolding a 
concern of Philosophy? The education of consciousness through history to Philosophy is 
important, but it is not Philosophy in the Hegelian sense.  
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The later Hegel saw in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline a special place 
for the location of phenomenology  “phenomenology of Spirit and consciousness ” is between 
“Anthropology and the Soul” as the first section of the Spirit  and then the section that follows 
the phenomenology is called “Psychology and the Spirit.” In other words  the Hegelian order is 
anthropology, phenomenology, and then psychology. From this point of view, some philosophers 
have suggested that the phenomenology is just a kind of bad historical sociology that fits 
between anthropology and psychology.  
There is a much bigger general issue here, namely, philosophical anthropology. Heidegger says, 
“Having become philosophical anthropology  philosophy itself perishes of metaphysics.” 
(‘Overcoming Metaphysics’, 1946, E.T., p. 99). Husserl and Heidegger attacked and 
counterattacked each other over the issue of their philosophies as philosophical anthropology 
only. Most modern philosophers were general attacked by Heidegger as being merely 
philosophical anthropologists. Of course, Heidegger connected this position to the metaphysical 
tendencies of contemporary philosophy.  
Husserl, in his attack on philosophical anthropology mentioned Dilthey and Max Scheler (1874-
1928), but Heidegger was the one who irks him the most. In his famous essay, Husserl started 
out saying  “As is well known  over the last decade some of the younger generation of German 
philosophers has been gravitating with ever increasing speed toward philosophical 
anthropology.” (“Phenomenology and Anthropology”, Husserl. June 1931. E.T., p. 485). Part of 
his attack was the stinging remarks Husserl made about Heidegger that Being and Time was only 
philosophical anthropology.  
To return to the problem of Hegel  Hegel’s main thinking was not the transcendental move by 
Kant or later by Husserl. Hegel was not in the dogmatic tradition of Christian Wolff (1679-
1754), nor was he following in the skeptical tradition of Gottlob Schulze (1761-1833). Hegel’s 
own unique thinking was his formulation of the Notion as absolute Spirit unfolding itself. Hegel 
pulled back from the Phenomenology of Spirit because of the same philosophical anthropology 
issues that came between Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger is part of the Hegelian 
countermovement.  
Kant said  “The critical path alone is still open.” (CPR, A855/B883). Hegel would have said that 
the actual knowledge of Science was unfolded in his metaphysical system. Kant said, 
“Metaphysics must be Science  not only as a whole  but in all its parts  otherwise it is nothing.” 
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). Hegel would have agreed with Kant and said 
that he had produced such a Science of actual knowing (see above), namely, the metaphysics of 
the absolute Spirit, which started with the Phenomenology of Spirit, then moved onward to the 
Science of Logic, and finally, to the two concrete Sciences – namely, the Philosophy of Nature 
and the Philosophy of Spirit. This would then “complete the System of Philosophy” (Science of 
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Logic  E.T.  p.  9). This means Hegel’s “System of Philosophy ” as a whole is the complete 
absolute metaphysical system.  
A. Final Thoughts  
 ow it is clear what Hegel’s intention were for the Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation 
shows how the Phenomenology of Spirit fits in the entire system and how it is part of Hegel’s 
more mature thinking in his complete system, namely, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences in Outline. Hegel foresaw the problem of philosophical anthropology and came up with 
a new basis for a metaphysical system. Heidegger wanted to overcome and leave all 
metaphysical systems behind. In Heidegger’s second magnum opus entitled Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning)  he said  “The time of ‘systems’ is over.” (E.T.  p. 4). Hegel’s is 
the epitome and the most complete metaphysical system. Heidegger did not understand the 
purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit  nor did he confront and shatter Hegel’s absolute 
complete metaphysical system (absolute idealism). Heidegger attempted to go around Hegel; he 
could not go through Hegel. Hegel’s philosophy still determines our philosophical reality!  
B. Research Questions  
Where does Hegel’s specific use of the term  otion/Concept (der Begriff) come from? Historical 
usage? The last chapter in the Phenomenology of Spirit is “absolute Knowing” and the last 
chapter in the Science of Logic is the “absolute Idea” then why did he not use expression “the 
 otion” as part of the chapter heading?  
What is left out of Hegel’s system and why? Where is Hegel on the irrationalism issue? Is there 
any room for faith in Hegel’s metaphysical system? His ontology seems to be theology and his 
theology is in his ontology, so where is faith in the system? There does not seem to be any need 
for faith.  
 ietzsche said  “The will to system is lack of integrity.” (Der Wille zum System ist ein Mangel 
an Rechtschaffenheit). What kind of dialogue could Hegel have with a philosopher like 
Nietzsche?  
Heidegger in his work on  ietzsche said this about Hegel  “And in his Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807) Hegel grasps the essence of Being as knowing, but grasps knowing as essentially 
identical to willing.” (Nietzsche Volume I  E.T.  p. 35). What does Heidegger mean that Hegel’s 
understanding of Being is (Sein) “Being as will” in the Phenomenology of Spirit? Is there some 
text within the Phenomenology of Spirit that supports Heidegger’s point here?  
Alfred Denker makes an interesting point about the use of expression “the Absolute” in German 
Idealism. He said  “Das Unbedingte and das Absolute are interchangeable.” Das Unbedingte is 
the unconditioned. How should we understand the meaning of the expression “absolute or 
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Absolute” in German Idealism? (See his article  “Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog” in 
Schelling: Between Fichte and Hegel).  
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Analysis of the “Preface” to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
This is an analysis of the “Preface” to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The first part of this 
paper will clarify the issue with regard to the changes in the title of this book that Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) wrote in 1806. I count four different titles.  
First title: System of Science: First Part, Science of the Experience of Consciousness (1806-
1807).  
Note: Title appears on some the published books. Some books have both the first and second title 
pages in different places. The manuscript was essential completed October 1806. This first title 
can be considered the working title of the book until Hegel got closer to the publication.  
Second Title: System of Science: First Part, Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).  
Third Title: System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Note: This is the final title in 1807.  
Note: Most the books published in 1807 have this on the title page and only this title page.  
Fourth Title: Phenomenology of Spirit (1832). Note: title as it appears in the Collected 
Works.Publication begins right after Hegel’s death in 1931.(Werke, Berlin, 1832-1845). Note 
Hegel or should we say someone has the “the” dropped.  
German title: Phänomenologie des Geistes or the early one Wissenschaft der 
Erfahrung des Bewußtseins 
The book was mostly written in the city Jena during 1806. October 13, 1806 is the Napoleon 
entered the town of Jena. “Preface” was finished in the end of January 1807.  ote: Hegel’s 
illegitimate son Ludwig born February 5, 1807. Hegel moved to the city of Bamberg in the 
middle of March 1807. The System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit was 
published in April of 1807. Hegel was out of work for some of this period. He went to Bamberg 
to edit the newspaper; it was published seven days a week. Hegel was pro-French and pro-
Napoleon in general in his reporting. Including many reports about Paris.  
In many ways the “Preface” (7  total paragraphs) can be considered the “Preface” to Hegel’s 
whole metaphysical system  but  ust the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit was unlabeled and was 16 paragraphs at the front of 
the book, so in fact, the Introduction functions in some way as the real preface to the 
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Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction was added later through the ‘table of contents’. 
Although it is clear right from the first part of the “Preface” that Hegel does not like the idea of a 
‘Preface’ to philosophy. Why does Hegel think a ‘Preface’ to Philosophy is a little bit of strange 
undertaking?  
Hegel said in his “Preface” to the Philosophy of Right (Philosophie des Rechts) “As a preface it 
is its place to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it 
introduces. A philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective 
treatment.”  
(This is in contrast with Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)  who was always writing ‘prefaces’ 
to his books for attempts at greater clarity). The Phenomenology of Spirit as a book functions as 
a length ‘introduction’ to philosophy. One way of viewing Hegel  is to see the Science of Logic 
(Wissenschaft der Logik) as being philosophy in realm of pure thought, from this viewpoint, then 
the Phenomenology of Spirit is the raising up of natural consciousness to the standpoint of 
philosophy or Science. For example  in the Introduction  Hegel says  “The series of 
configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, the detailed 
history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” (Wissenschaft). 
(Phenomenology of Spirit, et. p. 50). We can see this from point of view of the Science of Logic 
(et p. 48) where Hegel, wrote the following about the Phenomenology of Spirit  “The path of this 
movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object and had the 
Concept (Begriff) of Science) for its result.”  
The “Preface” was written several months after the book was essentially finished. The 
Introduction spoke only of the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness”. Please note and 
think about this implications: Hegel did not use the term "phenomenology" in the Introduction. 
Many scholars think that the Introduction was one of the first parts of the book that was written 
and the “Preface” was written last.  
Remember: Science (Wissenschaft) is really for Hegel what we call metaphysics or philosophy; 
this is not natural science like we use the term today. “Metaphysics must be Science, not only as 
a whole  but in all its parts  otherwise it is nothing.” (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, I. 
Kant, 1783, in German, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft 
wird auftreten können).  Hegel took this dictium as his guidle principal: philosiophy is a Science 
and in German the word used at that time was Wissenschaft. In a few places, Kant used the 
expression in German: “szientifische” for science. 
What is the nature and essence of philosophy for Hegel? 
What is philosophy as a Science? 
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What is philosophy as full-blown metaphysical system? 
What is a System of Science for Hegel?  
Why must philosophy, Science, and metaphysics be a system?  
Aristotle’s words: epistêmê  entelecheia  alêtheia  eidos, energeia, dialektikê. 
How does Hegel take Aristotle thought and re-work to become German Idealism? 
Hegel’s “system” issues: unity  differences  movement of stages  process  content as Spirit  
wants to include everything in the world, God, methodology, transitions from each part to the 
next part, etc.  
The following 19 questions are formulated from an outline of Hegel’s own table of contents for 
the “Preface“(1807): 
1) What is scientific knowledge? 
An aggregate of information is not scientific knowledge. You also need to know the whole 
system through its history and its progression and development. The course of the history of 
philosophical systems or the metahistory of philosophy leads through a progression. The bud to 
the blossom example. This is Hegel’s thinking on the negativity that drives the motion and inner 
development and progression through history, consciousness, philosophical systems, etc. A 
motion and a flux those are always moving. Process with a big ‘P’. Process in general or change 
as such. Scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge (system, metaphysics) is the seriousness 
of the Concept/Notion/Begriff.  
2) How is the element of truth is in the Concept and its true form the scientific system? 
Hegel speaks of the goal of the project, which is absolute knowing and hence, truth is only as the 
Concept and we need a scientific system of Concepts. For Hegel sees the goal as where 
metaphysics can “lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing – that is what I 
have set myself to do.” Hegel is going to give us a full-blown metaphysics system, that is, not a 
Kantian Propaedeutic or Prolegomena to metaphysics. The content will be fully worked out and 
given. The absolute Concept is truth when it is in the form of a complete scientific system. This 
is not a question of religion or divine love or felt or feeling or intuition; but rather, a question of 
truth in its true form. Who is Hegel in dialogue with in this section?  
(Eschenmayer, Gorres, Herder, Jacobi, F. Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Schelling, J. Wagner). 
Clearly, in dialogue with Kant and Fichte on the meaning of Science as a metaphysical system. 
On the Greek side, Aristotle on the issue of episteme, that is, as a group of certain truths about 
the essences of all things.  
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3) What is the present position of the Spirit? 
We have started a new age or a new period in world history. The spirit is never at “rest but 
always engaged in ever progressing motion”. For Hegel this was the birth of new modern world. 
The French Revolution of 1789 was a tremendous impact on the young Hegel. He was a part of 
the pro-French element inside German areas. This was the time of dukes and the Prussian King. 
Hegel wanted a new birth of freedom.  
4) How the principal is not the completion and why against formalism? 
In the section, Hegel is making a rather general point. Philosophers can have lots of details and 
“drag a lot of material” into their analysis  but this is simply ‘formal’ material. We need 
“absolute actuality” not  ust some kind of empty formalism. These points are generally thought 
to be aimed at Schelling philosophy of nature.  
5) What is the meaning of expression the absolute is subject? 
There are three philosophers being mentioned in this short section. Substance (Baruch Spinoza 
(1632-1677), the opposite view (Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716), the 
intuited unity of thought and Being (Schelling’s Identity philosophy). Schelling has a strong 
contra movement to Spinoza. Hegel wanted to include him in his uplift of earlier philosophical 
systems.  
For Hegel his position is the absolute is subject as well as substance. I think this points to 
Hegel’s philosophical position of absolute idealism  where the absolute Spirit is also the 
unity/identity of subject and substance. They are in Hegel’s speculative thinking the “Same”. 
This sameness needs to be thought within Hegel’s metaphysical unity of sub ect/ob ect. In his 
early essay, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy (1801) (Die 
Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie). Hegel tries to over 
overcome the objective subject-object and subjective subject-object dichotomies of Fichte and 
Schelling. For example  Hegel says in that essay  “Identity has been constituted in Fichte’s 
system only as subjective subject-object. This requires an objective subject-object for its 
completion, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two and turns out to be complete 
only in both together.” (et. p. 7 ).  
The goal for Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit is absolute knowing, and in the Science of 
Logic the goal is the absolute Idea, and in the last section (objective Spirit) of the Encyclopedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im 
Grundrisse) the goal is absolute Spirit. Remember Hegel said in the Science of Logic  “God as 
absolute Spirit  which alone is the true nature of God.” (et. p. 5 7)  
6) What does it mean – what this is? 
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There are a couple of important points in this section. The famous remark  “The true is the 
whole”. This means only the whole thing is true  not  ust some parts. You need the whole in its 
development. Again, the idea of change and motion being contained in the system.  
The true is as a system, which is substance essentially as subject. This speaks of the absolute as 
Spirit. This leads to the last part of this section  where “spirit knows itself as spirit is Science”. 
Just before this he makes some more speculative statements about the self-generation of the pure 
Concept as being “existence for itself an ob ect reflected into itself”. This is Hegel way of trying 
to work through the problem of the term “Concept” sounding like a something “sub ective” 
inside our mind. This is  OT true for Hegel. The Concept is “ob ective” and inside things as 
their inner nature. To use Aristotle here to speak of the entelecheia. This is the complete reality 
or perfection of objects and things in their objectness, but not as some-thing static – rather, in 
motion towards its inner end. The absolute Spirit and the absolute idealism is when our 
subjective Concept comes in to some kind of unity or sameness with the objective Concept or 
entelecheia, which is objectively in objects and things. These are not just physical objects like 
trees, but rather, objects like the family, ethics, the state, art, religion, and philosophy.  
7) What is the element of knowledge? 
Philosophy must give us a ladder to the standpoint of Science. This is one of main purposes or 
tasks of the Hegelian project called the Phenomenology of Sprit, namely, is to give us the 
knowledge whereby we can obtain the standpoint of Science. Hegel wrote in a letter to his friend 
Karl Windischmann  “It is science which had led you into the labyrinth of the soul  and science 
alone is capable of leading you out again and healing you” (1810  quoted by T. Pinkard). The 
Hegelian science can heal you.  
8) What is the ascent into this is the Phenomenology of Spirit? 
This project is a voyage of discovery for Hegel and through him for consciousness. This is 
consciousness in its early stages. This is the education of consciousness through history up to the 
standpoint of Science. We cannot just simply jump to the absolute Spirit. The progress is 
development and progression of consciousness. This is a special kind of education of 
consciousness that has been done through history and the work of the world spirit through 
history. There are stages or shapes of consciousness on that voyage toward the absolute 
(unconditioned) knowing. One can think of this project as trip through the cave out into the light 
of day. The mature or later Hegel will refer to the Phenomenology of Spirit as his own voyage of 
discovery.  
9) How the transmutation of the Notion/Concept/Begriff and familiar into the thought? 
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This is a bit of confused section, but two thoughts are at work in this section. One thought is that 
absolute power it shown by the Understanding (note capital ‘U’). The second point of Hegel is 
that Spirit somehow has to go through the circle of moment, stages, shapes  that is  the “absolute 
dismemberment”. The second thought is important for his own system and is linked to the 
remarks about the ‘absolute being shot of a pistol”. The system has a unity  but it also must have 
parts. The big Hegel system comes in three parts: logic, nature, and spirit or to use Descartes, 
substantia infinita, res extensa, and res cogitans. There is negativity underneath which helps 
bring the system apart and push it forward through the stages or moments.  
10) What does it mean – and this into the Concept/Notion/Begriff? 
Hegel says in this section  “Through this movement the pure thoughts become Concepts and 
come to be what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual 
entities.” This movement furthermore is “the nature of the scientific method in general”. These 
ideas point to more than the Phenomenology of Spirit this rather leads to the Science of Logic as 
the pure thoughts as Concepts moving in circles. It is also in the Science of Logic that Hegel 
thinks through the dialectics and the methodology for logic and his metaphysical system. The 
circles within pure thought (Concepts) move dialectically with the negativity pushing the 
moments or stages of system as it expands itself. (See also paragraph 17 in the Preface).  
With this section the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded. Spirit prepared itself in the element 
of absolute knowing (goal)  but its time to move on to the “true in the form of the true”  namely  
true infinite free Concepts (i.e. Logic).  
11) In what way is the Phenomenology of Spirit is negative or contains what is false? 
The Phenomenology of Spirit has as its contents the voyage of the historical shapes of self-
consciousness (education of self-consciousness) to absolute knowing. The earlier moments or 
stages or shapes of self-consciousness are not false. They are just points on the journey. In this 
same way, the Phenomenology of Spirit as the entire journey is not false, since it helps natural 
consciousness to rise up to the point of Science or “true in the form of the true” or the Science of 
Logic. Hegel in the early unpublished text “Logic and Metaphysics” of 1801-180   wrote  “I 
believe that only Logic can serve as an introduction to philosophy…” (Translation in Forster  p. 
589). Whereas here we see Hegel is arguing that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the introduction 
to philosophy. The “introduction” or “preface” for Hegel is not Science itself  but these points on 
the journey are not false. Like the bud is not false after we have the full blossom of the flower.  
12) What is the relationship to historical and mathematical truth? 
These truths are not philosophical truths. Hegel late in the Science of Logic said  “In point of 
fact, as the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Concept, and all of its content rests on 
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that alone.” (Science of Logic, et p. 817). These truths are not the infinite free Concept. They 
have an “indifferent  external  lifeless content”. Schelling at a high opinion of math. This was 
also connected to Schelling attempted use of the Spinoza’s geometric method. Kepler and 
 ewton was also on Hegel’s mind as applied mathematics.  
13) What is the nature of philosophical truth and its method? 
Truth is the Concept in the process of the whole movement of the system.  
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) said, Regula IV, "Method is necessary for discovering the truth of 
nature." Hegel points to method and the method is in the Logic. The method is also the way of 
describing the metaphysical system. He is not doing philosophy as arguing one points versus 
another point, rather, this is a metaphysical system unfolding the world in history as a process.  
14) Why be against formalism? 
Hegel’s Science is not formalism or idealism or dogmatism  but rather  the Concept as absolute 
Idealism. Hegel is in dialogue here with Friedrich Joseph Schelling (17751854) and of course 
Kant. Fichte has a version of what Hegel called formal idealism. Hegel’s view was much more 
organic and living.  
15) What are the demands of the study of philosophy? 
The famous remark  “study of science is taking upon oneself the exertion or hard labor of the 
Concept”. This means that we have to think in the Hegelian Conceptual thinking. It is not easy.  
16)In what way is argumentative thinking in its negative attitude? 
Determined negativity becomes part of the positive process of the system.  
17) In what way in its positive attitude or its subject? 
Hegel said  “the element of dialectical movement is the pure Concept”. Here Hegel does explain 
a few parts of his dialectical method. At the end of this section Hegel makes the strong point 
about the content of philosophy. Hegel’s metaphysical system will later fill in all of the details 
for a complete full-blown metaphysical system in all of its parts. This is contrast to Kant who 
wanted to develop a full-blown metaphysical system, but instead got stuck on foundational 
issues.  ote even the terms of Kant’s works  for example  the three ‘critiques’ are foundational. 
In addition, note the titles of some of Kant are other work: The Goundwork (Foundation) for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). In German, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten; Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird 
auftreten können; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.  
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18) What does it mean natural philosophizing as health common sense and as genius? 
Again  Hegel says  “True thoughts and scientific insights are won only through the work or labor 
of the Concept”. Or you can take the vulgar road in your night cloths or in the high priest’s 
robes; however, you will not be in the Hegelian system.  
20) What is the author’s (i.e. Hegel) relation to the public? 
Right at the end of the “Preface”  Hegel commented in a personal way  “I find the distinctive 
mark of Science in the self-movement of the Concept…” The final goal for Hegel’s is the 
Concept; this is his methodology, movement, and the content of his metaphysical system. This 
says it all! How did Hegel apply this to a system? 
 
Hegel’s Major Writings: 
Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801)  
Glauben und Wissen (1802) 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) 
Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813, 1816, 1832) 
Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830) 
Philosophie des Rechts (1820) 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte 
Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Kunst (1823) 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion  
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Hegel's Dialogue with Lesser Known Philosophers 
 
“Metaphysics must be Science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts  otherwise it is nothing”.  
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, I. Kant, 1783).  
When we read a thinker like G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) one way of interpreting his writings is to 
think about who Hegel is in dialogue with. Who is he thinking about when he was writing? For 
example, is he arguing against Kant's position or some one else? When he is writing about Being 
is he thinking about Parmenides? Who is Hegel in dialogue with?  
Hegel often makes references to well known philosophers like Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, Plato, and 
Aristotle. But let us look at one of Hegel's major writing. In one the first footnotes in Hegel's 
Science of Logic (Introduction), there are footnotes to the System of Logic (System der Logik: ein 
Handbuch für Lehrer und zum Selbstgebrauch, published in 1811) by Jacob Friedrich Fries 
(1773-1843) (et p.52). Another philosopher that is mentioned early in Hegel's book, in the 
section on Being, is a reference to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), his Treatise on the 
Undertaking of the Critical Philosophy to Bring Reason to Understanding. Jacobi gets a number 
of quotes and footnotes in this section (et p.95-7). Do you know who Fries and Jacobi were in the 
history of philosophy?  
Who are these lesser known philosophers? Are they important for understanding Hegel? Most of 
the lesser known philosophers are philosophers who lived and wrote as the same time as Hegel, 
but who did not become well known. Although at the time, they may have been read by many 
and well known. In a sense most of them are only footnotes in history books now.  
One example is F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) who was well known at the time. However, in the 
twentieth century we have philosophers like Bertrand Russell’s; in his book on the history of 
philosophy (A history of Western Philosophy) he makes the following remark, "His (Fichte) 
immediate successor Schelling as more amiable, but not less subjective. He was closely 
associated with the German romantics; philosophically, though famous in his day, he is not 
important." (p.718). So, for some philosophers Schelling lands in the dustbins of history. On the 
other hand, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) said this about Schelling, "Schelling is the truly 
creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy". (Schelling's treatise on the 
essence of human freedom, p. 4). Heidegger ranks Schelling above Hegel and Fichte.  
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Some of these philosophers published just before Hegel time and were connected with the 
flowering of Kant's philosophy. A primary example during Hegel's time is Johann Georg 
Hamann (1730-1788), who was well known during this period. Hamann was one of Kant's closes 
friends and yet, Kant argued against him in a number of publications. Hamann has an 
irrationalistic theory of faith and in general was against Englightment. It is historically 
interesting that Hegel toward end of his life in 1828 is writing about "Hamann's Writings" in the 
Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, which is some forty years after Hamann death. But 
obviously Hamann is not as well known some two hundred years later. Johann Georg Hamann 
(1730-1788), one person who wrote about him said,  
" 'magus of the north', a Protestant mystic who disliked the 
analytical rationalism of the Enlightenment and saw more 
creative power in feeling, language, and especially poetry, 
the 'mother-tongue of the human race'" 
Schelling is more well known today than Hamann, but nether of them are as famous as Kant or 
Hegel.  
There are also a group of philosophers that people think Hegel is making reference to with 
certain expressions. For example, there is a recent article by George Di-Giovanni where he 
argues the phrase that Hegel uses in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, " producing the 
Absolute at once, as if from a pistol', is intended for Jakob Fries; rather than, as normally 
assumed, for Schelling. 
However, first we need to a short review of the: 
Pantheism Controversy 
In July of 1780 Gotthold Lessing supposedly told Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) that he 
was some kind of a Spinozist. After Lessing died, then Jacobi starting exchanging letters with 
Mendelssohn about Lessing confession about being a follower of Spinoza. Spinozism is also 
linked with the position of Pantheism. Mendelssohn was getting ready to publish a book called 
Morning Hours about Pantheism, so Jacobi heard about Mendelssohn book and he rushed to 
publication a book of their letters called On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr. 
Mendelssohn (1785).  
Jacobi basic position was that Spinoza's Substance led to rationalism and rationalism leads to 
Pantheism, and Pantheism leads to atheism. On the other side, Jacobi position leads to faith. So, 
Jacobi wanted philosophers to decide on which side they were on with regards to the two horns 
of the dilemma. Either you are with reason or faith. In a sense it was either rationalism/atheism 
or theology. Which do you choose?  
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As Alfred Denker explains in his article "Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog. The Absolute as 
Fundamental Problem of German Idealism" with rationalism you can explain the world but you 
have the burden of determinism and fatalism.  
Kant was drawn into the debate and published a short article called "What does it mean to orient 
oneself in thinking" (October 1786). Kant took Mendelssohn side in the debate, but developed 
his position through rational faith on moral and some might say religious grounds. He tried to 
include faith. Remember the famous remark of Kant's in the Critique of Pure Reason, "Thus I 
had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith…" (CPR, Bxxx).  
Following Alfred Denker again, Jacobi's critical analysis leads German Idealism to the thorny 
woods of the Absolute (the unconditioned) and Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all had to come up 
with a respond to Jacobi's charge of Pantheism. So, the stage was set and the philosophers had to 
respond.  
Hegel wrote essays or reviews about a number of philosophers who were his contemporaries. 
Some are more famous than others and some were to become famous after Hegel's death. This is 
a brief review of many of Hegel's contemporaries and philosophers that Hegel is in dialogue with 
regard to the history of philosophy and philosophy itself.  
 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) 
Fichte developed his own system of transcendental idealism, the Theory of Science 
(Wissenschaftslehre, 1796). Hegel says, "He wrote a treatise on Religion, termed a "Critique of 
all Revelation," where the Kantian phraseology is employed throughout - so much so that it was 
thought to be the work of Kant." (History of Philosophy). Hegel then summaries his attack on 
Fichte with the following argument against Fichte, Hegel said,  
“The Fichtian standpoint of subjectivity has thus retained its character of being unphilosophically 
worked out, and arrived at its completion in forms pertaining to sensation which in part remained 
within the Fichtian principle, while they were in part the effort - futile though it was - to go 
beyond the subjectivity of the ego.” (History of Philosophy) 
In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "Philosophy as Science (or in 
German - Wissenschaft)" This is following Kant and Fichte. In addition, in the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "nothing less than a sun-clear report" (Kaufmann's 
translation et p. 78). This is a clear reference to Fichte's A Sun Clear Report to the General 
Public Concerning the Actual Essence of the Newest Philosophy: An Attempt to Force the 
Reader to Understand (1801). Fichte was charged with Atheism (1798) leaves Jena for Berlin 
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(1799). Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1808). In 1811 he was made Rector of the 
University of Berlin.  
During the War of Liberation in 1813 Fichte canceled his lectures and went into the militia. 
Johanna Fichte, his wife was a nurse in a military hospital she got sick but lived. However, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte got sick and died at the height of fame serving in the German militia of 
the time.  
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) 
One of people that Hegel really disliked was Fries. Fries taught as University of Jena at the same 
time as Hegel. He wrote a book entitled, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling (1803) where he was 
very critical of all of the post-Kantians. One could say that the reason Hegel published the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was to try to get university positions before Fries got them. Fries 
did get a position at the University of Heidelberg in 1805 and Hegel was stunned. Fries 
published a book with the title of Knowledge, Faith and Intimation (1805). Fries thinks that these 
feelings that we have are independent of reason and understanding "Ahndung," or "intimation." 
Feelings (inkling, divination, presentiment) are intimations of the transcendent. Fries was a 
follower of Kant, but not with the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Rather he wanted the 
post-Kantians to go toward an empiricist and moralistic way.  
Karl Friedrich Goeschel (1784-1861) 
Karl Friedrich Goeschel wanted a reconciliation of Christianity with modern culture. Lived in 
Berlin at the same time as Hegel. In 1830, Hegel wrote of a review of Goeschel's book entitled 
Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowing.  
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) 
Goethe was one of the most famous writers of this period in German literature. Wrote Foust 
(1808) and Sorrows of Young Werther (1774). Very good friend of Friedrich Schiller. Strong 
personal connections to Hegel, dinners, letters, etc.  
 
Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) 
Hamann was one of Kant's closes friends and yet, Kant argued against him in a number of 
publications. Hamann has an irrationalistic theory of faith and in general was against 
Englightment. Was like by S. Kierkegaard.  
Christian Gottlieb Heinrich (1748-1810) 
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Professor of History at Jena was against the appointment of Schiller in history. Schiller later 
moved to philosophy.  
Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs (1794-1861) 
Professor of philosophy at University of Breslau, 1822; Professor at University Halle, 1824. In 
1825 wrote on Aesthetics and Goethe's great work Faust. The title is: Aesthetische Vorlesgungen 
über Goethe's Faust, als Beitrag zur Anerkennung wissenschaftlicher Kunstbeurtheilung. Also 
wrote on tragedy. The title is: Das wesen der antiken tragödie, in ästhetischen vorlesungen 
durchgeführt an den beiden Oedipus des Sophokles im allgemeinen und an der Antigone 
insbesondere. 
Was a great follower of Hegel. Hegel's student from Heidelberg.  
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) 
Herder was against the synthesis of faith and reason. His collected works are long, 33 volumes. 
He was one of Kant's well-known students. Attacked Enlightenment. On of the leading lights of 
the "Sturm und Drang" (storm and stress) movement. Friend of Hamann. In 1785, Kant 
published a review of Herder's work, Ideen (Ideas).  
Wilhelm Freiherr Von Humboldt (1767-1835) 
Change the school system of the times to a more humanistic way and liberal. Developed a theory 
of language. Was attacked by Hegel in his 1827 review, "On the episode of the Mahabharata 
known as the Bhagavad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt". Von Humboldt vision of a university 
as a union of "teaching and research" remains with us today. He was always surprised that Hegel 
system became famous. Founder of the University of Berlin, but was not involved in its 
development. Wilhelm von Humboldt Gesellschaft e.V. zur Wahrung und Förderung der 
Bildung, der Kultur und der deutschen Sprache Did early studies of lingustics. His brother 
Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) was the traveler (central and south America, 1799-1804) 
and did natural science. Also traveled to Siberia, Ural Mountains, and Caspian Sea in 1829. I 
would like to thank Dr. Tze-wan Kwan, Professor and Chair, Philosophy Department, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, People's Republic of China for 
pointing out the relationship between the two brothers. Back to Hegel. There is a recent 
translation of Hegel's work. Entitled: On The Episode of the Mahabharata Known by the Name 
Bhgavad-Gita by Wilhelm Von Humboldt translated by Herbert Herring, New Delhi : Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1995. 
This is an English translation of Hegel's work, Über die unter dem namen Bhagavad-Gita 
bekannte episode des Mahabharata von Wilhelm von Humboldt. In some ways it is classic 
Hegel, since he puts this Indian work in his large context of world history.  
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Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) 
He thought that our knowledge of mundane and divine matters rests, not on argument, but on 
feeling and faith. The one word should come to mind on Jacobi position is FAITH. In the Preface 
to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "the unmethod of intimation' (Kaufmann's 
translation, et p. 74). Mostly likely he was thinking of Jacobi. He was clearly against the French 
revolution. Considered Goethe to be on the side of fatalism. Jacobi attack Lessing and Moses 
Mendelssohn. Started the Pantheism Controversy.  
 
Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) 
Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) wrote "Groundwork of Philosophy," setting forth a 
"Transcendental Synthesis". Wrote some awful reviews of Hegel's works. Krug followed Kant to 
the chair of Philosophy at University of Konigsberg (1804). Hegel wrote an early work entitled 
"How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr. 
Krug)" in 1802. Krug was a common sense philosopher dressed up as a Kantian. Krug also 
attacked Reinhold and Fichte.  
 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) 
Hegel read one of Lessing plays in his youth and made notes about in his diary and later quoted 
from it in Hegel's writings. The play is called Nathan der Weise (1779). Early work, On the 
education of the Human Race, 1778. Lessing has been considered a deist, a theist, a Spinozist-
pantheist, a panentheist and most likely some kind of atheist. Lessing remarks about Spinzoa that 
started the great Pathenism Controversy in the late 1700s.  
 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) popular philosopher - rationalism. Defended orthodox 
theology based on reason. Wrote letters to Kant. He was model for Lessing play, Nathan der 
Weise (1779). Work on fine art and aesthetics. Loved poetry, wrote Hebrew poems at the age of 
10.  
 
Novalis (1772-1801) 
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Novalis. His real name was Friedrich Leopold Friedrich Baron von Hardenberg Romantic 
Movement in Jena 1799. Wrote a novel entitled, Hymns to the Night. (Hymnen An Die Nacht). 
This was written after the untimely death of fiancée at the age of 14. He defines Philosophy as 
homesickness, as the need to be at home in all places.  
Hegel said this about Novalis,  
Subjectivity signifies the lack of a firm and steady basis, but likewise the desire for such, and 
thus it evermore remains a yearning. These yearnings of a lofty soul are set forth in the writings 
of Novalis. This subjectivity does not reach substantiality, it dies away within itself, and the 
standpoint it adopts is one of inward workings… (History of Philosophy). 
 
Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823) 
Made Kant famous person. Reinhold taught Kantian philosophy at the University of Jena (1787). 
In 1788 was teaching to classes with over 400 students. Leading interpreter of Kantian 
philosophy until Fichte published his Critique of All Revelation anonymously. Every one thought 
this book was the work I. Kant. This launched Fichte's career and made him more famous than 
Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie ("The Philosophy of Elements"). Reinhold also attacked 
Schelling. Hegel is out to defend Schelling in his early writings against the attacks of Reinhold. 
Reinhold's publication, The Fundamental Concepts and Principles of Ethics (1798), uses the 
expression "common sense". In general, he worked on Kant's philosophy and came up with a 
theory of consciousness.  
 
Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854) 
F.W.J. Schelling was a roommate with G.W.F. Hegel and the famous classical poet, Fredrick 
Holderlin (1770-1843) at the Tubingen Stift. His first major publication Ideen zur Philosophie 
der Natur (1797) was published at the age of twenty-two. He was appointed to a chair of 
Philosophy at Jena University, 1798 (age of twenty-three). In 1803 he moved to a chair at 
Wurzburg University until 1806. During this time he wrote his treatise on human freedom in 
1809 (age of thirty-six). This was to be his last major work published during his lifetime even 
though he wrote volumes more. These were not to be published in his lifetime.  
In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "or to pass off one's absolute as the 
night in which, as one says, all cows are black - that is the naiveté of the emptiness of 
knowledge." (Kaufmann's translation, et p. 26). Hegel tried to calm Schelling down in letters 
even before Schelling saw this reference, but Hegel and Schelling were no longer friends after 
this time.  
118 
 
Much later Hegel said, 
It was Schelling, finally, who made the most important, or, from a philosophic point of view, the 
only important advance upon the philosophy of Fichte; his philosophy rose higher than that of 
Fichte, though undoubtedly it stood in close connection with it; indeed, he himself professes to 
be a Fichtian. Now the philosophy of Schelling from the first admitted the possibility of a 
knowledge of God, although it likewise started from the philosophy of Kant, which denies such 
knowledge. At the same time Schelling makes Jacobi's principle of the unity of thought and 
Being fundamental, although he begins to determine it more closely. (History of Philosophy).  
 
Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805) 
German philosopher and poet who wrote a series of popular "Sturm und Drang" (storm and 
stress) plays, including Die Räber and Wilhelm Tell. Although he criticized Kant's ethical theory 
in Über Anmuth und Würde (On Grace and Dignity) (1793), Schiller applied Kantian notions to 
the sensuous appreciation of aesthetic experience in (Briefe über die äesthetische Erziehung des 
Menschen) Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). Hegel was greatly influence by the 
Schiller language and incorporated a lot terminology from Schiller into the Phenomenology of 
Spirit.  
 
August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) 
Brother of Friedrich Von Schlegel (1772-1829). Did the standard translation of Shakespeare into 
German. Also did work on Sanskrit and was involved in the publishing of Indian religious text. 
Schlegel was general known with his brother for his involvement the early German Romantic 
movement. 
 
Friedrich Von Schlegel (1772-1829) 
Friedrich Von Schlegel. Romantic movement. Hegel said, "This first form, Irony, has Friedrich 
von Schlegel as its leading exponent. The subject here knows itself to be within itself the 
Absolute, and all else to it is vain; all the conclusions which it draws for itself respecting the 
right and good, it likewise knows how to destroy again. " (Philosophy of History). Studied 
Sanskrit.  
 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
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German philosopher and theologian. In Über die Religion. Reden an Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern (On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers) (1799); Schleiermacher proposed 
that religious experience be based on human emotions (especially the feeling of dependency) 
rather than on reason. Also, he was the author of Der Christliche Glaube (The Christian Faith) 
(1822). Translated the dialogues of Plato into German, and invented the modern study of 
hermeneutics. 
There is one interesting remark about their relationship: 
"Hegel admired his On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799), but later came to 
hate him, avowedly because he rejected his view that religion rests on a feeling of 'absolute 
dependence'." 
But later Hegel polemics against Schleiermacher became so bad that the students in the lecture 
hall would stomp their feet in displeasure. Taught at the University of Berlin at the same time as 
Hegel. Schleiermacher was a great and a very polished lecturer. Hegel was the opposite. He was 
a great thinker, but not a very good lecturer. For Schleiermacher religion and theology is 
primarily neither morality (contra Kant) nor belief or knowledge (contra Hegel), but rather, an 
immediate self-consciousness or feeling of absolute reliance on God. He was very close friend of 
Friedrich Schlegel. Schleiermacher was against Napoleon as a foreign conqueror and dictator 
(contra Hegel and Goethe). Consider by many to be the founder of modern Protestant theology 
Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833) 
He was a skeptic and professor at Helmstadt. Became famous by attacking Reinhold and Kant's 
critical philosophy. Had read some of Hume. Reinhold and Fichte attacked him. Hegel also 
wrote a review of Schulze work in an article called "The Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy" in 
1802. Taught the great Arthur Schopenhauer. In general, Schulze attack the whole idea of Kant's 
thing-in-itself. Schulze also published a book very close to Hegel's Encyclopedia; he called it 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, for use with Lectures (1814). Hegel wrote a very 
long article on 1802 entitled "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its 
Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One". The latest 
form is indeed Schulze. This article is basically a review of Schulze book, Critique of 
Theoretical Philosophy (1801). Hegel was upset with Schulze commonsensical skepticism and 
tried to defend ancient skepticism like Sextus Empiricus against Schulze.  
 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) 
In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "Comprehending God as the one 
substance outraged the age in which this definition was proclaimed. " (Kaufmann's translation, et 
p. 28). This is a reference to Spinoza.  
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Hegel's lesser known works: 
Although there are more 'lesser known' works of Hegel's, I thought this would show some of his 
publications that are directly related to this article's on lesser known philosophers.  
The Positivity of Christian Religion, Essay (1795) 
(Discuss Kant).  
On the Nature of Philosophical Criticism in general and its Relation to the Present Conditions of 
Philosophy in Particular. (1802).  
(Discuss Kant and Fichte, Philosophy as Science).  
The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, 1801. (Has a third 
section discussing Reinhold).  
On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and 
Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One.  
(Discuss and reviews Schulze's work).  
How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr. 
Krug) (1802). 
Review of Freidrich Heinrich Jacobis Werke. Dritter Band. (1817)  
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Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of Its 
Forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy. (1802).  
Preface to Heinrichs Religion and its inner relationship to Science. (1822).  
Heinrich full title of the book is "Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft; nebst 
Darstellung und Beurtheilung der von Jacobi, Kant, Fichte und Schelling gemachten Versuche, 
dieselbe wissenschaftlich zu erfassen, und nach ihrem Hauptinhalte zu entwickeln." By Hermann 
Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs (1794-1861). 
On the episode of the Mahabharata known as the Bhagavad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
(1827).  
Review of Hamann's Writings (1828).  
Review of Goeschel's book entitled 'Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowing'. (1830).  
On Lessing's letters to his wife. (Unknown, place and date of publication).  
Hegel’s Major Writings: 
Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801)  
Glauben und Wissen (1802) 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807)  
[Earlier title: Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins] 
Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813, 1816, 1832) 
Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830) 
Philosophie des Rechts (1820) 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte 
Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Kunst (1823) 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion  
 
Some notes:  
Hegel loved both Medoc and Pontac wines, which really cost more than he could afford.  
Hegel himself did not end up as a footnote in history as can be seen by the view of Hegel that 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in his early essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life," 
1873, said this about Hegel influence: "I believe that there has been no dangerous variation or 
change in German culture in this century, which has not become more dangerous through the 
monstrous influence of the philosophy of Hegel, an influence which continues to flow right up to 
the present." 
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Heidegger’s Encounter with F.W.J. Schelling: The Questions of Evil and Freedom 
End of Metaphysics 
 
“There is no other principle of explanation for the world than divine freedom.” 
F.W.J. Schelling.  
“All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”   
Spinoza (Ethics, v 42).  
“The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom.” 
From a Letter from Schelling to Hegel, February 4, 1795. 
 
Abstract 
Martin Heidegger through his reading of F.W.J. Schelling’s treatise on human freedom comes to 
a critique of metaphysics. Heidegger starts with an analysis of systems in general, then 
pantheism, fatalism, human freedom, a metaphysics of evil, metaphysics in general, and finally 
the metahistorical ontological position of Being as Will. Basically  Schelling’s radical thinking 
on human freedom and evil annihilates the metaphysical foundation of Idealism and hopefully 
metaphysics in general. It is only after the end of metaphysics, according to Heidegger can we 
began a dialogue with Being and God or the gods. This work on Schelling is perhaps the most 
sustain discussion of traditional theological issues in Heidegger’s writing.     
Introduction      
The speculative thinking of German Idealism seems far removed from our time. This paper looks 
at Heidegger’s reading of one of the deeper thinkers of German Idealism, namely, F.W.J. 
Schelling (1775-1854). Schelling was a young bright star of Idealism, he was highly published, 
but his friend G.W.F.Hegel (1770-1831) soon replaced him in the sun light.  
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) publications show him as the most published philosopher and 
thinker of the twentieth century. Heidegger’s thinking has sparked many people to write about 
him. He is the most written about twentieth century philosopher. This has been called the 
Heidegger industry.  
Heidegger’s early theological connections are extensive. He entered as a novitiate of the Society 
of Jesus at Titis near Feldkirch in Austria in 1909, at the age of 19. He began studying for the 
priesthood at the Albert-Ludwig University in Freiburg. In 1911 abandons the theological 
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seminary  changes to mathematics and philosophy. Heidegger in 1913 says “the undersigned 
intends to dedicate himself to the study of Christian philosophy” and the next year 1914 he says  
“career in the service of researching and teaching Christian-Scholastic philosophy” (The Young 
Heidegger  p. 54). He also speaks of doing a study of the “problem of a theoretical-scientific 
treatment of Catholic theology” (ibid. p. 55).  
Now at the end of the millennium, it is time to review what has happen in the twentieth century 
in thinking and theology. Heidegger’s first ma or publication was Being and Time in 1927 and it 
is his most famous work. His collected work (Gesamtausgabe) has grown to ninety volumes and 
is still growing. Most of these are lectures he gave to specific groups or are extensive lecture 
notes that were first-read to students at the University of Freiburg or Marburg. Heidegger’s most 
documented lecture course on Schelling dates from 1936 with some notes from the summer 
semester 1941 at the University of Freiburg. This paper is based on the English translation of the 
book entitled: Schelling’s treatise on the essence of human freedom, by Martin Heidegger.  
Clearly Heidegger’s is an ontologist. The question of the meaning of Being is his fundamental 
question in Being and Time and remained his primary matter for thought. Through his work on 
ontology, philosophy, and metaphysics, he has especially influenced the theology of his friend 
Rudolf Bultmann among others.  
Who was Schelling? 
F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) was a roommate with G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and the famous 
classical poet, F. Holderlin (1770-1843) at the Tubingen Stift. His first major publication Ideen 
zur Philosophie der Natur (1797) was published at the age of twenty-two. He was appointed to a 
chair of Philosophy at Jena University, 1798 (age of twenty-three). In 1803 he moved to a chair 
at Wurzburg University until 1806. During this time he wrote his treatise on human freedom in 
1809 (age of thirty-six). This was to be his last major work published during his life time even 
though he wrote volumes. These were not to be published. Back to1806, he meets the theologian 
Franz von Baader (1765-1841) and was reading Jakob Bohme (1575-1624). Other influences on 
Schelling at this time were Christoph Oetinger, Paracelsus, Emanuel Swedenborg, Johann 
Bengel, Saint Martin, Johannes Tauler, Meister Eckhart, and Nicolaus of Cusanus. In 1841 he 
was called to Berlin University to try to overturn Hegel’s influence after Hegel’s death in 1831. 
In Schelling’s Berlin lectures was a group of students who perhaps became more famous than 
Schelling himself, namely, S. Kierkegaard, J. Burckhardt, F. Engels, L. Feuerbach, and M. 
Bakunin. Schelling has become more famous in the twentieth century through his influence on 
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) and his theology. Tillich two most famous books on Schelling are: 1) 
The construction of the history of religion in Schelling's positive philosophy: its presuppositions 
and principles (originally, his thesis from 1910) and, (2) Mysticism and guilt-consciousness in 
Schelling's philosophical development (originally, his thesis from 1912). 
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At this moment we need to mention Bertrand Russell’s  A history of Western Philosophy. In the 
section on I. Kant (1724-1804), after discussing Fichte, (1762-1814) he ends with the following 
remark  “His immediate successor Schelling (1775-1854) as more amiable, but not less 
subjective. He was closely associated with the German romantics; philosophically, though 
famous in his day  he is not important.” (p.718). B. Russell is known for writing a great many 
works during his life time. Perhaps he needed to do a little more reading, research, and thinking 
before writing. Also, A history of Western Philosophy was written under contract, so perhaps he 
was more interested in money than philosophy. Who said that the Sophist had a bad name in 
Greece?  
Heidegger’s encounter with Schelling       
Heidegger has a fresh way of reading, thinking, and philosophizing with other philosophers and 
poets. He is not just interested in what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, 
where they get stuck, and Heidegger tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to 
have a dialogue. Heidegger is very much alive to the hermeneutical text. Part of the methodology 
he used in Being and Time was hermeneutics and he is responsible for rekindling this 
methodology in the twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time, he says, 
“Phenomenology of human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of 
that word . . . “ 
Heidegger’s reading of Schelling is not as controversial as his interpretation of Kant.  
For the motto of this interpretation of Schelling, Heidegger approvingly quotes Schelling 
himself  “If you want to honor a philosopher  you must catch him where he had not yet gone 
forth to the consequences, in his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his 
point in departure” (Treatise  p.9). Although this is Schelling’s thought  Heidegger’s later works 
mention this same motif repeatedly, as he does his own unique interpretation of the Western 
thought. In another work Heidegger says  “The ‘doctrine’ of a thinker is that which is left unsaid 
in what he says.” In a later article Heidegger says  “We show respect for a thinker only when we 
think. This demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought.” (The Word 
of Nietzsche, p. 99).             
To be exact  Heidegger’s reading of Schelling is a radical interpretation. This reading has more 
to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics, than that of 
understanding Schelling’s own pro ect. If you want to understand Schelling  then read Schelling. 
On the other hand, if you want to understand Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of 
ontology - then read Heidegger.  
Heidegger starts his analysis with saying that  “Schelling’s treatise on freedom is one of those 
very rare works . . . “ (Treatise p.4). From a different point of view, G.W.F. Hegel remarked 
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about this work  “Schelling had made known a single treatise on Freedom. It is of a deep 
speculative nature  but it stands alone. In philosophy a single piece cannot be developed” 
(Hegel’s History of Philosophy, p.13). This tells us more about Hegel’s position than his 
understanding of what Schelling is trying to do with his work on freedom. (A short historical 
digression. By this time, the two great friends, Schelling and Hegel had already had a falling out 
and only had a chance meeting later in life at a bath spa, Karlsbad, September 1829. After Hegel 
died, his son Immanuel heard Schelling lecturing in Munich and was invited to his house and 
seemed impressed with Schelling’s and his daughters as well.)     
Now to return to Heidegger’s work. According to Heidegger  Schelling is very important for our 
understanding of this period. For example, he says A . . . for Schelling is the truly creative and 
boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he 
drives German Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position (Treatise p. 4).” Our 
task is to see if Schelling can really get us by Idealism and metaphysics. Has metaphysics finally 
come to end after Idealism? 
It should be noted that Heidegger does not come to a generalized notion of freedom or evil. 
These notions are rather used in the service of his bigger project, that is, of the deconstruction of 
metaphysics. This is part of our problem in the understanding and the interpretation of 
Heidegger’s work on Schelling. Heidegger takes only a glancing blow at both freedom and evil. 
His main sights are aimed at the foundations of ontology, theology, and metaphysics. This 
process has been called genealogical deconstruction or archeologies of western metaphysics. 
Heidegger says in Being and Time  “The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially 
belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a 
formulation.” (E.T.  p.  0). So  the purpose of this project is the same as Being and Time, 
namely, what is the meaning of Being. Thus, Heidegger looks at Schelling in terms of the history 
of ontology and metaphysics. What is Schelling’s place in the history of metaphysics? 
Attack on the concept of Systems     
Beginning with Spinoza and certainly with Kant the concept of the System has been an 
important “driving force” in Western thought. Kant says for example  in Critique of Pure 
Reason  A13  “Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science  for which the critique of 
pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically . . . “ and in A847 “The original idea of 
a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division; it is therefore architectonic, in 
conformity with its essential ends . . . “ Kant’s concept of system is clearly - architectonic. Kant 
was a great system thinker, but the concept and implementation of the system clearly reach its 
climax in Hegel. Hegel is perhaps the greatest system thinker ever.  
Hegel says in his Science of Logic (181 )  “Accordingly  logic is to be understood as the system 
of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. It can therefore be said that this content is the 
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exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.” 
(p. 50). In a sense GOD is the SYSTEM or GOD equals the SYSTEM. Note the whole 
pantheism discussion.  
 
In Hegel’s thinking there is  A. . . first part of the System of Science which contains the 
Phenomenology should be followed by a second part containing logic and two concrete sciences, 
Philosophy of  ature and Philosophy of Spirit  which complete the System of Philosophy” (p. 
 9). Later on Hegel’s system pro ect was completed as lecture notes under the title 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences.  
Hegel’s entire system is obviously linked to his theology. In the first part of the Science of Logic, 
Hegel has a section entitled “With What Must the Science Begin?”. At this end of this section 
Hegel states: “...(and God has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with 
him) . . . “ (p.78). This points clearly to the theological foundations of Hegel’s system. Heidegger 
would have said this points to the onto-theological foundation of not  ust Hegel’s system  but the 
metaphysics of Idealism in general. Heidegger says  “God is the leading idea of system in 
general (Treatise p. 50).” It is hard to image German Idealism without a theology  an atheist 
Idealism seems out of the question for these philosophers.  
Heidegger makes the following amazing remark about Hegel’s entire system and Schelling 
destructive criticisms of systems in general. Heidegger says  “The treatise which shatters Hegel’s 
Logic before it was even published.”(Treatise p.97). Hegel’s Science of Logic is the fundamental 
foundation to his entire system. Once Hegel wrote his Logic the rest of his life was just working 
on the fine details of his system. In a sense, Hegel was finished thinking and philosophizing. All 
of Hegel’s questions had been answered.  
In Heidegger’s analysis of Schelling  he says  “Schelling shows first of all how the system is split 
open by the reality of evil” (Treatise p.98). Freedom leads the way for possibility of evil. Human 
freedom radical conceived by Schelling breaks open the system.  
How is freedom possible within a system? 
Freedom     
What does Heidegger’s analysis of Schelling show us about freedom? Heidegger says  A . . . 
freedom is freedom for good and evil. The ‘and’ the possibility of this ambiguity and everything 
hidden in it is what is decisive. That means that the whole concept of freedom must change.” 
(Treatise p. 97). So, it is not good or evil. Instead, Heidegger is doing ontology and his analysis 
has more to do with the possibility of evil, that is, not what evil means, but that evil exists and 
has an ontological status. Is there really evil in the world? Does evil exist for us?  
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According to Schelling  “Until the discovery of Idealism the genuine concept of freedom was 
lacking in all recent systems  in Leibniz’s  ust as in Spinoza’s.” Schelling thinking in relation to 
Spinoza (1632-16770 has always been close, but he also makes reference to Leibniz (1646-1716) 
concept of freedom. Schelling often quotes G. W. Leibniz’s Theodicy (1710), which has two 
ma or sections: section I  “Preliminary Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason.” 
Section two in three parts  entitled  “Essays on the Justice of God and the Freedom of Man in the 
Origin of Evil.” (p.31  E.T.  1-417 paragraphs). Note the concepts of freedom of man and evil are 
similarly in name to Schelling’s treatise; however, they are used in a much different way in 
Leibniz. 
Toward the end of his analysis  Heidegger asks the question  “But then why is the treatise on the 
system a treatise on freedom? Because evil truly existent in human freedom and as human 
freedom. The most extreme discord in beings is truly existent in the freedom of man (Treatise 
p.177).” This leads to the next section on evil.  
Evil          
I. Kant in October 1794 received a strongly worded letter from his King. This was right after 
Kant published his last major work entitled: Religion within the limits of reason alone (1793). 
The King was not happy with Kant and said: “If you continue to resist  you may certainly expect 
unpleasant consequences to yourself” (p.xxxiv). Although he got into hot water over the 
publication, the major theme of the work is evil and human nature. For example, there are four 
books and the first is entitled: Book One. Concerning the indwelling of the evil principal with 
good, or, on the radical evil in human nature. Although these topics seem somewhat the same as 
Schelling, Kant has a much different direction. Heidegger does not make any connection with 
Kant in his analysis of Schelling. Although Schelling grew up reading Kant and Fichte, he seems 
to pay more attention to Leibniz in this work.  
What does evil mean for Heidegger? In his analysis of Schelling  he says  “Evil - that is the key 
word for the main treatise. The question of the nature of human freedom becomes the question of 
the possibility and reality of evil.” And AEvil itself determines the new beginning in 
metaphysics. The question of the possibility and reality of evil brings about a transformation of 
the question of Being.” (Treatise p. 97). How is that possible? What is the speculative 
relationship between the question of Being (Sein) and evil?  
During Heidegger’s analysis of Schelling  he makes a sweeping statement “Previous systems  
especially Idealism, are incapable of founding a true system acknowledging the reality of evil. 
The next time the reflection is affirmative: the determining of the ground of the system, the 
essence of Being in general, must be more primordially conceived in order for evil to be 
comprehensible in its own being and thus introduced into the system, thus making a system of 
freedom possible (Treatise p.98).” This amazing statement by Heidegger does not seem to lead 
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anywhere. So far  Heidegger’s other writing does not follow up on this statement. Heidegger has 
certainly made attempts to more primordially conceive the essence, meaning, truth of Being, but 
the introduction of evil into the system and making a Heideggerian system of freedom has not 
happened. What is Heidegger’s concept of freedom? So far in published writings this is not a 
major concept for Heidegger, but his use here is more generally to attack Idealism and 
metaphysics.  
 
Ontology       
In part of Heidegger’s analysis of Being he also quotes Schelling  here is the whole passage  
Heidegger says  “Being is understood as egoity  as freedom. Freedom is will. Thus, Being is 
originally willing. “The Will is primal being.” (Treatise p. 99).” The famous quote from 
Schelling is “The Will is primal being.” This plays into Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Schelling’s ontology.  
For Heidegger, Schelling is at the beginning of the 19
th
 century shapes Being’s Metahistory with 
Being as Will, which begun with Kant.  
Freedom is Will, Being is Will, this then leads us in the late 19
th
 century to Schopenhauer’s 
central work The World as Will and Representation and Nietzsche’s ma or pro ect (starting in 
1877)  which he called the “Will to Power ” and he restarted again and again. For Heidegger 
these are last moments in his Metahistory of Being. Being is - Being as Will. This is a 
Metahistory which Heidegger is hoping will end. This provides him a foundation to escape the 
entire onto-theological metaphysics of western thought. (See “The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking”). Heidegger says in his work on  ietzsche the following about metaphysics  
“But then what does it mean Athe end of metaphysics”? It means the historical moment in which 
the essential possibilities of metaphysics are exhausted” (Nietzsche Vol IV, p.148). Heidegger 
points this out directly in a later work, he says, ABut Hegel also, as little as Husserl, as little as 
all metaphysics  does not ask about Being as Being . . . “ (p.389). Again  Heidegger wants to step 
beyond his own shadow, to ask about Being (Sein) and God outside of traditional metaphysics 
and ontologies. He is ontologist and he wants to radically ask the question of the meaning of 
Being.  
Theology          
According to Heidegger theology, philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology are closely linked. 
This position is not in line with what passes as Philosophy on most university campus today. 
Heidegger says  “Philosophy’s questioning is always and in itself both onto-logical and 
theological in the very broad sense. Philosophy is Ontotheology. The more originally it is both in 
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one  the more truly it is philosophy. And Schelling’s treatise is thus one of the most profound 
works of philosophy because it is in a unique sense ontological and theological at the same time 
(Treatise p. 51).”  
At a more particular level Heidegger’s remarks on Christian theologies (circa 1936) appear in 
general to be negative. For example, Heidegger says,  
“The assertion often heard of late that modern philosophy is simply a secularization of Christian 
Theology is only true very conditionally and also true only in being restricted to adopting the 
realms of Being. Rather, the reverse is true that Christian theology is the Christianization of an 
extra-Christian philosophy and that only for this reason could this Christian theology also be 
made secular again (p51).” 
Finally  In Heidegger’s analysis of Schelling  he says  “God lets the oppositional will of the 
ground operate in order that might be which love unifies and subordinates itself to for the 
glorification of the Absolute. The will of love stands about the will of the ground and this 
predominance, this eternal decidedness, the love for itself as the essence of Being in general, this 
decidedness is the innermost core of absolute freedom (Treatise p.160).” 
(In German: “Gott lasst den gegenstrebigen Willen des Grundes wirken  damit  enes sei  was die 
Liebe einige und sich zur Verherrlichung des Absoluten unterordne. Der Wille der Liebe steht 
uber dem Willen des Grundes, und dieses Uberwiegen, die ewige Entschiedenheit dazu, also die 
Liebe zu sich selbst als Wesen des Seyns uberhaupt; diese Entschiedenheit ist der innerste Kern 
absoluten Freiheit.”(in Schelling: Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen; AKA Schelling: Vom 
Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). 1936., p. 277).   
In this quotation, Heidegger links God=Love=Absolute Freedom=Eternal Decidedness=Absolute 
in a very direct way, they are the Self-Same. How this becomes an identity is part of the deep 
speculative thinking that has directed this kind of inquiry. 
End of Metaphysics  
Metaphysics has exhausted its possibilities, it has ended. The question for Heidegger is what path 
there is for thinking after metaphysics. He wants to open the question of the truth of Being - and, 
make room for God or the gods.       
Heidegger did an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in September 1966. This was 
only to be published after his death. Heidegger died in 1976 and the interview was published a 
few weeks later. The interview seems to get at a much more personal tone of the later 
Heidegger’s think on a great number of topics. You also get a sense that Heidegger is humble 
about his influence and what can be done. However, this is the concept of theo-logy with no 
connections to metaphysics or the Onto-theo-logy nature of metaphysics. This is a step out. The 
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followed passages give us a sense of Heidegger’s thinking on the future of a postmetaphysical 
theo-logy 
“Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a sort of readiness  
through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in the 
time of foundering; for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder (Der Spiegel’s Interview 
with Martin Heidegger  p 77).”  
Heidegger’s last remark in this interview was  “For us contemporaries the greatness of what is to 
be thought is too great. Perhaps we might bring ourselves to build a narrow and not far-reaching 
footpath as a passageway.” (Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger, p284). So, we need 
a ‘footpath’ or some kind of path onward. Heidegger uses the image of the path a great deal in 
his writings.  
A Heidegger poem dating from 1971 says, 
Paths, 
Paths of thought, going by themselves, 
vanishing. When they turn again, 
what do they show us? 
Paths, going by themselves, 
formerly open, suddenly closed, 
later on. Once pointing out the way, 
never attained, destined to renunciation -  
slackening the pace 
from out of the harmony of trustworthy fate. 
And again the need  
for a lingering darkness 
within the waiting light.  
(Philosophy Today, vol. 21, 1976, p287) 
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Heidegger feels himself in the lingering darkness and he is waiting for the light.  
The lingering darkness is the absent of God and God is the light.  
And where is the trustworthy fate?  
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 Heidegger and Schelling Additional Notes. 
Heidegger does not mention Schelling in Being and Time (1927). However, in the little essay by 
Heidegger entitled “My way to Phenomenology ” he mentions on his walks with his Professor 
Dr. Carl Braig (circa 1911) A . . . I first heard of Schelling’s and Hegel’s significance for 
speculative theology as distinguished from the dogmatic system of Scholasticism” (p. 73). In a 
very early work of Heidegger’s entitled “Review of Ernst Cassirer’s Mythical Thought” (19 8)  
he compares Cassirer’s position to the later Schelling’s work on mythology. In the last paragraph 
Heidegger writes  “The critical questions here brought forward cannot detract from the merit of 
Cassirer’s work insofar as it is the first attempt since Schelling to place myth as a systematic 
problem within the range of philosophy (p. 45).”  
Heidegger earlier lectures from 19 9 are concerned with only the early Schelling’s work  not the 
Treatise on freedom. See Heidegger’s volume GA  8  Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, 
Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart. 1929. In 1968, Heidegger gave 
the first of series of seminars First Le Thor seminar (Hegel: Differenz des Fichteschen und 
Schellingschen Systems), in Provence, August 30 to September 8. The topic of this seminar is 
Hegel’s work  entitled: The difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian systems of 
philosophy. Also, there are notes from volume GA 49, Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. 
Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der 
menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende (1809). 1941.  
In Heidegger’s work entitled  “Who is  ietzsche’s Zarathustra?” he says the following about 
Schelling’s treatise: 
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 “The essential coinage of Being comes to language in classic form in several sentences 
formulated by Schelling in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom 
and the Objects Pertaining Thereto (1809).  
The three sentences read:  
 
‘In the final and highest instance there is no other Being than willing. Willing is primal Being, 
and to it willing alone all of the predicates of the same primal Being apply: absence of 
conditions; eternity; independence from time; self-affirmation. All philosophy strives solely in 
order to find this supreme expression.’ 
Schelling assets that the predicates which metaphysical thought since antiquity has attributed to 
Being find their ultimate, supreme, and thus consummate configuration in willing. However, the 
will of the willing meant here is not a faculty of the human soul. Here the word willing names the 
Being of beings as whole. Such Being is will”. (E.T.  p.    ). 
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Martin Heidegger contra Nietzsche on the Greeks 
 
Introduction 
Martin Heidegger has developed his own thinking in opposition to  ietzsche’s philosophy and to 
metaphysics in general. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as trapped within metaphysics as the same 
time as being the last metaphysician of Western thought.  Nietzsche according to Heidegger has 
brought metaphysics to an end.  In Heidegger’s metahistory of Being   ietzsche is under the 
epoch of will as will to power.  So, Nietzsche stands at the end of metaphysics and yet Heidegger 
has given us a clue that Nietzsche is part of the transition beyond metaphysics.   This is the 
transition to a new, other beginning of philosophy that Heidegger is leading us toward.   First, the 
general context of reading Heidegger needs to be elucidated.  This will be done by looking at 
Heidegger’s confrontational methodology and his way of reading philosophers and also 
hermeneutical text issues with Heidegger’s writings and publications.  The ensuing second part 
enumerates four areas that bring out Heidegger’s contra “position” with  ietzsche on the issue of 
thinking with the Greeks.  Why are the Greek so important for Nietzsche and Heidegger? 
Nietzsche is taken with opposing Plato, whereas Heidegger seems closer to Aristotle and Pre-
Platonic Philosophers.  
Heidegger’s Confrontational Methodology 
Although Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche was important for his development, it seems 
that Heidegger’s reading and encounter with Kant in the 19 0s was the interpretive reading that 
Heidegger received the most acrimonious grief from others. His Kant interpretation methodology 
is one that drove Heidegger to clarify his thinking on encounter methodology with other 
philosophers and poets.   So, I will use some examples from what Heidegger said over a number 
of years about his Kant interpretation as first developed in 1929 with the publication of Kant and 
problem of Metaphysics.  It should be noted that historical this publication is one which have 
with Edmund Husserl’s marginalia and clearly shows the early break between and Husserl and 
Heidegger. One of the central issues is Heidegger’s remark about interpretive violence and the 
fact that Husserl’s misconstrued this idea. Heidegger wrote  “Certainly  in order to wring from 
what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation must necessarily use 
violence.” (section 35   01-203, et. 141).   Why must we use force and violence? 
Specifically, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical interpretation of Kant. This reading has 
more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics than with 
understanding Kant's own project. Heidegger said, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to 
Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics  ET p.175  Heidegger’s personal notes 
were added later) Heidegger said in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant 
interpretation: "Kant - - people refuse to see the problem and speak rather of my arbitrarily 
reading my own views into Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ET p147, 1930-31).  Even 
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in a lecture series not devoted to Kant  Heidegger’s still feels a need to response to his critics.  
During this lecture series on Hegel was the time that the first reviews by Ernst Cassirer and 
Rudolf Odebrecht were being published about Heidegger’s Kant book.   
In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
said, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation 
of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx).  I 
think Heidegger wants to be clear and tell his readers that he knows about the criticisms of the 
book and he is not denying anything about this interpretation.  A careful reading will understand 
the force and violence that Heidegger brings to his dialogue with Kant. The rekindled spirit of 
Kant will speak again.  It is easy to make some pe orative remarks about Kant’s old system and 
then not to come to grips with Kant’s thinking for today.  
Bernd Magnus gives us some remarks Heidegger made to an unnamed friend about his Kant 
book. Heidegger reportedly said  “It may not be good Kant  but it is awfully good Heidegger.” 
(‘Forward to English Translation’ to Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same by Karl Löwith, page xvii).   This personal remark makes the point that Heidegger is not 
trying to be a punctilious Kant scholar or a pedantic historian of philosophy. Heidegger is not 
simply a Kant adherent. Again, Heidegger defines philosophy as philosophizing and being in a 
live dialogue with other philosophers even if this means not getting them “right”  since that is not 
the point. Why must philosophy open a new horizon with Kant’s thinking? 
Heidegger was adamant when he wrote  “Kantbook  an attempt to question what had not been 
said, instead of writing in a fixed way about what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, 
what has not been said is filled with riches.” (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p.175, 
marginalia).  So, it is not a matter about what Kant said, but rather what he thought and also what 
he did not think.  Heidegger some time speaks about what is unsaid in a thinker.  
In the author’s forward to the multi-volume Nietzsche Band I-II (1961)  Heidegger wrote  “The 
matter  the point in question  is in itself a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung)” (et. p. xxxviii).  
Heidegger goes on to say in next few pages  “Confrontation is genuine criticism.  It is the 
supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker. In confrontation we undertake to 
reflect on his thinking and to trace it in its effective force, not in its weakness.  To what purpose?  
In order that through the confrontation we ourselves become free for the supreme exertion of 
thinking.” (Nietzsche Volume 1, et. p. 4-5).  What is the purpose of reading a philosopher?  
Again, this is not to get Heidegger or Nietzsche or even their readings of the Greeks right.  The 
pivotal task is not scholarship or philology or witty repartee, but rather philosophical thinking 
and to galvanize a genuine dialogue with philosophers.  
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In a summary essay on Nietzsche  Heidegger wrote that “We attend to a thinker only by thinking.  
This requires that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought.” (“ ietzsche’s 
word “God is Dead” p. 190 in Off the Beaten Track).   
Heidegger is showing us in his historical lecture what is means to engage in a critical encounter, 
struggle, or a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with other philosophers. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger brought up the “Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology” (section II  #6). 
Needless to say  the single word “destruction” gave Heidegger enough grief.  Later on in 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger said something even more intriguing, 
“What unfolds as “destruction” in Being and Time does not mean dismantling (Abbau) as 
demolishing (Zerstörung) but rather as purifying (Reinigung) in the direction of freeing 
metaphysical positions.“ (GA 65 et. p. 154).  Therefore, Heidegger has given us a methodology 
not just to understand how he reads and encounters philosophers, but an adroit methodology for 
our own dialogue with Heidegger. A standard way of engaging Heidegger’s thought. The 
methodology shows us to move along Heidegger’s pathways as an attempt with being historical 
thinking (seynsgeschichtliche Denken).   
The journey and the seeking is putting us on a path.  Heidegger says  “Seeking itself is the goal.” 
(Das Suchen selbst ist das Ziel). (GA 65, p. 18, et. p.13).  We can take Heidegger at his word and 
try to think through what that means for philosophizing.  Since this is not about revealing 
“eternal truths” nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand “system” 
nor creating a “worldview” (Weltanschauung) nor creating a value system.  But rather  seeking 
and asking questions, simply philosophizing.  The journey is the process.   
Textual Issues with Heidegger’s Publications 
Heidegger writings and letters are extensive and proliferating, but there is an interesting issue of 
how and what Heidegger actually published and how he has directed his son and others on how 
to publish his writings after death (posthumous writings).  For example, we know that Beiträge 
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) was to be published only after most of the historical lectures 
series were published.  The volumes of Überlegungen (GA 94-96) (Considerations or perhaps 
Reflections) are to be published after the vast majority of the volumes of the Gesamtausgabe are 
published and according to Dr. Hermann Heidegger are closed for publication until at least 2005 
(now 2011 – what happen?)  How did Heidegger understand his publications as his own 
development? 
During Heidegger’s life time there is some evidence that only two books were published as a 
book, namely, Kant and the problem of Metaphysics and Being and Time. Being and Time which 
was rushed to be published as an incomplete project so that Heidegger could get a permanent job 
at the University of Freiburg.  Heidegger has always stressed the preeminent part of Being and 
Time as questioning investigation not as philosophical book or work.  In the Appendix to his 
Schelling book which he published  Heidegger wrote  “Thus we can distinguish the necessity 
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designated by the name Being and Time from the “book” with this title.” (et. p 189).  Heidegger 
in a more radically way said  “All specific “contents” and “opinions” and “pathways” of the first 
attempt in Being and Time are incidental and can disappear.” (GA65 section 1 5  et. 171).  
 In fact, he said in his second major project Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) is not a 
“work”.   For example, at about this same time, but after Beiträge was completed Heidegger 
wrote,  
“Diese "Beiträge zur Philosophie" sollen in einem neuen Anlauf die Weite der Seinsfrage 
sichtbar machen; hier gilt nicht die Ausfaltung im Einzelnen, weil diese allzu leicht den 
eigentlichen Gesichtskreis verengt und den Grundzug des Fragens verlieren läßt. Noch aber ist 
auch hier nicht die Form erreicht, die ich für eine Veröffentlichung als "Werk" gerade hier 
fordere; denn hier muß sich der neue Stil des Denkens kundgeben - die Verhaltenheit in der 
Wahrheit des Seyns; das Sagen des Erschweigens - das Reifmachen für die Wesentlichkeit des 
Einfachen." (Besinnung (1938/39) GA 66, page 427).    
Of course right at the beginning of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger said, 
“must avoid all false claims to be a “work”. (GA 65  et. 3).  This means we are not presumably 
dealing with some final philosophical “work” or finished pro ect.   The matter does not allow for 
the “work” to be published.  Thinking has a different way of proceeding.  
So far, Heidegger has not published aphorisms, but he has published a few books, addresses, 
lectures, dialogues (GA77), poems, sketches (Entwürfe), elucidations, and letters. Heidegger 
does not claim to have published a philosophical work.  Being and Time was partial based on a 
lecture series in the Summer Semester 19 5  entitled:  “Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. 
Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Geschichte und  atur” (now  Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs GA20).  So, Heidegger’s book Kant and the problem of Metaphysics 
is a singular project.   Heidegger mentions in the Preface to the Fourth Edition (end of August 
1973) that  “The Kant book  written immediately after the conclusion of the second Hochschule 
course (March 17 – April 6  19 9)  was based on the preparatory work.” (et. p. xviii).  Heidegger 
wrote the Kant book very quickly after he returned to Freiburg from Davos.  The general 
implication is that Heidegger was impetuous with his Kant reading.  Heidegger could not do his 
radical interpretation of Kant with impunity.  The litany of complaints again Heidegger about the 
Kant book forced Heidegger to explain himself in the later published Forwards that came out 
with various editions that were published during his life time.  
Heidegger has given some interesting titles to his publications during his life time.  Many of 
these convey the impression that those writings are not a final philosophical statement or 
Heidegger’s ultimate philosophical position; for example  Holzwege (1935-1946), Wegmarken 
(1919-1961), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959).  In Holzwege, Heidegger puts a note in front 
of the texts of what is a Holzwege, a pathway that has no direct goal. The new English 
translation of this book is entitled  “Off the Beaten Track”.  One can say barking up the wrong 
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tree or going down the wrong path. However, these are writings are not just simply digressions 
or peregrinations. Late in his life Heidegger added a crucial motto to his collected writings 
(Gesamtausgabe)  “Pathways  not works” (Wege - nicht Werke).  This means these are collected 
writings not his collected works.  However, there are some publications that Heidegger himself 
published during his life time that will not be appearing in the Gesamtausgabe as planned so far, 
hence  the word ‘collected’ is not entirely true. 
The main point is that Heidegger sees himself on the way. Even a chronological approach does 
not work very well, for example, Pathways (Wegmarken) covers forty years of Heidegger’s 
writings. All of these rhetorical devices make a strong point that Heidegger is underway.   This 
comes out of his basic philosophical ‘position’ (if that is the right term) of being post-
metaphysical.  That means he is not describing the world and he is not making speculative 
metaphysical statements about the Übersinnlichen (the supersensuous) world.  Consider the 
direction of Kant on this issue in an important unpublished essay, What Real Progress has 
Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?, written in 1793 where 
Kant defines metaphysics as "the science of advancing by reason from knowledge of the sensible 
(Sinnliche) to the knowledge of the supersensuous. (Progress  et. p. 53).  Heidegger’s quest for 
meaning or truth of Being is not about the metaphysical eternal supersensuous world.  These are 
all Nietzschian concept-mummies (Begriffs-Mumien).  Heidegger is pertaining to pathways and 
not philosophical works or grand systems.  Heidegger said in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom 
Ereignis)  “Questioning is here beginning and end.” (et.  4 ).  Remember Heidegger said  
“Seeking itself is the goal.” (GA65 p 18  et. 13).  We can take Heidegger at his word and try to 
think through what that means for philosophizing. Since the pro ect is not to reveal “eternal 
truth” nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand “system” nor 
creating some kind of liberal “worldview” nor creating a value system  so empirical facts do not 
need “proofs” or “logic” or to develop a philosophical “position”.  The journey and seeking is a 
path toward philosophizing.  Philosophy is philosophizing nothing more or less.   Heidegger 
said  “The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency 
by which he remains a seeker.” (GA45  p 5, et p.7).   The lack of seeking is pointing toward the 
distress (Notlosigkeit) of the current epoch.  
Since many of Heidegger’s published writings have started as historical lectures to students  it 
seems that Heidegger’s voice in these writings is to his students.  The voice here is Heidegger as 
a teacher. Heidegger gave lectures or addresses to a variety of audience; some times his lectures 
were to philosophers, but more often a general academic audience.  Some of these were 
published during life time, but many have not been published yet (see especial a large collection 
of his lectures GA 80 Vorträge (1915-1967)).  
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) has been heralded as Heidegger second magnum opus 
(Otto Pöggeler) and it stands a singular project at this time. We still await some other major 
writings that were done shortly after Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939), for 
example, Über den Anfang (1941), Das Ereignis (1941/42), Die Stege des Anfangs (1944)) and 
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of course the Überlegungen volumes (Considerations) sometimes called the “Schwarzen 
Hefte”, which are often referenced inside of the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis).  Can 
we take what Heidegger wrote in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) with more authority 
than in his historical lectures or other writings?   At this time, it seems that the Beiträge has a 
special place in Heidegger’s writings; but there are many more publications from this period that 
may place the Beiträge in a different context.  Certainly, the Beiträge was not in any way a series 
of lectures or address and was not widely known among Heidegger’s students.  It was fairly 
concealed by Heidegger, so it seems to be closer to Heidegger essential thought.  Heidegger 
worked on this publication for a number of years and it is oddly autobiographical.  He references 
many of his own works, many of which are not yet published sixty-four years later.  So, 
Heidegger on Heidegger is part of the intimate dialogue of his thinking and writing in the 
Beiträge.  
Heidegger’s writings are his pathways  so it is important to remain within the hermeneutical 
context and not to over draw our conclusions.  Heidegger is acting as a guide and is pushing and 
directing us up the mountain, but the right analogy is that we still have to do the climbing and 
follow this path with our own thinking.  Nietzsche is lucid on this point when he said in the 
Wanderer and His Shadow (#267), "There are no educators. As thinker, one should speak only of 
self-education".   In the Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886, he says, "We ourselves wish to be 
our experiments…" (#319).  
Nietzsche said in his extraordinary autobiographical work Ecce Homo (written 1888), "I am a 
disciple of the philosopher Dionysus" (Preface, Section 2, et. P. 217).  This is pointing in non-
ontological direction and more toward a life philosophy, namely, a whole world view that 
includes the cloak of the power of ancient Greek.  Of course, we can ask what happen to German 
philosophers like Wolf, Leibniz, Hamann, Kant, Herder, Jacobi, Hegel, Fichte, Schleiermacher, 
Lange, Zeller, Lotze, Schelling, or even Schopenhauer  
The topic of Heidegger’s contra  ietzsche on the Greeks can be seen in at least four specific 
areas that can be distinguished. 
1) Nietzsche caught by Platonism  
Heidegger writes in his essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1940) that  ietzsche is the “most 
unrestrained Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics” (et. p. 174).  ietzsche is entirely 
caught by metaphysics (GA65 et 127).  Heidegger points toward one of his basic attacked against 
Nietzsche are the claims that Nietzsche early on recognized his basic philosophical position was 
the task of overturning Platonism.  The two basic points for Heidegger in Western metaphysics is 
the first beginning marked by Plato and the second who marks the end is Nietzsche. This 
distinction is the relationship between the supersensuous (Übersinnlichen) and sensuous.  Plato’s 
ideas are in the domain of the supersensuous and  ietzsche’s Ockam’s razor cuts away the 
supersensuous (true world, see Section 4 from Nietzsche's Twilight of Idols or How to 
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Philosophize with a Hammer, HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. 
The History of an Error) and leaves us with the sensuous or apparent world. Of course at some 
points Nietzsche wants to do a way with this distinction and hence this leads us out of Platonism. 
Certainly, Plato and Nietzsche were antipodes on the world of ideas. For Nietzsche there are no 
eternal ideas.  Heidegger’s point is that  ietzsche wanted to invert Platonism and still in general 
got stuck in the Platonist distinction of the supersensuous and sensuous worlds.    
Nietzsche was on the verge of seeing through his inversion of Platonism, but taking his overall 
considerate is still within the web of Platonism.  Western philosophy is just a series of footnotes 
to Plato according to a famous saying by Alfred North Whitehead. However, with Heidegger he 
sees this as the metahistory of metaphysics and forgottenness of Being as being caught in the 
limitation of Platonism or the inadequacy of western metaphysics.  After Heidegger sees these 
limitations, this is the way that Heidegger wants to break out in to a new, other beginning for 
philosophy.   Heidegger’s break out is done through a confrontation with Platonism and its 
entanglement in  ietzsche’s inversion of Platonism.  Western metaphysics has happen all within 
the limitation and realm of Platonism.  Nietzsche sees Christianity as Platonism for the people.   
For Heidegger, Nietzsche is simply the extreme opposition (the antagonist opponent) to eternal 
truth and ideas of Platonism.  Although Nietzsche was reading many of the early Greek 
philosophers, the task for Nietzsche is still within the dominion of the fundamental trends of his 
engagement with Platonism.  It should be noted that there is nothing of Kant or Hegel or the 
German philosophers in  ietzsche’s on-going development and thinking.  The crux to Nietzsche 
for Heidegger is  ietzsche’s opposition to Platonism. For Heidegger   ietzsche is trapped within 
the limited horizon of Platonism.  Heidegger said  “ ietzsche remains caught in metaphysics: 
from beings to Being; and he exhaust all possibilities of this basic position…” (GA 65 18   et. p. 
127).  Hence, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche task is simply the overturning (Umkehrung) of 
Platonism 
Heidegger on the other hand is completely contra to this reading of Western metaphysics. 
Through the philosophical comprehension of the early Greeks and a deeper understanding of 
Aristotle, Heidegger gains a sweeping perception of the Greeks that leads to recovery and 
retrieval of the question about the meaning or the truth of Being of beings without those essential 
elements of Platonism. Heidegger’s  udgment of  ietzsche as the “most unrestrained Platonist” 
shows unmistakably Heidegger’s contra interpretation of the Greeks.    Heidegger wrote  
“ ietzsche was stuck in this interpretation because he did not recognize the guiding-question as 
such and did not enact the crossing to the grounding-question.” (GA65  section 110  et. 153).   
Nietzsche does have his own way out of Platonism, which he summed up with the expression, 
“My recreation  my preference  my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides.” 
(Twilight of the Idols  “What I Owe to the Ancients” section 3).   
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2)  Young Nietzsche --- superficial 
In Heidegger’s essay from 1946  Anaximander’s  Saying, Heidegger said, 
“The young  ietzsche does indeed  in his own way  establish a lively relationship to the 
personality of the pre-Platonic philosophers, but his interpretation of the texts are thoroughly 
commonplace (herkömmlich)  even quite superficial (oberflächlich) throughout.” (et. P. 243, Off 
the Beaten Track).  Der Spruch des Anaximander. German p. 297. GA 5).  
Heidegger is talking about the Pre-Platonic Philosophers which is the text of a lecture series 
delivered by the young Friedrich Nietzsche (then a philologist) at the University of Basel in 
1870s.  Heidegger is clearly belittling Nietzsche reading of the pre-Platonic philosophers and his 
interpretation is banal.   He does speak to Nietzsche actual relationship to the early Greek 
philosophers  which is more than  ust a slight influence on  ietzsche’s own thinking.  In this 
passage Heidegger makes three more important remarks. The first notion is that he contrast 
Nietzsche’s translation with Hermann Diels translation and finds them both to lacking.  
Nietzsche calls them Pre-Platonic and Diels calls them Pre-Socratics.  After Heidegger’s remarks 
about Nietzsche, he follows that with a very strong statement about Hegel.  Heidegger wrote, 
“Hegel is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought…” 
(et. p.14).  In his lecture on “Hegel and the Greeks” (circa 1958)  Heidegger gives more praises 
for Hegel and says similar things.  Although Kant and Nietzsche did develop a Metahistory of 
philosophy  it is clear that Hegel’s Metahistory of philosophy is distinctly connected to his whole 
philosophy of history.   The absolute spirit as moving from the abstract to the concrete, Hegel 
was able to give a pattern to the entire development of history.  Of course the same was said 
about Nietzsche only book on the Greeks, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music (Die 
Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1873)) with the later title of The Birth of 
Tragedy Or: Hellenism And Pessimism (1886), which started a fight between Nietzsche and 
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff  over the very nature of philology.  Hugh Lloyd-Jones 
said  “with all its appalling blemishes  it is a work of genius  and begun a new era in the 
understanding of Greek thought.” (Quoted in translator’s introduction to  ietzsche’s Pre-
Platonic Philosophers  p. xlii).  Although  ietzsche’s writing maybe marked with little regard to 
pedantic and scholarship notions, it is clear that what is important is  ietzsche’s ability to push a 
new paradigm of how to view the Greeks.  Heidegger does understand that there is a question of 
the bigger picture and for that Nietzsche is important even though it is not the same vision that 
Heidegger has of the Greeks thinkers.  
3)  Untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus  
Heidegger wrote a very clear and sharp critical remark about  ietzsche’s true understanding of 
the Greeks  Heidegger statement is a book he published.  Heidegger said  “To be sure, Nietzsche 
fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of 
the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found its way to the decisive question, although 
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Nietzsche did re-conceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its entirety in a way 
that is surpassed only by Hölderlin." (et page 133). Introduction to metaphysics. (GA 40). 
Translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
The supposed commonplace opposition is that for Parmenides, Being is the one and never 
changes and for Heraclitus, Being is becoming and always in flux. According to historians 
Heraclitus and Parmenides were supposedly antipodes. Heidegger said that this was not true and 
he calls this a commonplace and untrue opposition.  
Nietzsche in a exceptionally telling passage in his autobiography, Ecce Homo outlines his 
philosophy in relationship to Heraclitus.  Nietzsche said,  
 
“I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer 
and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the 
decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying  Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along 
with a radical repudiation of the very concept of Being (Sein) –all of this is clearly more closely 
related to me than anything else thought to date.  The doctrine of the “eternal recurrence ” that is  
of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things – this doctrine of 
Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. (Ecce Homo, on his own 
book entitle: “The Birth of Tragedy  section 3).   
In this passage Nietzsche links up his closeness to Heraclitus, Dionysus, his connections to 
Zarathustra and the doctrine of the eternal return of the same; but most important for Heidegger 
is thought that for  ietzsche  Heraclitus is involved in the “radical repudiation of the very 
concept of Being (Sein)” (radikaler Ablehnung  refusal).  This is clearly where there is a split 
between Heidegger and Nietzsche on the issue of the rejection or refusal of Being, since for 
Heidegger Being is full and not empty or a fiction.  
But how much did  ietzsche know and scrutinize about Heraclitus’ thinking? In a sense 
Nietzsche was never disciplined enough to collected all of the saying of these Greek 
philosophers in one collection. That was accomplished by Hermann Diels with the publication of 
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch, which was first published in 1903.  
As Heidegger points out that this work is dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey, although not because 
that Dilthey was a great Greek scholar.  Nietzsche also did work on an Index to the prestigious 
philology journal Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.  This indexing and review of 
contemporary philology gave Nietzsche a better understand of the current philology research at 
that time. So in fact, Nietzsche did work on Greek philology before his submersion into Greek 
philosophy.  But it was his insight into Platonism that drove  ietzsche’s philosophical response.  
Of course, this is part of his tangled relationship with Socrates.  Although Nietzsche had 
metaphysical problems and concerns it seems more his driving force is with more with morality 
than with metaphysics or ontology.  Again, Heidegger is not concerned with getting Nietzsche 
right accord to some interpretation which reads the weight of  ietzsche’s statements in Ecce 
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Homo about his life and philosophy. But rather, what is provocative in Nietzsche for Heidegger’s 
thinking.   
What is the decisive question that Nietzsche never found? Certainly as a pristine metaphysician 
 ietzsche could have to come to the question of “What is the nature of beingness (Seiendheit)?” 
Or  he could have asked the question “Why is there something  rather not nothing?”   ietzsche’s 
own critique of metaphysics predetermined that Nietzsche would not follow down this path.  
This is where Nietzsche stands in league with Heidegger and their basic position of being anti-
metaphysics.  Heidegger wants to take the next step by not being caught in the web of being 
“anti-” metaphysics.  He wants to leave it behind and stand completely outside of metaphysics.  
Our question is does Heidegger actually stand in a new beginning.  Can we still have a 
relationship to metaphysics by freeing and purifying metaphysics?  Heidegger’s historical 
lectures are the way that Heidegger has attempted to engage philosophers from the past, that is, 
to bring them to life in the present.  Even though these philosophers are as Hegel said  “…with 
respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors.” (The 
Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, e.t. p.87). Philosophers stand 
side by side all thinking one thought but each in their own way.  
Heidegger understands the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus is contra to 
 ietzsche’s understands of that relationship as a simple opposition.  
Note carefully that Heidegger does in the end position Nietzsche very high in the rebirth of 
Greek philosophy, which is just surpassed only by Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843)  
4) Ontology and the new, other Beginning 
In an important remark  Heidegger said  “with Nietzsche the critical encounter 
(Auseinandersetzung) as the one is nearest (Nächsten) but to recognize that he is farthest 
removed from the question of Being (Seinsfrage)”. (GA65 et 1 4  g 176).   ietzsche is the 
closest one in the project of overcoming metaphysics, of overcoming Platonism, of 
understanding the finitude of Da-sein, of coming the closest to a new spirit of the Greeks.   
Nietzsche sees “Being is an empty fiction” (das Sein eine leere Fiktion).  (Twilight of the Idols, 
“Reason" in Philosophy”  section  ). Heidegger rightly understands  ietzsche’s position as being 
farthest removed from his single question about the Being of beings. In the Introduction to 
Metaphysics  Heidegger said this about  ietzsche’s remarks about ontology. “What  ietzsche 
says here about Being is no casual remark, jotted down during the frenzy of labor in preparation 
for his authentic and never completed work. Instead, it is his guiding conception of Being since 
the earliest days of philosophical labor. It supports and determines his philosophy from the 
ground up.” (et. p.38). Heidegger’s position on the importance of ontology is clear  Heidegger 
said this in a number of places  but it makes it clear when he states  “The question of the 
“meaning of Being” is the question of all questions.” (GA 65 et 8  g 11). In his work on Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit (GA3   lecture 1930)  Heidegger said  “ . . . the inner necessities of the 
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first and last problem of philosophy - the question of Being" and he continues, "I have been 
concerned with renewing the question of ontology - the most central problem of Western 
Philosophy - the question of Being . . ." (E.T. p.13) Additional Heidegger said, "We assert now 
that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(GA24, 1927 lecture), p11) and he adds the following remark  “Philosophy is the theoretical 
conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is 
ontological." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, lecture 1927), p.11).   
Although Heidegger does not quote Nietzsche, there is an important passage by Nietzsche in the 
Pre-Platonic Philosophers lecture series from 1870s at the University of Basel.  In the section on 
Heraclitus (most likely dating from 187 )   ietzsche wrote a real propitious remark  “Well  this 
is the intuitive perception of Heraclitus; there is no thing of which we many say  “it is”. He 
rejects Being.  He knows only Becoming  the flowing.”   ietzsche then continues in a few 
sentences later  “Heraclitus thus sees only the One  but in the sense opposite to Parmenides.” (et. 
p. 62-63).  Although Nietzsche here realizes the ontological issues, he does not make it a central 
issue or even a question.  
Ontology is not just one discipline among other philosophical discipline like ethics, 
epistemology, and logic; but rather, philosophy is only as ontology.  Certainly, Heidegger and 
Nietzsche were antipodes on ontology.  
Heidegger is contra  ietzsche as ontology is primary.  Heidegger’s position is exactly contra to 
 ietzsche thesis about the Being of beings as “empty fiction”.   It is through Heidegger’s 
analysis of the Greeks (specifically, Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and also 
Aristotle) that Heidegger draws out his resplendent ontological thinking.  On the other hand, 
Nietzsche does not find ontology as central in the Greeks.  What does Nietzsche find?  Nietzsche 
wrote a short note in 1885 that not only summarized his closeness to the Greeks but may have 
foreseen Heidegger’s bond to the Greeks.  ietzsche wrote  “… with discovery of antiquity  the 
digging up ancient philosophy, above all of the pre-Socratics – the most deeply buried of all 
Greek temples! A few centuries hence, perhaps, one will judge that all German philosophy 
derives its real dignity from being a gradual reclamation of the soil of antiquity, and that all 
claims to “originality” must sound petty and ludicrous in relation to that higher claim of the 
Germans to have joined anew the bond that seemed to be broken, the bond with the Greeks, the 
hitherto highest type of man.”   In another note Nietzsche said in March-June 1888 (Will to 
Power  #437)  “The real philosophers of Greece are those before Socrates”.  
 ietzsche goes on to say  “Today we are again getting close to all those fundamental forms of 
world interpretation devised by the Greek spirit through Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, 
Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxagoras – we are growing more Greek by the day…” Will to 
Power (419) (1885).  From these remarks it is clear that Nietzsche realizes the immense impact 
the Greeks had on German philosophers and will have in the future. The image of the Greeks had 
a profound effect on  ietzsche’s philosophy and thinking even without having  ietzsche 
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pedantically following every translation of the Greek to the final degree.  This is not a question 
of  ietzsche’s Greek philological scholarship  but rather the tremendous impact and influence of 
the Greek image.  
What did Heidegger find in the Greeks that the incorrigible Nietzsche did not see?  It is 
becoming apparent and incipient that one of Heidegger’s pro ects is in his discussion of the other 
beginning in philosophy. For example in the Beiträge he says, “the thrust into the crossing and 
thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to an end, if 
philosophy is to attain its other beginning” (GA 65  Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) 
(1936-1938) p.171-173, et. p 121).  There are sections with the titles:  „Die ursprüngliche 
Zueignung des ersten Anfangs bedeutet das Fußfassen im anderen Anfang“(section 85) or  „Die 
Auseinandersetzung des ersten und anderen Anfangs“(section 9 ).   So, Heidegger is trying to 
guide us so that Philosophy itself can “attain its other beginning”.   Heidegger sees the links to 
the Greeks as when they started the first beginning to philosophy and where he is pointing to 
another, new, other beginning to philosophy.   In the future there will be additional major 
publications of Heidegger’s that again are pointing to this other beginning in philosophy. For 
example in the forthcoming publications: Über den Anfang (1941),  Das Ereignis (1941/42), and 
Die Stege des Anfangs (1944) subsections are tied up with the idea of beginnings (Anfang).  In a 
different light remember Hegel’s question in the beginning of the Science of Logic “With What 
Must the Science Begin?”  (“Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?”).   
Heidegger sees this original thrust of the first Greek beginning of philosophy as an inspiration 
for the new, other beginning in philosophy.   The crux is that Heidegger is guiding us toward this 
new, other beginning in philosophy by raising the question of the meaning and truth of Being 
(Seyn, Ereignis).  Heidegger was first starting to raise these issues and questions in a lecture 
course started in Winter Trimester 1937/38, the title of the course was “Grundfragen der 
Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik' [Vorlesung]“  which was published in English 
as the Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic (GA 45).   There is a 
section entitled  “Our situation at the end of the beginning and the demand for a reflection on the 
first beginning as a preparation for another beginning.” (GA 45 p. 1 4  et. p 108). (“Unser Stand 
im Ende des Anfangs und die Forderung einer Besinnung auf den ersten Anfang als 
Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs”).  In a section at the end of this work Heidegger writes, 
“That is  we are standing before the decision between the end (and its running out, which may 
still take centuries) and another beginning…” (GA 45 g 1 4  et. p. 108). (“Und dies sagt: Wir 
stehen vor der Entscheidung zwischen dem Ende und seinem vielleicht noch Jahrhunderte 
füllenden Auslauf – und dem anderen Anfang.”).  Heidegger stands at the decision point between 
the final end of the first beginning in philosophy and the new, other beginning in philosophy that 
is just starting.  
Nietzsche also understands his position in history.  He said at the beginning of 
”Why I am a Destiny” in Ecce Homo  “I know my fate. One day my name will be associated 
with memory of something tremendous – a crisis without equal on earth.”  I do not think that 
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Heidegger would say this is the same way that Nietzsche did, but I think the results will be the 
same.  Heidegger is confronting and endowing us with a decision toward the new, other 
beginning which will force a breaking point or a rift in philosophy. Heidegger’s question is: will 
it be the final epitaph? 
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Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche on Amor Fati 
 
Amor fati -- love of fate. Perhaps this is one way that Nietzsche wants to summarize his whole 
philosophy into two words.  What did Heidegger hear with these two words – amor fati?  
In 1937 summer semester  Martin Heidegger taught a course entitled:  ietzsche’s Fundamental 
Metaphysical Position in Western Thought.   In the publication of this lecture series in the 
Nietzsche volumes in 1961, Heidegger has changed the title to: The Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same.  At the end of this lecture Heidegger in section  6 entitled:  ietzsche’s Fundamental 
Metaphysical Position; the whole section ends with his only brief published remarks about 
Nietzsche and amor fati.  As Heidegger sees it   ietzsche’s fundamental metaphysical position is 
amor fati.  Heidegger does use this expression amor fati in one of the supplement remarks (1939) 
in Die Geschichte des Seyns. More importantly, in a recently published lecture from the same 
period entitled “Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein)”  we find twenty or 
more passages on amor fati from Heidegger. Heidegger wrote a letter to Hans-Hermann 
Groothoff (26 Nov 1939), he mentions Ernst Jünger and amor fati. 
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger want to go back to the Greeks.  Amor fati helps Nietzsche to a 
non-Christian affirmation of the meaning of the earth. For Heidegger, it is crucial to understand 
that he is contra  ietzsche’s postion on the Greeks and it is rather Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-
1843) and Heidegger that have a deeper grasp of the early Greeks. Heidegger reaches back to the 
early Greeks for a new other beginning (Anfang) in philosophy.  This is a radical anti-
metaphysical stance or a leaving behind of all metaphysics.  Heidegger’s unpacking of 
 ietzsche’s amor fati show us that Nietzsche is still tied and trapped in metaphysics.  Heidegger 
locates  ietzsche’s position as the last metaphysican of the West. What does amor fati mean in 
 ietzsche’s thought and what does it mean for Heidegger’s critical encounter with  ietzsche?  
Nietzsche on Amor Fati 
Why Nietzsche would use an expression in Latin like amor fati and only a few times to express 
his inner most nature?   ietzsche’s thinking about amor fati spans from 1881-1889, through four 
published sources, six unpublished notes and a letter written in 1882.  All of these passages will 
analysed chronological in this article.   
Amor fati – love of fate.  Nietzsche may have been contrasting amor fati to Spinoza’s amor dei 
intellectualis.  ietzsche’s own use of amor fati lines up (1881) when Nietzsche was reading 
Kuno Fischer’s book Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (1865), which includes a section on 
Spinoza.  There is a copy of this book currently in  ietzsche’s library. There is also a letter to 
Overbeck in July 30  1881  where  ietzsche links his thinking with his ‘precursor”  namely  
Spinoza.  But in fact, Spinoza and Nietzsche are oppostite in many ways, they are indeed 
antipodes philosophically.  Therefore, amor fati is the love of fate, love of the necessity of 
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human life on the earth, not the love of God.   You should live your life as if you love your fate, 
do not worry, you will live your life as your fate – you have no choice. For Nietzsche, the 
Dionysian and the eternal return of the same are wrapped up in a Heraclitean innocent of 
becoming; and these ‘concepts’ are all linked to the requirement of your love of your earthly 
fate, namely, amor fati.  If there is no Hinterwelten, then what is left on earth? Answer: your own 
inimitable fate.  
Analysis of Nietzsche’s thought on amor fati in chronological order 
The first use of amor fati dates from autumn of 1881.   itezshce wrote  “Copy by R. W. 
Emerson autumn 1881. First the necessary, the needful (Noethige) - and this so beautifully and 
perfectly as you can! ”love what is necessary (nothwendig)" - amor fati this would be my moral, 
it all property on and lifts it up over its terrible origin to you.” (kgw=v.2541 ksa=9.643. V.15 
[20]). Emerson does write about fate, but Nietzsche transfoms this, if indeed there is any real 
connection to Emerson.   Here amor fati is moral in the ethical realm, but even at this point there 
is an attachment to the concept of necessity.  This is the first known use of amor fati in all of 
 itzsche’s writings.  
 ietzsche wrote  “Yes! I want to only love still  what is necessary (nothwendig)! Yes! Amor fati 
is my last love!" (Dezember 1881 – Janurar 1882 kgw=V-2.562 ksa=9.664, V.16 [22]). Love the 
necessity of life.  What is necessary? Answer: love of fate.  In many passages, Nietzsche is 
linking amor fati to the notion of “necessity”.  What is necessity? Answer: inevitability.  What 
will be, will be and you should love what will be – even if you think you have a choice you 
should love your fate.  
 
Nietzsche wrote, “Also I am in a mood of fatalistic “surrender to God” (Gottergebenheit) I call it 
amor fati  so much so  that I would have rush into a lion’s  aw  not to mention --  
(Naumburg, ca. June 5, 1882: Letter to Franz Overbeck. Selected letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
1969, page 184).” What makes  ietzsche speak about the surrender or devotion to God?  Why a 
mood and not a metaphysical statement?  If you surrender to God’s will  then there is no issue of 
your fate that is inner directed. There is a still a strong recurring theme of fatalism in Nietzsche.  
Fatalism affirms the inevitable.  
Nietzsche wrote in “The Gay Science ("la gaya scienza")   Book IV  76. (First edition 188 ). “I 
want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things:—then I shall be one 
of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from henceforth! I do not want 
to wage war (Krieg) against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse, I do not even want to accuse 
those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation! And all in all and on the whole: 
some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer!”  This passage is the first published use of the amor fati.  
We must attempt to see all of the necessity in things in general.   Nietzsche is highly critical of so 
many philosophers, –isms in philosophy, people, and cultures, so it is rare when Nietzsche wants 
to be a yes-sayer and move to the affirmation.  What is necessary in things, sounds like will-to-
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power and the necessity of that will in the world.  Plus, he wants to make things beautiful. This is 
Nietzsche wanting to become the artest. Twice Nietzsche brings up amor fati in the context of 
Richard Wagner (1813-1883), who for a while was Nietzsche’s ideal of an artist.   ietzsche is on 
the edge here with an aesthetic fatalism.  Does it mean that  ietzsche’s yes-saying is a 
metaphysical statement about the world? 
Nietzsche wrote a title of a book he wanted to write, “Wisdom and love for the wisdom 
Prolegomena for a philosophy of the future. By Friedrich  ietzsche.”  “Die Fragmente von 
Frühjahr 1884 bis Herbst 1885 [Frühjahr 1884. VII.25 [500], kgw= VII- .141  ksa=11.145”.  
Under the draft title of this book is simply two words: amor fati.  This is one of the many, many 
drafts of books projects that Nietzsche seemed to be writing down endlessly.  Nietzsche has read 
Ludwig Feurbach’s Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (copy in his library) and was 
influence by him; and hence it shows in the fragment of a book title and would later resurface in 
 ietzsche’s book of 1886 as Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft.  
Thus, Nietzsche would have the content of a book on wisdom and the love of wisdom; described 
in just two simple words: amor fati.  
 ietzsche wrote  “I do not want nothing differently  also backwards  - I was not allowed to want 
anything differently... Amor fati... “Fragmente Dezember 1888—Anfang Januar 1889 kgw=VIII-
3.445 ksa=13.641 VIII. 5 [7]. “ The thought here is just like the eternal return of the same – the 
eternal return of necessity is amor fati.  The necessity leads directly to amor fati.  It does, 
however, point to the issues of necessity and if you have a choice to want your fate to be 
different.  While it is in some sense undeniable that choice and fate are directly opposite each 
other, but Nietzsche is pointing out that I do not want anything to be different.  Do we accept it 
or are we resigned to our own fate?  Are we active or pastive or acquiescence to our fate without 
a choice? In any case, Nietzsche was not allowed anything different.  
Nietzsche wrote in his unique and self-absorbed autobiography  “My formula for greatness in 
man is amor fati: that man does not want to have anything differently, either in the future, the 
past, or for all eternity. Not only must he endure necessity, and on no account conceal it—all 
idealism is falsehood in the face of necessity—but love it . . .”  Ecce Homo (Why I Am So 
Clever, #10) (1888, autumn).  This is Nietzsche’s polished prose (laid on the gold scales) and 
ripened like a good late wine.   Now, it become the greatness in man (note so postively 
affirming).  Again as Nietzsche explans it further, it sounds like the eternal return of the same 
and not only the thought of necessity  but we should “love it”.   Certainly  fatalism  but note the 
usage of the word “want”; that means  not the stronger fatalism of “you will anyway” as if you 
had an actual choice.   
Nietzsche wrote, I myself have never suffered from all this; what is necessary does not hurt me; 
amor fati is my inmost nature.”  Ecce Homo (The Case of Wagner, #4) (1888, Autumn).  So, 
 ietzsche is telling us that “necessity” does not hurt because I already have amor fati as my 
intermost nature.  What is necessary sounds like there is no freedom and no free will, Nietzsche 
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has already wrung out freedom and free will.  Furthermore, we should love it, namely, love fate. 
Do not think you can choose something different.  Side note: Eastern philosophy, amor fati is 
like the Indian or Hindu concept of dharma. Dharma has the strong notion of fatalism in it. In 
Ecce Homo   ietzsche talks about his own version of extreme fatalism  he calls it “Russian 
fatalism” where a Russian solider  ust lies down in the snow and dies.  The final choice.  
 In a simarly way   ietzsche wrote  “As my inmost nature teaches me  whatever is necessary as 
seen from the heights and in the sense of a great economy—is also the useful par excellence: one 
should not only bear it, one should love it. Amor fati: that is my inmost nature.”  Nietzsche 
Contra Wagner Epilogue 1 (1888, December).  Embrace the whole idea and thought of our 
stance in the world as the love of fati.  The necessity is useful because it realizes that there is no 
love of God, since there is no God; then yes, it is better to have only our love of our earthly fate.  
For Nietzsche, this is an extremely Greek way of looking at the world (un-Christian) and our 
place in the world – love our fate.  
This is the last passage that Nietzsche wrote about amor fati  here he says  “…to a Dionysian 
affirmation of world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection – it wants the eternal 
circulation: – the same things, the logic and illogicalness of entanglements (Knoten). The highest 
condition a philosopher can reach: Dionysian to existence (Dasein) stand – my formula for it is 
amor fati.”  Will to Power 1041 (1888) spring-summer, 1888-1889. VIII.16 [32] kgw=VIII-
3.288, ksa=13.492, CM, W II, 7a [32].  This note from the unpublished writings (Nachlaß), 
really adds many more things to  ietzsche’s thought of amor fati.  The eternal return of the same 
means the Dionysian affirmation and furthermore, it wants the world as it is without anything 
changed. Fatalism embraced and with the additional meaning of loving your fate.  As Nietzsche 
has lived his experimental philosophy  even if this means the “most fundamental nihilism” and 
no-saying, he switches in the middle of this note (#1041) to his most yes-saying.  There are three 
points of linkage: Dionysian, eternal return of the same, and amor fati.  Again, Nietzsche is 
trying to sum up his total “yes-saying” in two words – amor fati.   
Heidegger on Nietzsche’s Amor Fati  
Heidegger revised and edited his lectures (1936-1941) on Nietzsche in to two volumes and 
published them in 1961.  Heidegger deleted and made changes for this publication.  But this was 
not in the section on amor fati.  So  this is Heidegger’s revised publication of his lectures after 
his review 20 years later.  At this point in his life it is not clear that he knew that all of his 
writings and lectures would be published later, so why he published only these writings on amor 
fati remains unknown. There is some foreshadowing in the early part of the volume two.  
Heidegger wrote  “We know that since antiquity in the Western intellectual tradition necessity 
designates a particular trait of beings; and that necessity (Notwendigkeit), as a fundamental trait 
of beings, has received the most variegated interpretations: Moria, fatum, destiny, predestination, 
and dialectical process.”  (Nietzsche volume II, et p. 96).  The love of fate points toward the 
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inescapable destiny of man or the predestiny. Heidegger uses fate and fatum as the basic trait of 
necessity. 
Heidegger’s essential published remarks on amor fati are in his Nietzsche volume, where he 
says, “ ietzsche himself once chose a phrase to designate what we are calling his fundamental 
metaphysical position, a phrase that is often cited and is readily taken as a way to characterize his 
philosophy: amor fati  love of necessity. (Epilogue to “Nietzsche contra Wagner“; VIII   06). 
Yet the phrase expresses  ietzsche’s fundamental metaphysical position only when we 
understand the two words amor and fatum – and, above all, their conjunction – in terms of 
Nietzsche own most thinking, only when we avoid mixing our fortuitous and familiar notions 
into it.”  Heidegger goes on in the passage to state  “Amor – love – is to be understood as will...” 
and finally, “Fatum – necessity – is to be understood, not as a fatality that is inscrutable, 
implacable, and overwhelming, but as that turning of need which unveils itself in the awestruck 
(emergency  “der  ot”) moment as an eternity  eternity abundance (Werdensfülle) with the 
becoming of being (Seienden) as a whole: circulus vitiosus deus.” (Nietzsche volume II, et p. 
206).  
Amor is the will and fatum is the becoming of beings as whole. For Heidegger, he understands 
amor as love, and as the will.  In other words, amor (as the will) is understood on the subjective 
side.   We should note: whereas fatum or necessity as fatum is more on the objective side of 
nature as having the necessity in the world.  So, the expression amor fati is where the two come 
together: subjective and objective.  More importantly this shows that amor fati is still using 
metaphysical statements and that means that Nietzsche is doing metaphysics.   
The Latin expression   “circulus vitiosus deus”  there are some different English translations: 
circle vicious God, a vicious circle made God, God is a vicious circle, or the circle is a vicious 
God, divine vicious circle. Nietzsche used the expression in Beyond Good and Evil (section §56). 
Is Nietzsche doing theology? For Heidegger metaphysics at its base is always ontotheological 
and  ietzsche’s metaphysic has a theological element even when he is anti-theology. 
Heidegger’s interpretation of metaphysics as ontotheology thinks that the question of God 
(metaphysica specialis) and the question of Being (metaphysica generalis) have been tangled in 
all metaphysics; and most importantly, this includes Nietzsche as well.  Nietzsche does not 
escape metaphysics; although he is pushing the limits and attempting the reversal (not the 
overcoming) of Platonism.  
Heidegger often blurs the distinction between Nietzsche’s published writing and his unpublished 
writings of the  achlaß. The same issue is of course true of Heidegger’s own writings and some 
of his supplemental remarks (Beilagen). Heidegger was against the use of the aphorism as way of 
doing philosophy and his pity remarks are often difficult to decipher, but they were not 
constucted as aphorisms. These remarks often stand by themselves and so the context is often 
difficult to understand.     
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Heidegger says in a “Reversal as overcoming of the Nihilismus - circulus vitiosus deus - amor 
fati. (GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, “ ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein 
und Schein), p. 153, #162).  The reversal of Platonism and nihilism is still caught in the 
fundamental postion of metaphysics and even the anti-metaphysical is still stuck to the 
metaphysical thinking.   
Heidegger sketches even shorter remarks  “Amor - will as love… Amor fati – moment of eternity. 
(GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, “ ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und 
Schein), p.170, #181).   
Under the heading of “The essence of Amor Fati” we find the following remark  “Amor - the 
decision - the will; fatum - the necessity. Will as release to the necessity, this is the highest 
freedom.” (GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, “ ietzsches metaphysische 
Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p.169, #179). Another heading Heidegger asks the question, 
“177. Amor fati - the formula for the basic position?” GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, 
“ ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p.168, #177). These hand written 
notes of Heidegger show him actively engaged in his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. The 
essential point is clear   ietzsche’s fundamental postion is amor fati, and that is still 
metaphysics.  
Conclusion 
Heidegger’s remarks about amor fati hits Nietzsche with his own hammer.  Nietzsche attempted 
a reversal of Platonism (forms of Christianity) and yet got completely stuck in metaphysics.  The 
crux of  ietzsche’s philosophy is amor fati and Heidegger’s analysis shows that amor fati is 
metaphysics. Maybe Nietzsche can be seen as not just the last metaphysician, but as giving us 
hints on the way out metaphysics. His criticism of the other worldly supersensuous, Christianity 
as Platonism for the people, abolishment of the true world and the apparent world, and the 
requirement to overcome Platonism -- all these attempts by Nietzsche has helped Heidegger in 
working his own way through metaphysics to a new other beginning (Anfang) of philosophy and 
thinking.  Nietzsche has attacked the problem of metaphysics but only Heidegger has a way out 
of metaphysics.  
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Martin Heidegger’s ontotheological problems and Nāgārjuna solutions: Heidegger’s 
Presuppositions and Entanglements in Metaphysics 
 
In the Hegel book  Martin Heidegger wrote  “…all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds 
its presupposition (Voraussetzung).” (1)  What are Heidegger’s own presuppositions? Where did 
Heidegger get stuck attempting his own philosophy?  The purpose of this paper is to examine 
Heidegger’s internal problems  his metaphysical shadows, his presuppositions, and his bounds 
and limits.  The second part of the paper will see if a 2-3
nd
 century Buddhist Philosopher, the 
Acharya   g r una (perhaps the greatest Indian philosopher) can help Heidegger with some 
ways out of his own predicament.  In June 1950, Heidegger wrote about his Kant Book, 
“Philosophicohistorical research is always correctly subject to this charge (violence of my 
interpretations) whenever it is directed against attempts to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue 
between thinkers.” ( ) We are attempt a creative and critical encounter (Auseinandersetzung) 
and thoughtful dialogue between Heidegger and   g r una over their philosophical 
presuppositions.  
Heidegger’s critique of history of metaphysic as being ontotheology; namely  metaphysics is 
ontology as Being as first and most universal ground common to all beings; second,  metaphysics 
is theology as highest ground (causa sui); and metaphysic as logos (as logic). Therefore, the 
basic nature of metaphysics combines all three essential and is ontotheological (termed used by 
Kant and redefined by Heidegger).  Heidegger was critical of the traditional philosophy.  
Heidegger’s own entanglements with metaphysics maybe linked to his own Christian 
background  his ‘subterranean quakes’(GA66  p 368) and his overcoming of Christianity without 
destroying it.  
There are many linkages between Heidegger and the eastern thought of Japan and China (his 
work on the attempted translation of the Tao Te-Ching in 1946 with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao), which 
includes his own Asian students; however, his connections with the Indian philosophical 
traditions are more problematic and have been more with the connected to the Vedânta tradition 
(J.L. Mehta  for example) than with the Buddhist traditions. Heidegger said “The greatest 
difficulty in this enterprise always lies, as far as I can see, in the fact that with few exceptions 
there is no command of the Eastern languages either in Europe or in the United States.” (in his 
Letter 1969 to Hawaii conference). But it should be noted that Sanskrit and Greek have a 
common origin in proto-Indo-European; and Sanskrit is much closer to the German language 
than all other Asian languages. For example  Boss writes: “These days  when Heidegger comes 
to stay with me, he shows more and more interest in Indian thought. He regrets in particular that 
he has no knowledge of Sanskrit. He now has asked me to inquire what would be the Sanskrit of 
some fundamental terms and concepts. Above all, he wishes to know whether the Sanskrit 
language can distinguish between ‘‘Sein’’ and ‘‘Seiendes.’’ (Hoch 1991  p.  51-292) Hoch, Erna 
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M. 1991. Sources and Resources: A Western Psychiatrist’s Search for Meaning in the Ancient 
Indian Scriptures. Verlag Ruegger. ISBN 3 7253 0412-2.    
 Also, this interest is mentioned in the Zollikon Seminars (p. 254). Letter March 7  1960. “If you 
could – but only at your leisure – find out and share with the me the Indian words for 
“ontological difference”  that is  for “Being” and “beings”  for “unconcealedness” and 
“forgetfulness”  I would be very grateful.”  This led to an exchange of letters and interviews 
between Medard Boss, Erna M. Hoch, Kanti Chandra Pandey a professor of Sanskrit at Lucknow 
University (during the year 1960) and Martin Heidegger (Hoch 1991, p. 251-292) concerning the 
details of Sanskrit words for some of Heidegger’s request.  
Heidegger had difficulties with his dialogue on Nietzsche.  In his letter to Boss dated August 16, 
1960  he says “I am still stuck in the “abyss” of  ietzsche.” (3). He must have been working on 
his two volume set on Nietzsche which was published in 1961.  About Nietzsche according to 
Otto Pöggeler  Heidegger said  “Er hat mich kaputt gemacht”; namely  “ ietzsche kaput me”.  
This is because a number of Heidegger’s own presuppositions were questioned during his 
encounters with Nietzsche. These are essential left over from his attack on the ontotheological 
nature of metaphysics.  With the lost the supersensuous (Übersinnliche) world there is no 
guarantees or ultimate support, so therefore, there are no goals, no values, no worldview, no 
view, and no standpoint for philosophy.  
Ultimately we have a single task to wrestle the very nature of philosophy out of earlier 
philosophers. What is nature of philosophy? What the nature of philosophical thinking? Great 
philosophers altered our understanding of what it means to do philosophy.  What is living and 
what is dead in Heidegger’s and  agar una’s philosophy?  Heidegger has some intrinsic 
counterdictions (inconsistencies) and problems within his philosophical thinking – some of 
which he sees himself at various times in his development. In  agar una’s work on “Averting the 
arguments” (Vigrahavyavartani)  he states his opponents twenty verses and replies. The main 
attack is that Nagarjuna (he lived in the 2-3 AD in southern India, he was a Buddhist) has to 
assume self-existence in order to attack the self-existence, in other words it is an attack against 
 agar una’s self-consistence in his philosophical thinking.  To show that a philosopher’s 
philosophical thinking is self-counterdiction is one of the first ways to attack a philosopher.  
Nagarjuna deployed the so called Catuskoti (fourfold) logic, known as tetralemma logic. 
Example would be:  “Everything is real and is not real. Both real and not real.  either real nor 
not real. This is Lord Buddha's teaching.”  (MMK XVIII:8).  agar una often uses his 
methodology against himself  since he has no position.  Heidegger’s critical remarks 
(Auseinandersetzung) about his major treatise Sein und Zeit (1927) will be published in GA 82 
Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen.  
Hegel is noted for his thought that speculative thinking, does indeed involve showing the 
counterdictions in the world as an inherent structure of the world. This is part of Hegel’s re-
thinking of dialectical thinking and with Karl Marx developing this much further than Hegel. For 
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example, “Hegel” Bertrand Russell observed  is “the hardest to understand of the great 
philosophers’ because with Hegel there is a different way of thinking all together – 
counterdictions.”   What is philosophy? Almost no one agrees on what it is we are doing  since 
philosophy’s unusually nature is inherently problematic and belongs to the essential first 
problems of philosophy.  We do not agree on the basic presupposition as to what is philosophy. 
Philosophy is a seeking and a questioning, it does not have the power to be any more. There is 
also the question of “section 18. The Powerlessness of Thinking” (p. 33) in the Contributions.  
Metaphysics is at an end; but Heidegger has his own entanglements with the shadows of 
metaphysics (the Buddha’s shadow was shown for centuries according to Nietzsche, Gay 
Science, 3
rd
 book  #108).  Heidegger’s metaphysical shadows still play on the walls of the Die 
Hütte.  Christianity in the past has set the foundations for the setting goals (eschatology), 
Christian values of the highest good (evil at the bottom of ranks), and a Christian worldview 
(standpoint).  
Heidegger’s presuppositions that I wanted to outline are: 
1) Setting goals (progress). Nihilism. Ideals, idols. Purpose. Aim. Or, no goals?  
Goalessness (Ziellosigkeit). GA 65, section 260.  
2) Hierarchies of Values (highest good, bad, evil). Or, no values?  
Valuelessness (wertlosigkeit).  
3) Worldview. Philosophy as constructing a worldview? Weltanschauung.  
4) Viewlessness (Ansichtslosigkeit, a special word for Heidegger).  
5) Standpointlessness (standpunktlosigkeit) 
 
Remarks and Analysis 
 
1). Goalessness in Heidegger. 
Goalessness is sometime translated from German as aimlessness. For Nietzsche Goalessness 
(Ziellosigkeit) is a form and basic belief of Nihilist (Will to Power, #25). Heidegger wrote in the 
Contributions  “ ihilism in  ietzsche’s sense means that all goals are gone.(GA 65, section 72, 
et p. 96  german p. 138).  Later in this paragraph he talks of ‘admit the goal-lessness’ and then 
believing again in goals, for example: the volk (people), movies, seaside resort vacations (et. P. 
97).  On the other hand, he also talks about seeking, in the Contributions, Heidegger remarks 
about the goal is  ust “seeking” (p. 13).  Contributions “In this way the inceptual mindfulness of 
thinking becomes necessarily genuine thinking, i.e., a thinking that sets goals. What gets set is 
not just any goal, and not the goal in general, but the one and only and thus singular goal of our 
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history. This goal is the seeking itself  the seeking of Seyn.” (p. 13).  About the same time, in the 
Wintersemester 1937/38, Heidegger wrote: “The grandeur of man is measured according to what 
he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker (Suchende).”  (Grundfragen 
der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik', GA 45 g. p. 5, et. p.7). Basic Questions of 
Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic".   
 
In an interesting remark Richard Polt says  “…the Contributions are a transitional text in which 
Heidegger has not quite weaned himself away from metaphysical, goal-directed thinking.” (p. 
225). Richard Polt goes on to mention that Heidegger sees this problem himself in an 
unpublished writing entitled: Überlegungen X (section 52). By the next major writing, after 
GA65, in Besinnung (1938/39) at least in writing is no longer talking about goals but he say in 
the poetic Introduction “We do not know goals and are only a pathway“(GA 66  section 6a  p. 9). 
Indeed, the whole notion of goals requires the will to a goal or even just a will; so as we are 
moving the will to power or the will to will out of metaphysics, then this means that process of 
setting goals also has to be left behind. In terms of culture, this is seen in the goals setting of such 
ideas as: Plato’s Republic  Karl Marx’s  communist utopia or during in 1930s the so called 
“Thousand-Year Empire“.   ietzsche was critical of the improvers of mankind in Twilight of 
Idols and other idols or ideals. Can we will non-willing as such? I no longer will a goal.  
A few days before Heidegger death in 1976, he came up with the motto for his collected writings 
(Gesamtausgabe)  he wrote “Wege – nicht Werke". The translation into English would be, 
“Ways - not works".  Heidegger used the word “Wege” for many of publications  for example, 
Holzwege (1935-1946), Wegmarken (1919-1961), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959), 
Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45). Heidegger would often say that his thinking was underway or a 
pathway. This shows that Heidegger wanted to be known as  ust “going”  in other words  no 
goals just a pathway.  “Future thinking is a thinking that is underway…” (Contributions, et p 3). 
His way out of the bottle as a fly sounds like the Chinese philosophy’s Tao.  
2) Valuelessness in Heidegger. 
In the distance background is the Value-Philosophy of the NeoKantians like Heidegger’s teacher 
Heinrich Rickert (Neo-Kantian Southwest School included Wilhelm Windelband). Values are 
thought of terms of will.  For Nietzsche, Nihilism is when the highest values have devalued 
themselves. Remember  ietzsche’s pro ect of the revaluation of all values under the guise of will 
to power and Nihilism.  Beings are values in this late stage of metaphysics.  Nietzsche wrote in 
fragment  “The entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing suddenly into 
nihilism--into the belief in absolute valuelessness (Wertlosigkeit), i.e., meaninglessness 
(Sinnlosigkeit). (Will to Power, #617).  
 Heidegger says  “Every metaphysics is a “system value-estimations.” (Nietzsche by Heidegger, 
Vol 3  p.  0 ).  During Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche he came to greater understanding 
of the place of values in the late stages of the history of metaphysics.  Heidegger says that 
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“Value is ‘essentially the viewpoint’ (Gesichtspunktes) of power-reckoning of will to power 
(Will to Power, #715).  In the Letter on Humanism he says, is it wrong to talk against values? 
Values are of course part of the subjective part of all modern thinking. Heidegger in the Letter on 
Humanism goes on to says  “To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum 
for valueslnessness and nullity of beings.” (et. p.265 Pathmarks).   
3) Worldview in Heidegger. 
Philosophy and worldview are incompatible according to Husserl and Heidegger, although 
Husserl would replace philosophy as worldview with philosophy as rigorous science (Philosophy 
as Strict Science, 1911). Heidegger wrote a letter to Rudolf Bultmann in 1927 requesting 
information about his development  where he says  “My work has no ambitions toward a 
worldview or a theology, but it may well contain approaches and intentions in the direction of an 
ontological founding of Christian theology as a science. This should suffice to give you an idea 
of what I am after.” (Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, by Theodore J. Kisiel, University 
of California Press, 1993, p. 452).  
Heidegger’s attack on worldview-ism was in his work on the nature of ground questions in 
phenomenology (developed in his work with Edmond Husserl) given in a series of lectures at the 
University of Marburg in 1927, after the writing of his most famous major work, entitled: Being 
and Time.  In the very earlier lectures Heidegger discusses the difference between scientific 
philosophy and worldview philosophy. The title of the lectures in English, Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (1954) Published by Indiana University Press, 1975.  GA24 Die Grundprobleme 
der Phänomenologie. 19 7. Overview of Heidegger’s remarks.  
The word worldview (Weltanschauung) was first used by Kant in the Critique of Judgment (his 
third critique) and there is no Latin or Greek equivalent it was coined in German first and was 
used later in English.  The word and its meanings involved over time, Heidegger quotes and 
investigates the usage of the word in Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt, Schelling, Hegel, 
Gorres, Ranke, Schleiermacher, Bismarck, and final Karl Jasper (his book on the Psychology of 
Worldviews was published in 1925); but the one philosopher of note that he leaves out was 
Wilhelm Dilthey.  
In the next section that Heidegger asserts the main point of his philosophy (alpha and omega of 
philosophy)  that Being is the “proper and sole theme of philosophy” (et 11  G 14-15). He goes 
on to say that “Philosophy is ontology. In contrast a worldview is positing of knowledge of 
beings and a positing attitude towards beings; it is not ontological but ontic.” (et 11  G 14-15). 
After a few remarks  he shuts the door with the statement “a worldview philosophy is simple 
inconceivable” (et 1   G 15-17).  Philosophy is not involved in creating worldviews. What does 
this do for ethics and morality or political philosophy?  Although at various points in 
Heidegger’s writing he most certainly gives a worldview and has an agenda.  
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4) Viewlessness in Heidegger 
Heidegger in unpublished lecture from 1932 says, "There is no point of viewlessness," 
Heidegger states ” there is only choice of point of view  strength of point of view  and courage of 
point of view." GA 36/37 Sein und Wahrheit (lectures 1932). Sommersemester 1932. Der 
Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) [Vorlesung]. (“A  ote 
on the Philosophy of Heidegger” by Mar orie Glicksman  The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35, 
No. 4 (Feb. 17, 1938), pp. 98.  Supposedly, Heidegger came up with the word 
“Ansichtslosigkeit”.  
5). Standpointlessness in Heidegger.  
6). Positionslosigkeit 
Heidegger said  “Yet we must heed one thing: this standpoint of freedom-from-standpoints is of 
the opinion (Meinung) that it has overcome the one-sidedness and bias of prior philosophy, 
which always was, and is, defined by its standpoints. However, the standpoint of 
Standpointlessness (Standpunktslosigkeit) represents no overcoming (Uberwindung). In truth it 
is the extreme consequence, affirmation, and final stage of that opinion concerning philosophy 
which locates all philosophy extrinsically in standpoints that are ultimately right in front of us, 
standpoints whose one-sidedness we can try to bring into equilibrium.” (Nietzsche Vol II, et 118, 
German, Vol I, p 379). There are no standpoints --- only Standpointlessness.   
One of Heidegger’s  in the middle of his writing on the Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave 
Allegory and Theaetetus (1931-3 )  we find a interesting passage  where he says  “The desire to 
philosophize from the standpoint of standpointlessness, as a purportedly genuine and superior 
ob ectivity  is either childish  or  as it usually the case  disingenuous…[a couple of sentences] 
Not freedom from any standpoint (something fantastic), but the right choice of standpoint, the 
courage to a standpoint, the setting in action of a standpoint and holding out within it, is the task: 
a task, admittedly, which can only be enacted in philosophical work…” (The Essence Of Truth: 
On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus , Continuum, 2005. et. p.  57, translation Ted Sadler).  
[empiricist-positivist side of the Cartesian legacy, namely, Rorty and Taylor. Their story, 
however, is in many ways typical of numerous others. Each, I claim, retains more of the 
standpointless or ahistorical ideal than he realizes. I begin with a brief review of Descartes' own 
struggle to reach this ideal, in order to stress its ahistorical character and to identify the strong 
"Cartesianism" that still characterizes much later English-speaking philosophy] 
However  by 1955; Heidegger which is “I write all of this in the form of questions; for, as far as I 
can see, thinking can today do more than to continually ponder what evoked in the said 
questions.” (“On The Question of Being”  Letter to Ernst Jünger  “Zur Seinsfrage (1955) / Über 
die Linie” in GA 9 Pathmarks et. p.306). Madhyamika (“Middle Way”) school of Mahayana 
Buddhism is best represented by Nagarjuna was a second century Buddhist philosopher – is the 
preeminent single philosopher that India ever produced. Nagarjuna attacked most of the 
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traditional Indian metaphysical schools and the Buddhist schools as well.  The language Sanskrit 
is close to the original mother language of all Indo-European languages, for example, Greek, 
Latin, Russian, Persian, Hebrew, German, French, and English. The Sanskrit University library 
in Varanasi has over 100,000 texts in Sanskrit and there is a very rich and old tradition of 
Sanskrit in India. Sanskirt was used like Latin was used in Europe for years as the universal 
language in writing for philosophy, literature, and sciences.  The Buddhists had their own way of 
using Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word “drsti” means a view or sometime more loosely translated as a 
dogma.  agar una’s favorite dialogue of the Buddha’s was the “Discourse to Katyayana” 
(Kaccayanaqotta-sutta) where there is a length discussion of the right-view and the wrong-view. 
Remember there is the Buddhist teaching of the Aryan (noble) EightFold Path: Right Viewpoint. 
(samyag-dṛṣṭi  samm -diṭṭhi) or right seeing. Indian philosophy in Sanskrit is called: Darshanas, 
Visions of life.  (note: Darsan, seeing).  
Mahayana philosophical schools, Svatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasangika - Madhyamika 
Nagarjuna has taught not only emptiness but also the emptiness of emptiness (sunyatasunyata). 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Devanagari:              ), or Fundamental Verses on the 
Middle Way final chapter, and final words. Many different translations.  
Chapter: 27. Dṛṣṭiparīkṣ : Analysis of views. 
Verse: 30. “I bow down to Gautama  whose kindness holds one close  who revealed the sublime 
dharma in order to let go of all views.” (Tibetan translation). 
Verse: 30. “I reverently bow to Gautama (the Buddha) who out of compassion has the truth of 
being (saddharma) in order to destroy all views.” (Sanskrit translation).  
Verse: 30: "I reverently bow to Gautama [the Buddha] who, out of compassion, has taught the 
true doctrine in order to relinquish all views." 
Verse: 30: “I prostrate to Gautama Who through compassion Taught the true doctrine  which 
leads to the relinquishing of all views.” 
Nagarjuna view was viewlessness. 
The Buddha was seeking nirvana and enlightenment; and not another view of the world.  
The second century Indian Buddhist (Madhyamika) philosopher, Nagarjuna was critical of all 
philosophical worldviews (Dṛṣṭiparīkṣ ) and may have suggested solutions to a number of 
Heidegger’s own entanglements with the ontotheological nature of metaphysics and the Christian 
aspects of Heidegger’s thinking.  
It seems fitting that the very last verse of Nagarjuna's challenging work, 
Mulamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way), would present the readerw 
ith what seems to be a riddle:" I prostrated o Gautama, who through compassion, taught the true 
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doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views" (27:30). This should be read with an 
earlier verse (13:8): "The victorious ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all 
views. For whomever emptiness is a view, that one will accomplish nothing."1  
drsti (view) We should not forget that Nagarjuna declared that "sunyata is the relinquishing of all 
views." 13:8 (sunyata is sarvadrstinam prokta nihsaranama "the relinquishing of all views") 
 
Footnotes: 
(HHPS  et. 36) ( “… dass alle Philosophie im Ersten und Letzten nur ihre Voraussetzung 
entfaltet.” (German p. 53). GA-32.  
Preface to the Second Edition. Kant and Problem of Metaphysics. p.xx. June 1950.  Translated 
by Richard Taft. Indiana University Press, 5
th
 enlarged edition, 1997. p. xx.  
Zollikon Seminars. P. 255.  
Zollikon Seminars. P. 290. 
6) Anti-Christ, section 15. 
“Introduction to the Symposium and Reading of a Letter from Martin Heidegger’ by Winfield E. 
Nagley. Philosophy East and West, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 221 
“Wege – nicht Werke” is der Leitspruch  den Heidegger wenige Tage vor seinem Tod fur seine 
GA letzter Hand zusammen mit dem Titelblatt handschriftlich aufsetzte. "ways - not works" is 
the guidance saying, which handwritten Heidegger put on few days before its death fur its GA of 
last hand as well as the title page. 
Ihr instandiger Beistand auf dem langen Weg Wegfeld (way field).  
T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (2d ed. 1960, repr. 1970); 
The Victorious ones have said  
That Emptiness is the relinquishing of all views.  
For whoever emptiness becomes a view  
That one will accomplish nothing (MMK XIII:8).  
 
I prostrate to Gautama  
Who, through compassion  
Taught the true doctrine  
Which leads to the relinquishing of all views. (MMK XXVII:30) 
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Heidegger said in 1971  “I would like to dissuade you from the literature on Heidegger” (4). 
Exactly  unless we have a ‘matter for thought” (Zur Sache des Denkens); that is Heidegger’s own 
internal struggle (shadows) with metaphysics.  ietzsche wrote that  “Buddhism is the only 
positivistic religion in history; even in its epistemology (a strict phenomenalism)… (6)”. How 
much the later Heidegger (after 1939) is still engage in some form of descriptive phenomenology 
of the world like the Buddhist is still open to thinking? From an Appendix from 1964 for 
Phenomenology and Theology  Heidegger says  “One should avoid the impression that dogmatic 
theses are being stated in terms of a Heideggerian philosophy  when there is no such thing.” (et  
p. 55). So, by 1964 there is nothing like a Heideggerian philosophy  
The director of the conference, Professor Albert Borgmann, has translated the letter he received 
from Martin Heidegger regarding the Conference as follows:  
“It is a great honor to have your letter of June  3. I want to thank you and the other gentlemen 
for your interest in my work. That you together with colleagues from Japan are planning a 
conference in honor of my eightieth birthday, deserves special thanks on my part. Again and 
again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take place with the thinkers of what is to us the 
Eastern world. The greatest difficulty in this enterprise always lies, as far as I can see, in the fact 
that with few exceptions there is no command of the Eastern languages either in Europe or in the 
United States. A translation of Eastern thought into English, on the other hand, remains-as does 
every translation- an expedient. May your conference prove fruitful in spite of this unfortunate 
circumstance. It is extremely kind of you to offer me all the conveniences necessary for 
participation at this meeting in Hawaii. But-as you rightly supposed-I can- not undertake this trip 
at my age ... Please express to your colleagues my gratitude and give them my best wishes for a 
fruitful dialogue. With most cordial regards to you and the other gentlemen. signed by Martin 
Heidegger.” 
 
THE END or PERHAPS just some space for you – the reader and thinker who are self-
attempters.  
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